text:
The Degeneration of the Nation

An Essay on the Four Postulates of Learning

Learning is the future: A very brief essay that analyzes learning into its components and characterizes them - according to the four rules developed in the concluding Netanya seminar. The essay before us parallels them to the four main branches of philosophy, which receive a learning version: The philosophy of language is replaced by the philosophy of learning, ethics is transformed into the ethics of learning, epistemology is formulated as learning epistemology and aesthetics as learning aesthetics. This is how it's done: Learning about learning

By: The Diligent Student

Wittgenstein, behind you (Source)

What is a learning system? We'll agree that the solar system is not a learning system. But - why isn't the solar system a learning system? Well, let's note that what characterizes learning is change, and the solar system maintains its state, and the stars continue to revolve. But if so, then there is also change in the solar system - the stars continue to revolve. If so, perhaps learning is a change in change itself - a second-order change? Or third? And so on? But such changes also exist in the solar system, there is acceleration. And perhaps in learning the change includes surprise, and is not predictable but open? But even in the solar system such changes can occur, and even one-time developments, like a comet falling into the sun, or surprising ones like the appearance of an object from outside the system. And if the change needs to be something not known in advance that has a substantial impact, then it's possible that a new and dark planet could be caught in the sun's gravitational pull, whose influence on the system is only noticeable in the long term, but it accumulates to an enormous impact (and if this isn't a revelation of a secret, what is?). And if we characterize learning as development, meaning as something that is built, or as purposeful development, as something that is built towards a goal, then the solar system also developed in its creation (the gas disk turned into stars, all the asteroids fell into the stars, etc.), and it is also developing today towards its end. The sun is constantly expanding and heating more and more distant planets - and in another billion years Earth will no longer be suitable for life due to heat and Mars will warm to Earth's current temperature. But perhaps it's not about adaptive development, which responds to the environment, or there's no optimization here? In fact, its development can also be described as an adaptive and responsive process, since objects that come from outside and are caught in it eventually fall into one of the objects in it, and even its initial development was such that after many collisions from countless objects, few large objects were created, with relatively orderly oscillations (anything that didn't - collided or left the system's boundaries sooner or later) - in fact it became a more and more orderly place over time. And is the solar system really not a learning system? After all, this text was written in the solar system. Is there no learning in it?

Why distinguish the Earth system, or life on Earth, or humans, or even myself, from the solar system? What constitutes the difference between them? Is it the impact, meaning I am negligible in the solar system, but if in the future we blow up the Earth (or, as sometimes suggested, the Moon), will the solar system already learn? And perhaps we'll argue that there's no importance in all these distinctions, but that these are different degrees of learning. If we insist - we'll claim that even a falling stone is a learning system of degree zero, or very low. And maybe one day physicists will actually use an interpretation of learning for the laws of nature, or find learning behavior within string theory (say), and indeed gravity will be explained through learning interaction, and the stone will actually learn about the body pulling it in its fall? If so, what is the meaning at all of high-degree learning versus low-degree?

Is all this just in the eye of the beholder, namely the learner, namely in my eyes? Isn't this a regression to epistemology? Does learning limit us, by its nature, to the learning system itself that we are in? (After all - we cannot know or understand anything except through learning, in a kind of learning version of Kant). Is there anything objective at all that constitutes learning, or does every text constitute learning of its own, and every learning process is limited to its own learning, without the ability to say anything about general learning? Isn't there a regression to ontology in such a question, in Greek style? Isn't there in the struggle of definitions in this text, in a parodic Wittgensteinian style, a regression of learning to the method of language?

The First Postulate: Learning Will Replace Language

Well, as those who are not philosophers of language, we will not ask what is the meaning of learning, or of a learning system, and we will not be interested in its definition. In fact, it's not a particularly interesting exercise in the general sense. As learners, we will not ask about the meaning of the sentence "the solar system is a learning system", or its correctness, but we will ask whether it is interesting. Does it open a door to learning? And is all this investigation interesting, meaning does it teach us? Is this idea, that the solar system is a learning system, or that it isn't, and this investigation, is it innovative? Or is it a repetition of Wittgenstein as an exercise in learning his philosophy? Or perhaps - does it contain within it new philosophical learning? And if so, what is the innovation, or the new opening for innovation that has opened? How does this advance us?

This certainly depends on what learning process we are in. For example, if we are learning to write a poem, and we write "the solar system is a learning system", then this could be an opening for a parodic poem about the philosophy of learning. And if we are in the context of physical learning, perhaps this could give us new ideas about the development of the solar system, and new tools - learning ones - in its conceptualization. And the exact same thing if we are engaged in philosophical learning: Is this investigation interesting as a new philosophical method of investigation, or perhaps as a new argument? Or is it an imitative investigation, meaning of low learning value? In any case, we are unable to detach ourselves from the learning process we are in, and we discover that what matters to us is interest.

And it turns out, as Wittgenstein understood well, that his investigations are quite foolish, and not much new is learned from them, and there is no great interest in defining whether the solar system learns or not. It's a kind of children's game that stems from the fact that it's difficult to define things, because concepts are ultimately vague, without clear boundaries, and this thing itself stems from the fact that concepts were not given to us from heaven anyway (or according to unwritten game rules), but are constantly changing in the process of learning language. In fact, at the beginning of this text it was clear to us that the solar system does not learn, and we only needed to clarify to ourselves why, and at its end we might actually consider that it is a learning system, and this is because this text created a change in the idea of learning in our minds, and turned it from a limited idea familiar to us in a certain context - to a broader and more abstract and more philosophical idea (and this without defining it at all).

But if so, how can we still say interesting things about learning? ...if not through conceptual investigation? How can we learn about learning? And after all, learning about learning has value and interest - because it assists learning itself, and in fact this is the essence of philosophy. Well, we need to examine different learning processes in different learning systems - and characterize them. We need to create learning aids - and learning assistants. We even need to learn how to improve learning - to be the organizational consultants of learning in the world. And in this we need to find learning failures and characterize them, like the definitional investigative Wittgensteinian failure.

A learning philosopher does not try to define the undefinable, but tries to innovate new definitions, to conceptualize new conceptualizations. He is not the conservative of language but its creator. A philosopher's success was never in defining something existing, because there are holes in every definition and a definition was never found for anything and a solution to any philosophical problem, but in inventing new concepts, and finding new problems, and most importantly - new ways of learning (therefore: Wittgenstein in his time a giant, Wittgenstein in our time a dwarf, and so are all those who are small Wittgensteinians who continue to follow him). A learning philosopher does not try to prove his arguments and claims, but to learn them. The proof is a pretense of necessary learning, and mistakenly became the standard in philosophy, but proof at its best is just learning a way to go - a form of argument, or method (at best).

Therefore the best thing a philosopher can do is not to be Spinoza - meaning not to hide his true method in a false method (say, geometric). We read Spinoza without reading his proofs and he did not provide an interesting argument (interesting proofs) but interesting claims (interesting propositions). We learned nothing from his geometry for philosophy except what not to do. A philosopher is required to be honest and document the true learning through which he arrived at his philosophy (as long as it is interesting and something new is learned from it) - including the errors he went through along the way - because only from this do we learn to do philosophy, and learn his method firsthand (and not secondhand through his polished arguments - polishing is hiding the way the tool was created). A good philosopher is a teacher of a new method - and not of a new doctrine.

The main problem with philosophers is that they learn from mathematics as a field of abstract thinking, and therefore are interested in definitions and proofs. But even in mathematics itself the definition is nothing but a learning aid, which allows learning some concept, and the purpose of the proof is not only to prove a specific theorem, but to be a tool that the learner can use to prove other theorems with its mechanism. This is how mathematics really works - as a field of learning, not as a logical field. In fact, logic is a Spinozist presentation, which often happens after the historical mathematical learning itself, because initially the definitions are dirty - see infinitesimal calculus - and only in a refinement process of hundreds of years do they become the crystal that the Spinozists teach today in Calculus 1. Even modern precise definitions are usually later formulations, generalized, beautiful, not to mention the proofs that undergo amazing simplification and shortening processes, while turning sequences of claims into general concepts and structures and mechanisms, on the way to becoming a beautiful truth that descended from heaven at Sinai.

Therefore, although there is a sequence of claims here, it is not a proof sequence, but a learning sequence: building a new worldview - this is what philosophy does. Along the way it of course clears and destroys the previous picture with a critical method, but this is usually not particularly difficult, because every child knows that it's easy to destroy a tower and difficult to build. Why? Because the stones in the tower are indeed one above the other, meaning built, but they do not prove or force each other. Because philosophy builds in its learning, but does not prove anything, and any philosophical child can read the greatest philosopher and find countless holes in his claims. And even if a certain philosopher does screw his claims as a necessity to each other, like a Lego building and not from cubes, and let's say he even manages to glue them to each other - the child will be able to knock down the entire tower in one blow even if he doesn't dismantle it, because you can always disagree with the basic assumptions. Even if you connect a philosophical tower to the floor with a nail - the situation in philosophy is that you can disagree with the floor itself in a second and turn it over, and propose a new floor. Therefore what matters is the beauty of the tower. And this is the reason people are interested in philosophy and want to believe in it - not because it forces them, but because it attracts them. Like a girl (or like the Torah). And because it is interesting and learned, meaning: more beautiful towers can be built on it. And Spinoza built a beautiful tower.

Therefore, we must propose a learning theory of learning, otherwise we will fall into internal contradiction, if for example we propose a Wittgensteinian linguistic theory of it. We can learn our theory of learning for example from many learning cases, and find what is common between them, in the hope that this conceptualization will benefit learning itself. But this conceptualization will necessarily not be final, and if someone finds a new and more effective learning method - it will change the conceptualization. The conceptualization itself is a learning conceptualization. There is no final conceptualization in the world - and the end of any final, non-learning conceptualization is to be a false conceptualization.

But even more than learning from the places where learning works well, the conceptualization must learn from learning failures - because as one whose purpose is to assist learning, its external definition of learning is its limitation, which is not necessarily beneficial to it, and it is artificial. If we want to assist learning, then our conceptualization does not stem from the purpose of conceptualization in itself, as if this is what is expected of philosophy, but it is instrumental and helpful. Therefore the right place to start it is in places where learning does not succeed, because there we will surely help, and by conceptualizing the failures we will help remove them. And if we can improve learning and deepen it even where it succeeds, then this will be a particularly helpful helpful conceptualization. That is - the purpose of conceptualization (any conceptualization and not just philosophical!) is to help learning. Conceptualization is a scaffold of a tower - meaning our tower (as a meta-tower) is a tower of scaffolds for other towers, which helps them not to fall, and in the best case even a tall crane, which helps them grow taller.

But why is there necessarily a connection between the scaffold and the crane? Aren't these two different functions, for which there are different conceptualizations? Isn't there a difference between helping those with learning disabilities learn more and helping the gifted learn more? Therefore we need to distinguish apparently between two kinds of conceptualizations: one against failures, which is restrictive, and the other for achievements, which is opening. Aren't these two aids contradictory, and as aids isn't it better that they be separate? Why does the negative definition, the negating one, need to be attached to the positive definition, the affirming one, if these are not logical definitions but only aids? Is organizational consulting for a failing organization similar to organizational consulting for a successful organization?

The Second Postulate: Inside - Learning is Inside the System

The answer is that it is much harder than it seems to distinguish between the two situations, the one where correction is needed and the one where encouragement is needed (and there is no direct connection between them and situations of failure or success), and an aid tool that can help in one can harm in the other. In fact, the assumption that we know from the outside, outside the tower, what is right for the tower, meaning that we have some ability to perceive the tower from the outside in the learning process - is the most common and severe learning failure. We are not external consultants standing outside the tower, in any learning process, but we are inside the tower. The learner uses any aid given to him - from within. If we define here any aid tool (including any possible sentence we write for his use), the learner will always be able to use it only as part of a learning process, without direct access to the solution that is (perhaps!) outside. He cannot skip learning, and if we skip for him then this is not learning, but dictating the solution. And we ourselves are always within learning. And even as philosophers. The thought that we can be teachers of the world is an arrogant thought, and anti-learning. Philosophers need to understand that they too are students. Maybe wise students, skilled and with a passion for learning, but not teachers. Learning can only be done from within.

Therefore assistance to the learner can only be from the learner's own point of view. And if the learner is mistaken or actually succeeding in the direction he chose to develop in - only he can learn this. And if he does not know this, and is mistaken between the two possibilities, we will not be able to help him if we offer him a crane to raise the tower when he actually needs a scaffold to strengthen it - and vice versa. We may actually cause a bigger learning mistake - and the collapse of the tower. Therefore it is not up to us to regulate learning, and we cannot learn instead of the learner or for him, but only explain to him that he needs both a scaffold and a crane, and that he himself cannot see his learning from the outside - and the conclusions that follow from this. The very nature of learning is such that there are no proofs from within, no definitions at the boundaries, and no view from the outside - otherwise there would be no need for learning, and this would not be learning.

Learning happens in situations where you don't know how to solve them - what you already know you don't learn. Teachers do not teach, but provide learning aids - and learning takes place within the learner. A book, for example, is a learning aid, and not the content of learning (different things can be learned from a book). And also a lesson. Teaching is an illusion, and there are only tutoring lessons - because a lesson can be given, but if the student does not learn, learning has not occurred. Even a parent to an infant can only help his child learn, and cannot forcibly teach him - and if the child is unable to learn, not on us, then the parent will not be able to help. You cannot force anyone to learn - not other nations, and not your spouse (in fact war is an attempt at mutual teaching - hence its destructiveness).

Forced learning from the outside is not learning, but training and programming, and indeed it is done towards those who are unable to learn, such as an animal or a computer. And if it is done towards someone who is capable of learning - then it is the paradigmatic example of the immoral. The reason that murder, rape and theft are immoral is the external coercion, from outside the learning system. The wrong is an action by force on the system from outside the system, meaning a change that is not learning, and therefore there is no respect for the internal space of the learner (which is within itself - and this is important to emphasize - a learning system). Thus for example betrayal and lying and invasion of privacy and brainwashing and manipulation and oppression and violence are an external change made in you, which does not stem from your learning, of your internal system, and deny you your freedom - meaning your ability to learn. The crime is the invasion of your black box, in which learning takes place, and change in it with tools external to the system, which are not part of the system.

If we are for example within the system of painting development as painters, meaning within the learning of painting (or any other field), and someone comes and inserts an external consideration (for example money. Or a consideration that is not of the artistic matter - for example political. Or a consideration that is not mathematical, in learning mathematics - for example emotion) then this is learning corruption and in a severe case also moral. The more external the intervention is in the system, and disrupts its learning tools, the more anti-learning it is - and its damages to learning are greater. For example: systematic bribery. Or random beating of the learner - random cruelty is more severe than cruelty that is exaggeration of feedback above any need (and above what is effective for learning), because it is more harmful to learning (and therefore terrorism is more severe than fighting). But also too much and random positive feedback (like constant praise) is anti-learning and corrupt. Everything that tries to bypass the learning system and its tools, and its learning interface with the outside - and to influence the system directly from within is anti-learning. Like doing a child's homework for them - they didn't learn anything. And certainly what tries to eradicate the internal learning space is anti-moral, while the moral act is to expand it - learning expands the learning space and does not reduce it (therefore finding a new proof in mathematics is a moral act! And so is any learning breakthrough. Also new philosophy). The categorical imperative is learning. Therefore learning is the moral parameter (morality is a matter of measure - and learning is the correct ruler).

Therefore, it is impossible to perform any immoral act towards what is not a learning system, and regarding learning systems - the question is how much they learn. For example, the learning of a computer or bacterium or even a mosquito will not seem to us to be of great value, while a human is a learning system of much greater value. But the destruction of a culture, people or entire species with learning abilities or an entire galaxy will seem to us a greater crime even than the murder of a person, because the learning there is greater. The murder of a person who is about to die, when he will no longer perform learning, is less severe than the murder of a baby whose entire learning is ahead of him, but a fetus has not yet become a significant learning system. Lies and betrayal are manipulations (and if the lie is about something that doesn't matter to you, that is, a white lie, there is no crime in it), and therefore they are not an erasure of all your learning like murder, but they are a change with an anti-learning component within you. But in contrast, ongoing deception is more severe, and control through addiction is more severe, and full brainwashing is more severe, while physical coercion is even more severe. We see how the harm to learning corresponds to the intensity of evil in the act, where the worst possible act is the destruction of the universe, and the best is its creation - which begins all learning. This is not coincidental, because our moral hierarchy as learning systems stems from learning itself as the only value. Learning is who we are.

Therefore, humans create enormous learning systems. And therefore the destruction of the economy or art, for example, as enormous learning systems, or the burning of the Library of Alexandria - are enormous crimes, on a scale even greater than killing a person. The murder of Einstein, at the peak of his learning power, is a much more severe murder than that of an ordinary person. Why, for example, is rape more severe than theft? Because the penetration in rape into the system is much deeper and more irreversible than in theft. Because what is forced is precisely the element of choice, that is, learning, innermost to the system in its evolutionary learning. Pain in itself is not a reason for morality, although pain by coercion can affect the system from the outside, and therefore be immoral. To the same extent, even pleasure caused without consent, to the extent that it enslaves the system (let's imagine such a drug) is immoral. And this is also the reason why slavery is a terrible thing and work is not - because work goes through learning and respects the inner system of the person, and slavery bypasses it and nullifies the inner system. This is the meaning of turning a person into an object. And if it becomes possible to break into the human brain, it is an even more severe sin.

But heaven forbid we should draw from this the conclusions of progressive education, for one who does not teach sins against learning no less - he sins both against the learning of culture and against the learning of the child. In fact, if the teacher has no access to the learner's interior - and should not have (one who treats the inner learning algorithm as his own is a programmer and not a teacher) - then he has no way of knowing for certain if he has taught, but only if he has created a learning aid, that is, learning possibilities. Just as I as a writer have no way to force the reader to learn what is written here, and he can remain impervious to it and locked in a critical position (in the case of the learning refuser), or perhaps in a better case learn completely different things from it. Writing is only a learning aid, both for me and for him - it creates an opportunity for him. In fact, if I had caught him and put him in a re-education camp where he had to regurgitate what I wrote, or founded a philosophical cult - then certainly no learning would have taken place here, but anti-learning. Learning by its nature requires doubt, and freedom is the inaccessibility of the inner system from the outside, that is, the secret. The moral demands that you do not know, and therefore the teacher is himself learning to teach. He is always learning how to teach the student. There is no recipe for teaching.

Since morality is created from learning (personal, social, evolutionary, etc.) we can see it as a guide - a learning aid - to distance ourselves from the thing most harmful to learning. When there is no process accessible to us outside of learning, then learning is not only our epistemology, but also our ethics (and also our aesthetics, our ontology, our political theory, and our philosophy of religion, as can be shown). There is, in fact, nothing for us outside of learning. We have no other internal process, alternative - all neurons learn, they are all part of a learning system. We have no external perspective whatsoever on learning. We are learning.

The Third Postulate: Direction - Learning is Unidirectional

Since we approach the world and ourselves only through learning, not only do we have no access to the necessary internal causality of our development and processes within us (as if we were software and procedure), we also have no external description of them. We cannot dismantle the tower of ourselves - because we are built from it. We are the tower of ourselves. And every action, even an action of dismantling, will be performed by us, that is, by the tower (even suicide will not be its final dismantling, but only destruction). We have no access to what operates us from behind us, which is our entire learning history. We have no ability to look back, only to continue to be operated by it, to continue to learn forward. We have no eyes in the back, and even if we look back, then our back will turn behind us. Our desire to look at ourselves from the outside is equivalent to the desire of a hand puppet to meet the hand behind it that turns it. The learning process of which our current state is only one stage exists behind us in time, but not in space. We are not able to see even one step back, because we have no causal access to ourselves, but only learning access to the future, and in particular to our own future. We have no ability to see the past but only to turn to the future (we can remember the past, as a special case of future learning, in which we use memory for learning). The memory in our brain is a state in the present learning of the system, and in fact does not reflect the past, but what we learn from the past for the future. The past behind us is dead and inaccessible to us, and therefore time always moves forward - because we are learning towards the future.

Therefore, we must remove any explanation of our learning and also any description of it, and choose a synthesis between them - Direction. The explanation is suitable for one who has access to his own past, and is not aware of the unidirectionality of learning, while the description is suitable for one who deludes himself that he can see himself from the outside, and does not understand the property of the internality of learning. Only Direction is both unidirectional and internal, and therefore suitable for conceptualizing learning choice. This conceptualization is necessarily partial, because Direction is not a cause. It is like a learning aid, it is a sign to go in a certain direction, but the sign is not the cause of walking, and also not a description of the walking process, it is something that helped the choice. Therefore learning has only aids, and not instructions. Why is Direction unidirectional? Because it appears at a junction where there are many possibilities, and it disqualifies some, for example those that turn left, but does not say which of those turning right to go. And if we go back, we arrived at this junction from many possibilities, and we have no ability to find our way back and our route using the signage.

A more mathematical image is a one-way function. Indeed, we can calculate it in one direction - but not in the opposite direction. It is accessible to Direction but not to reconstruction. Thus there can be something that indeed directs us in a certain direction (and useful! not arbitrary), but we will not be able to reconstruct the process backwards, or reverse it - but we will be able to evaluate this Direction in the future according to its results for example. Another image is evolution. As organisms we know how to develop further, and choose with whom to reproduce (these preferences and mechanisms are ingrained in us), but we have no idea within us how we developed until now. We have no awareness of the mechanisms that push us from within, and our genes, but we can still perform very sophisticated and very interesting (and successful!) learning in choosing a mate and raising children. Culture, in fact, is not aware of what created it, and artificial memory aids, such as historians, need to be used to offer reconstruction. But even without them culture would develop, from its internal learning mechanisms. Learning from the past is a must - not so the past itself.

Therefore causal thinking is doomed to failure, and everything that seems to us as causes is always Directions, because if there was a cause, that is, a necessity, there would be no learning but action. Therefore, the self-perception of a learning system (from the outside it may look different, and therefore an outside perspective should be rejected) is always of Directions for learning, and not mechanical causes for a course of action, as in nature. And if we say that a cause made us - we mean Direction. Therefore always (even philosophers) cite as many reasons as possible for a claim - after all, if even one cause was correct and sufficient it would be enough, while only in Directions is there sense in multiplicity (and in attacking from many angles, as we are doing now). Causes exist only for a computer - because its innards are open to us. If we could see the cause - it means we could see ourselves from the outside. But in fact, we have no ability of mental vision at all, and this is just an illusion (a kind of learning method within us that is built like vision) - and we only have the ability to learn unidirectionally from the present to the future. We always take the next step, and even going back is the next step.

We cannot enter into the apparatus that is ourselves and look at it from within and say: this is the reason why it acted this way. And to the same extent we cannot detach from the apparatus that is ourselves and describe it from the outside, or find the internal cause from the outside, or the external description from within. Philosophy unfortunately has not really come out of the description according to which man is deep in a cave within the world, and from within it he sees and learns the world, and therefore he has a fundamental inaccessibility to the outside (and this cave can also be language). Learning teaches that the cave is not between us and the world: behind us - the cave.

But this cave is not a mine, and we cannot extract from what is behind us our unconscious, for example, or the hidden assumptions of language. There is no space within us, only time. Only the previous learning. The gap between us and the world, which created the idea of the cave in the first place, stems from the fact that man is time that exists within space - and there is a fundamental gap between time and space.

And what are the roots of time and space? Space is a space of possibilities, and time is a sequence of learning. To move between possibilities means: simulation of space. Thus you examine within you different learning possibilities and create a mental space (which is completely similar in your spirit to physical space - not for nothing comes the expression virtual space). The problem of learning is the impossibility of seeing your own nape - as opposed to the problem of seeing without glasses, which is the problem of the cave (even if the glasses are language).

But, if we are precise - you don't see anything anyway, even vision itself is a misleading cave-like conceptualization (and epistemological). You only build possibilities (as opposed to proofs). Understanding is not correct looking or correct picture or a view that imposes itself on you - understanding is building. And such building is always a possibility among building possibilities, and not a necessary building, which you deduce - and therefore understood. You have no access to your nape from which you can progress based on solid justification, there is no basis behind you but a cave - there is no space there that you can tour but time that has passed. And therefore any progress forward is not proof. It is learning.

The idea of man as a proof and justification machine is not correct and too rigid and limiting (internal causality), but also the idea of him as a language machine alone leaves without end playful degrees of freedom and misses the essence of man (external description) - and what is true for man is true for any learning system. Both descriptions are thesis and antithesis, while learning is a possibility growing from between them. Not without freedom like causality and not arbitrary like language, because learning is based on partial foundation. I learned something new *according to* something previous, and not *because of* something previous (as a necessity). The previous something enabled the new - did not necessitate it. Even a mathematician who learned and found a mathematical proof - if he tries to reconstruct to absolute precision all the details of the steps that led him to the solution will eventually encounter a black block. He had of course all kinds of signs along the way that helped him, and he will be able to point to them, but there was nothing that forced the learning of the proof (as opposed to the proof itself), and on another day he might have proved something else, or gotten stuck. In every progress, there were always dark parts of unexplained and unnecessary jumps over an abyss between the bright and clear parts to the learner.

The scientific idea of necessary internal causality in a system (or in a person) is actually the idea of computer software - a necessary procedure moving within you where each step determines the next step. On the other hand, the idea of language is actually the idea of computer language - a space of possibilities determined by means of language. But the important idea is precisely computer learning, which is between the infinity of possibilities of programming the software to its programmed operation. Every piece of information or Direction to a learning algorithm does not determine its operation, but directs it in a certain direction. It will try to change according to it, but there are countless ways to change according to it. Nothing forces learning. Therefore it has only aids - helping someone to do by themselves is superior to doing instead of them, and one should always leave freedom to the learner (learning and partial freedom is the ideal - and not absolute freedom). The vulgar postmodernist mistake is deriving absolute interpretive freedom from infinite possibilities, due to lack of the idea of direction.

Therefore in a learning view of language, meaning is not fixed, and also not free for our play like Derrida, but shows direction. And therefore if we chose a certain direction through it we cannot say that it forced us, but only helped us - it changed the space of possibilities (opened some, closed some). We can never blame the other - it's not because of your wife. Your responsibility. We can never blame our teachers or our parents, despite their influence on us - because we are students, and not robots on one hand, or word processors on the other hand (that is, an enabling linguistic system only and not learning, like internet protocols). We were not written and not written in - we are the ones who read them. Our teachers are no different from books - they are learning aids. We should thank our teachers only for the possibilities they opened and closed for us - and not for the necessity (learning ideas will solve the conceptual problems of the field of psychology stemming from its movement between explanation and description). Closing possibilities is not a necessity, but it is a negative Direction: go right means do not go left. But dragging you forcefully to the right is anti-learning.

The possible is superior to the necessary. The common mistake in philosophy is the thought that mathematics deals with the necessary, but it deals with the possible. The axioms are the enabler, and mathematics checks what they enable, and if there is a contradiction it finds it, and if the possibility is not interesting - it refines the axioms until they create an interesting system. The problem with contradiction is not the contradiction itself, for example as a metaphysical problem, as if we committed a cosmic sin and lightning will strike us from the heavens, but simply that contradiction creates an uninteresting possibility. That is, contradiction is not just anti-logical but anti-learning, and more precisely the meaning of it being anti-logical is its anti-learning, because logic is a learning system. In fact, one of the great promises in mathematics of the 21st century is to find the learning parallels of the linguistic ideas of the 20th century, and for example to establish mathematics on methods in a learning system - instead of on sentences in a logical system. To cancel its playful side in favor of a learning-developmental side. After all, just as we built the foundations of mathematics on language, we can build it on learning. And then we can find learning in all branches of mathematics - learning of manifolds, learning of groups, learning of functions etc. (and reinterpret concepts such as limit and derivative in a more generalized learning-developmental way, thus finding new topology).

In any case, the current mathematical definitions of learning (for example Probably Approximately Correct and learning of concepts - which are defined as subsets of the example space) are not sufficient (at least general learning of algorithms is needed). Therefore, a supreme task imposed on mathematics in the coming century is to find a definition for learning that will clarify it and make it useful in all branches of mathematics (and perhaps even be able to induce new understanding in philosophy). Since learning is a building process, theorems about what cannot be learned will become impossibility theorems, which are always difficult theorems to prove in mathematics, and thus learning will be able to help solve open problems in various branches. The main hope is that theorems about which efficient algorithms cannot be learned will allow a new approach to proving P!=NP. That is, the way in which mathematics can benefit philosophy (and vice versa) passes through learning inspiration and not formal, and not through formalism - as in the language period. In fact, learning can induce mathematics in which proof is identical not to a linguistic text, but to learning how to prove, to an algorithm that knows how to prove. And of course learning mathematics will also have an influence on physics and other sciences. Instead of physics of laws we can build physics of methods for example. And biology certainly suits mathematics of learning more than mathematics of laws. And thus learning economics is also possible etc. And finally the whole idea of causality will change even within science - and in every other system. And learning will be perceived as more basic - and finally more intuitive and natural - than causality.

The idea of causality is actually supposed to say why this and not otherwise, and also why it must be so. But Direction succeeds in saying why this and not otherwise - without the unnecessary addition of why it must be so, because it answers the question from within learning and not from outside, and within learning Direction is sufficient. We do not need forcing causes, that is, extra-learning, to justify this or that learning choice, but intra-learning causes, that is, Directions (like considerations in Talmud study do not need to hold as inference in mathematical logic, but according to what is legally accepted). In fact this is exactly the learning idea: the understanding that we are in a learning system, and according to the learning process we performed we reached a conclusion, is sufficient to justify the conclusion, out of understanding that there is no other way, and if we reach another conclusion - this too will happen only through further learning (like in court they don't really prove, but bring evidence-Directions, and it works, and is also not arbitrary). The cause is a force that pushes in a certain direction, and Direction is just a certain direction, while learning is just the force, and its flow according to the Direction is sufficient justification for why we got here (and not there). There is no metaphysical justification from heaven for what we learned, because it is not in heaven, and in earthly learning, that is, within the system, this is how it works - and it's okay. Just as Kant understood that even without metaphysical access directly into the world it's okay. Learning is okay. And no more is needed. And no more can be.

The Connection Between the Three General Postulates

I wrote this entire part in the middle of the night when I couldn't sleep, and now in the morning I'm both tired and don't know how to get out of it, but a scholar won't hide this. And it seems to me that the proper title for those engaged in the philosophy of learning is student of philosophy (equivalent to the Talmudic scholar in Talmud). Unlike all the philosophers who wanted to be teachers - we want to be students and establish the society of learners. Any engagement with learning from within philosophy about the world also has an inseparable aspect of learning within philosophy, precisely because learning is always within the system. Therefore, all philosophy can be seen as meta-philosophy, because philosophical learning will always be meta-philosophical learning. In a trivial sense this is also true for other fields - every painting is both learning about the world and learning about what painting is. Because all learning is also a demonstration of method. This symmetric property is the duality of demonstration: it demonstrates the thing itself but also the method, and it stems from the fact that every learning example is a Direction, meaning it can be taken towards the thing itself or towards the method, depending on how one wants to learn (and the deep student understands that these two things are sides of the same coin and actually unite in his mind into one supreme and abstract - and necessarily more philosophical - meaning).

What distinguishes and defines philosophy is a more intimate connection between philosophy and meta-philosophy, and in fact their unification and equality. Philosophy is defined as what applying this dual operator (of meta-X) equals itself - it is the fixed point of the operator (meta-X=X). In it there is no difference between the method and the method of the method. Otherwise there would be an infinite regression here (the method of the method of the method of...). That is, if we start from development in a certain field, and rise to its method, and from there to the method of its method, and so on, we quickly reach philosophy, whose method is identical to itself - the method of philosophy is philosophy. It's like a series of natural numbers (polynomial) where we want to know its pattern, between every two numbers above it we write their derivative - that is, the difference between them, and above every two differences the difference between them, and so on, until we reach a simple methodical pattern of constant difference, and above this pattern we reach a zeroing difference and in all the levels above it to infinity. Therefore every philosophical claim is also a claim about the history of philosophy and its future - about learning in it. And philosophy too is a system in which learning is trapped. One cannot get out of philosophical learning. That is, one can but then it's no longer philosophy. This is actually the connection between the first and second postulate: why is replacing language with learning related to the learning interiority (we are looking for connections in the network and not necessary derivation, as scholars)? Because in philosophy itself learning means that one cannot get out of philosophy, while language means that there is nothing inside philosophy. In language philosophy is only a framework, and in learning it is only content.

And what is the connection between the second and third postulate? That just as one cannot claim that because everything is within language then language is disconnected from the world (the postmodernist fallacy, which parallels the solipsistic position in epistemology), but simply everything is expressed in it, so one cannot claim that because everything is within learning then learning is disconnected from the world - but simply everything is learned in it. Precisely the understanding that the cave is within you - is what allows you to solve the problem of the cave externally: how do you learn about the world, how does the world affect internal learning. Because there is no justification here but only Direction, and because the world is ultimately inside your cave - it enters into your learning. For example, a process takes place within you where your brain learns from a certain datum. The external is expressed in internal learning, but only learning is accessible to you, not the world. You cannot justify it - certainly, because you cannot justify learning. The epistemological problem is the problem of one who demands learning to be justification and proof - and physics to be mathematics, and man to be nature according to science. Man works according to nature and the laws of science, but his learning works according to methods. Just as a learning algorithm works according to the laws of the computer, processor and software - and yet it is not a fixed algorithm but an adaptive learning algorithm. Because what matters is not what happens at the level outside the system (for example quantum mechanics in brain particles) but the learning dynamics of the brain. We can go backwards in the learning sequence only as learning moves - to say: I learned this because of this - and not as causal moves - to say: because of this thought came the next thought. The first statement is within the learning system and the second is outside it. The laws of nature are outside our system (we learned them indirectly!), just as a computer would have to indirectly learn its processor capabilities and structure. It has no direct access to what it is - its logic, but if it learns then there exists a (logical!) space in which it has access to learning considerations and choice of options according to experience. That is, there exists a space of Directions within which it is located. And Direction by its nature - unlike cause - is unidirectional. In cause one can logically go backwards, and it forces forward, and in Direction there is none of this - its power is in its weakness.

Learning is strong precisely because it manages to give Direction, which is neither obligation nor arbitrariness. Do you know why I loved? Because of an apple. Not because of the apple, but also not arbitrarily, but with the help of the apple. For no one knows the path of the spirit. Therefore there is no reason for love, but it is also not blind, and this can be said about every choice in life (although love is the most complex learning choice in evolution, because it is the most important choice in it, and therefore the question of why you loved raises confusion). Indeed there were Directions that led to love, but they are like attraction and desire, that is, they only pointed to a direction and did not point to the goal. Therefore learning always has many arguments that bring, like a network of Directions. And this is the type of content that really exists in the world, when you want something that has real content, and not just external form, then you discover that the content itself is not some material, but partial form, that is Direction - and usually a very rich collection of Directions, like a book. That is, the content is not made of countless small particles (like bits of information for example), but of countless small forms (each of which shows a direction, and all together can show a path, or document learning).

Unlike the rules of the language game, and unlike free play, learning has no rules but also no abandonment - it has methods and methodologies, that is, something that allows a new state in the system from a previous state, like a function. The rules are like axioms, for example the structure of the space of possibilities, but what gives mathematical content is the functions within it, which change the possibilities. Functions give a dynamic dimension but they are not procedures, that is, they do not create a predefined sequence of actions, but create a whole space of functions, of possibilities for change, that is, they are like Directions. A function for example tells you right. And there are also functions of functions, that is, like methods, functions that create functions from other functions, or Directions of Directions. For example combining two functions or adding random mutation (these for example are methods in evolutionary learning).

Only because we are learning systems, we can understand how learning looks from within the system - as free choice. The concept of freedom is a concept we would not have reached if we were not learning systems, and the fact that we are trapped within a system with this strange concept shows that we are in learning, because it is essentially unidirectionality. One cannot reduce my learning backwards to causes or even to rules just as one cannot reduce evolution to the rules of evolution, because many things happened in evolution, and in another evolution with the same rules other things would happen. Therefore evolution is also its specific content, which consists of countless Directions along the way (for example: watch out, lion! Tasty, strawberry). Just as our brain is perhaps identical to the brain of ancient man but its learning is completely different because of the different culture, which is the array of Directions within which the brain grew.

Therefore there is much to say in a learning process, to discuss it (the very possibility of discussion - which is not instructions - is made possible thanks to Directions), and to teach it, without anyone understanding how it works. We can learn in a very interesting way without knowing the algorithms of the brain, and live in an interesting way without knowing the algorithms of evolution. A person can be a great artist or great scholar without ever wondering about his method. And precisely a complete understanding of the algorithms will uproot learning, because learning from the outside is not interesting, like a child whose parent solves the problem for him and doesn't let him cope - then he doesn't learn. Therefore teachers present questions to students - and not just answers. Learning requires respect for the black box - while domineering is an attempt to break into it. This is the difference between a good parent and a bad parent - and between a free state and a totalitarian one. The role of a parent as its name implies is - instruction. To teach the child (not just raise him, care for him, or entertain him - all these are merely teaching aids). This is the reason there is childhood at all - so that the brain learns culture. Otherwise we would be born adults. Lack of understanding of what learning is is the cause of the education crisis that rolled into the cultural crisis, because the philosophy is not correct - and from it incorrect methods are derived and from them incorrect actions are derived.

Therefore philosophy, despite being ethereal and abstract, often turns out to be the most important factor in history - as the fundamental factor. Its power is nil, no one reads it, but it is located at the top of the learning hierarchy. And therefore its influence on culture, through students and students of students and students of students of students (who already do not know philosophy at all, or are aware of what stands behind their ways of perception and learning) - is exponential. It is like the lion, which stands at the top of the predation hierarchy, or the human super-predator, which have a tremendous impact on the entire ecological system, including creeping things and bacteria that have never heard of the lion or human. It is the super-learner, at the top of the intellectual pyramid, and its insights gradually percolate (sometimes it takes generations) to the last person in the world, who suddenly recites to you a very watered-down version of Kant.

Therefore in the humanities and art and mathematics one still feels the direct influence of philosophy, but further on, through the social sciences, sciences, economics and technology and religion etc. etc., only the method is distilled from it at a very abstract and elementary level. And therefore we encounter the phenomenon of "zeitgeist", that is, miraculous historical phenomena such as "the linguistic turn", in which philosophy has within two-three generations an impact on the consciousness of the masses and all of humanity at the most basic and powerful level - as something that somehow magically unites all these phenomena in countless disciplines into a kind of historical generalization. And why? Because language was a method. And so is every philosophy that succeeded. And therefore it spread like a virus, which perhaps in the wider world they don't know who the first patient was, but he had a tremendous impact. Philosophy is patient zero (or more precisely the great philosophers). Because philosophy by its nature performs acts of hybridization - for example mating ideas unnaturally, like a person mating with a monkey and causing AIDS - and it is a mutation at a very high and rare level. Only learning explains the power of philosophy, because it is not content that spreads, but a new way of thinking and method. And this is also the difference between ideology and belief and philosophy - in them it is about content, and in philosophy it is about method. Therefore small Judaism has (and had) global importance, because it is a method of methods, being the culture most dedicated to learning - and sanctifying it most in the world. This is the connection between the third postulate and the first: the highest derivative of a phenomenon - the Direction of the Direction of the Direction of etc. - is very weak in influence on the short term, but its influence in the long term is decisive. And Socrates and Abraham testify to this. And so is the meaning of replacing language with learning - from one sentence (and one simple learning move) a whole world is derived.

The Fourth Postulate: Learning Consists of Males and Females

The last postulate is a kind of internalization into the learning mechanism of the two sides of the problem we have discussed so far of finding a middle ground between causes and description. This is not just a theoretical problem, but the current central problem of lack of learning adaptability in culture, which is expressed in a cultural crisis (in art, literature, humanities, education, and even in declining innovation in sciences), and also in lack of learning thinking in public discourse (which creates severe misconceptions in the conduct of people, companies, economies and countries). This problem is created because of a perceptual lack of middle ground between too rigid and defined a framework - rules, causes, procedures - and too much arbitrary freedom - explosion of possibilities without any criteria, because when there are no learning tools then linguistic tools create a problem. Precisely defining the framework creates too sharp a dichotomy between sterile oppression and sterile freedom, when only the transition between them is fertile learning, which exists not in the absolute but in the partial.

The problem can be likened to sublimation: direct transition from gas to solid state, while learning is the flowing liquid (and therefore its formations are the most beautiful and rich in nature, and in fact even the beauty in nature that we see in solids stems mainly from the action of water, or its melting as magma, and also the beautiful formations in gas, like clouds, stem from liquid, because the developing learning dynamism is what creates fractals). From another direction, this can also be likened to the central problem that exists in the computer user interface: either a rigid procedure that is not open to the user, or a space completely open to user freedom (examples: word processor, Facebook network) - without middle ground. Therefore the computer currently does not learn from the user what to do, and there is still no effective shared learning, but only use. In contrast, ideal human-computer relations are teaching relations. Man will teach the computer to do things instead of programming it. Learning relations are the ideal relations, also in terms of their effectiveness, because control also exhausts the powers of the controller. And absolute control means absolute inefficiency and absolute exhaustion - if we had a slave that we had to detail everything he does (every muscle movement) it would be better for us to do it ourselves.

Learning is like a third direction of synthesis, mediating but also perpendicular, between epistemological philosophy and philosophy of language. The fourth postulate is good advice for learning, and is not a basic aid of any learning system like its predecessors, but a particular case that has been empirically proven to be very general in effective learning systems. In fact: it is a tool for designing learning systems and analyzing them. This rule establishes duality within the learning system itself and internalization of the problem (sometimes the way to solve a problem is to internalize it): within every learning system there are two types of processes/agents. These two types correspond to males and females (and they are actually the reason for the existence of two sexes), but a more accurate description of them, which is easier to generalize, is creators and evaluators.

As we have seen, the ethical criterion is more related to the external conditions that allow learning at all, in creating an internal medium, and therefore to the second postulate. The epistemological criterion is related to the third postulate, because it is related to the atoms of learning, to the fabric it is made of, and to the question of what are the kernels of knowledge - and to the understanding that all true knowledge is only partial, formal and Directional. The illusion of solid knowledge, as material and filling content, was the epistemological obstacle: knowledge as particles instead of as a field of Directions, and posing the question of knowing instead of the real question - the question of learning. In contrast, the fourth postulate is in the middle ground between the two postulates preceding it. Between defining the exterior of learning as occurring within a system - the large criterion, and its basic, minimal and Directional particles - the tiny criterion, there is the medium criterion - and it is the aesthetic criterion. At this resolution we should see every single learning system (large), which has countless Directions (tiny), as composed of a large number of agents within it (neurons, animals, mathematicians, writers, economic entities, Talmudic scholars, etc.). And then we notice that there are two fundamental types of agents, or functions, whose dialectical dialogue creates learning: the creative agents and the critical-evaluative agents.

Sometimes, like in neurons, each agent is both: it evaluates the signals from the neurons that entered it and changes the strength of the connection to them according to their success (to predict its firing), and then it creates from them a weighted signal, which exits from it to other neurons, in relation to which it is the creator and they are the evaluators. This creates competition - and this is the reason there are layers, to differentiate between the two roles (short circularity is problematic in evaluation, and this phenomenon is called corruption, for example if a neuron evaluates itself). Each layer evaluates the previous one and creates the next generation of signals - exactly like generations in evolution (and there corruption would manifest as incest). And so it is in Google's original algorithm - each site evaluates the sites it links to, and is evaluated by the sites that link to it, and there are sites whose main value is in their evaluation of others (Hubs). Also in the social network, there are the content-producing writers, and there are those who mostly read and respond and like and share, that is, do the evaluation (although there isn't much hierarchy - but this is the reason the network is not a quality learning system). In economics there are entrepreneurs and producers, and on the other hand there are investors and capital owners, and there are several such layers, up to the stock market, where there is a layer of sellers and a layer of buyers after it (also the evaluating boss is in the role of the capital owner in relation to the producing worker under him - and this is the reason there is hierarchy). In science too there are scientists who innovate and there are peers who evaluate and journals and institutions. Also in thinking (or in intellectual learning) there are many thoughts competing for the brain's attention at any given moment and from them few are chosen for speech and from them few are chosen for writing and from them few are chosen for publication and from them few are chosen for reading. And in art too there is a layer of creators versus layers of curators and critics and collectors. Also males and females: the females choose the competing males evaluated in their eyes, and then give birth themselves, that is, produce new combinations from them, which are supposed to compete in finding favor with the next generation. And the most developed place of this in human experience is the competition of men for women's evaluation - and therefore it is worthwhile to choose them as an image for evaluators and evaluatees.

In this context we should note the difference between artistic systems and other systems - the difference is not in the internal structure, but in its connection to the outside of the system. In artistic systems all the layers are within the system, and there is no learning connection to outside the system, and in other systems the layers are also connected to the outside, for example to nerve data (senses, pleasure, pain), or for example to survival in evolution (a layer of a certain species is not independent but connected to the species it eats and to the species that eat it - in the larger ecological system). From here we get the learning autonomy of art and the systems with learning autonomy as art. This autonomy must of course be actively defended, because it is not some immanent property but simply the way the system is built and wants to be built (its ethos). Therefore there is an isolating convention from the outside in art - that only what is within the system matters.

Hence, pure art is a pure learning system. Art is what happens when there is learning without feedback from the outside, and every system when it is more self-contained - becomes artistic. For example the peacock, if there is no strong external evolutionary pressure of predators on it - begins to grow an artistic tail, as a response to the pressure of evaluators that has been released from external constraints. Or the artistic dances of birds of paradise - because they live in paradise on earth and have abundant food. So we also see artistic engagement as a luxury and leisure, as something that belongs to the aristocracy or to those who have removed themselves from the system, and as evidence the inferior artistic product of contemporary bourgeois artists who go to study art as a profession in academia within the regular structure in society. Art flourishes more within religion, because although religion has external evaluation - God's will - we are quite isolated from this will, and religion isolates us from other pressures. Therefore the beginning of art was in worship.

Since there are no external evaluators for the evaluators in an artistic system (and even if there are they are not part of the system's learning), this system is characterized by a very developed taste of the evaluators, and a very complicated form of evaluation develops, which has no simple reduction, called aesthetics. Aesthetics is created from the very existence of competition without an external criterion, because if the evaluation was simple everyone would be able to meet it (because the system is built to be as independent as possible from external constraints - and therefore very free). Therefore aesthetics becomes more and more complicated all the time - without external constraint the peacock's tail will grow to infinity. Therefore in every aesthetic system aesthetics is never a fixed goal but a moving and changing goal, and there are fashions in it.

On the other hand, mathematics and science are the complete opposite, because the criterion is very clear and external: proof that even a computer will confirm or empirical confirmation. But since in practice the external criterion is not enough, precisely what is not externally defined in them and is still considered a criterion is already pure aesthetics - and therefore the beauty in pure mathematics is breathtaking. Because mathematicians have absolute freedom to explore in an aesthetic direction - and more than anything they seek and build beautiful structures and proofs (and ugly directions are abandoned). That is, we see that there is some aesthetics in every learning system (even the most formal), because in all of them there is evaluation. And if there was a system that can be reduced simply to the outside, it would not fulfill the second postulate of internality, and therefore would become trivial - and not learning. For example - mathematics without an aesthetic criterion, where a simple computer constantly proves formally correct proofs without any purpose and prioritization, which would create absolute and trivial garbage (a random collection of logically correct statements is not mathematics). And if we knew the solution to the game of chess - it would become non-learning, and only because we do not know how to solve it is there beauty in it.

Philosophy is less beautiful, usually, because it does not have developed evaluation mechanisms - there are no philosophical critics for example and there is denial and even alienation from the aesthetic criterion, because philosophy deludes itself that it works according to arguments and logic (and see for example the ideological ugliness of analytic philosophy), or free mystical-playful musings (the enormous aesthetic weaknesses of continental philosophy, which is written like bad experimental literature). And this is despite the fact that on the face of it philosophy should have been very beautiful, considering that there are few external criteria - but the ethos is anti-aesthetic. On the other hand, the philosophy of the past was often very beautiful (what destroyed the foundation of a dominant beauty tradition in philosophy was accidental: the loss of Aristotle's original writings and reliance on inferior summaries). The main problem of philosophy is the slowness of its learning, due to the fundamental difficulty of evaluating new thinking (outside the existing domain), and therefore its evaluators are usually the next generations. Thus an ethos of innovation developed in it (who was the first to think of an idea) at the expense of an aesthetic ethos (who expressed an idea in the most complete way).

In this situation philosophy relies on learning built on masterpieces and classics. This is a form of learning built on exemplary examples - what characterizes it is that the example itself contains its aesthetics. That is, each such example is not only an object of evaluation, but also an evaluation mechanism in itself: an aesthetic statement. When you have learning from examples, especially exemplary examples, then the examples are agreed upon, but what is learned from them is not agreed upon, and from each example one can project in many directions (this is a very complex Direction). Therefore a philosophical example, aware that it is an object of learning, must compete also in its ideational richness, in its potential, in its ability to contain depth Directions (methods) and not just surface Directions - that will enrich future generations. Therefore learning has the potential to bring aesthetics back to philosophy (Wittgenstein did not succeed, and precisely after him very ugly philosophy was written. Because precisely because it was a philosophy of language - the crooked philosophies created crooked writing). Philosophy from the family of the philosophy of learning should be a philosophical learning aid, and the meaning of it being aesthetic is that even the layman can evaluate it, and therefore learn from it and through it.

Thus philosophy will be able to return to the artistic world, as a genre of writing - and become a more enjoyable and widespread genre, that is - more interesting. Because what characterizes artistic learning is that it is learning from examples. What is the work of art and why does it exist? Every work of art such as a painting, book or symphony is an example for learning, which aspires to become an exemplary example for future learning, that is, a masterpiece. And every body of work of an artist aims to demonstrate learning in many examples, hence the importance of the multiplicity of works in art, alongside masterpieces (the masterpiece does not stand only by itself, because then it would be ignored, because it does not contain enough Direction to method - the less good works show the method). And then from what is recognized as a masterpiece one can derive learning in many ways, which indeed often materialize in the history of art, and the example is a junction from which learning can develop in different directions. The Direction opens possibilities (and closes others, usually those that have already been exhausted, or less interesting for progression from it). Hence the sense of completeness and uniqueness in the masterpiece - this unique state is created from the fact that the work is a learning junction. From it they progressed in several directions, or it allows several directions that are understood, and it is their intersection. That is, this state is created only in retrospect, but it is not arbitrary, because the work was such that it allowed progression in several arrowheads from the outset (and this is not simple).

The unique beauty of the unique work stems from the uniqueness of the learning example (for example - the common ancestor of many animals. The Bible - from which many traditions emerged. The first novel. The first Kafkaesque work). Many and different evaluators, with different criteria and different evaluation directions (and from different generations and different cultures!), all found it beautiful and appreciated it, that is, there is a wealth of things that can be evaluated from different angles. For example: in the masterpiece book there is also convincing realism like never before, also deep emotional description in an original perception of the soul, also exceptional landscape descriptions, also an innovative ars-poetic dimension, also the invention of a new plot structure, also a new language etc. etc., and therefore a sea of works and streams in different directions can come out of it. And certainly from its combination with others, from crossbreeding between them, new breeds can emerge. Therefore it is a beautiful man - who finds favor in the eyes of many women and brings many and different children. Therefore there is no beauty without art history, and the paintings of ancient man have lost a lot of their context, and they are beautiful in our eyes only as precursors to our paintings. There is no beauty detached from a learning system. Even the beauty of breasts stems from an evolutionary learning system (hence the tendency to nudity in art history - this is the place where two aesthetic evaluations intersect).

Summary of the Postulates

To summarize - let's now summarize the four postulates of learning. These postulates are slogans and aids that we arrived at by examining countless learning processes of various types from here to the edge of the solar system, and we discovered that they are beautiful and useful rules of thumb in our organizational consulting for learning systems. The philosopher is the organizational consultant on behalf of himself to the world, who advises without being asked - therefore he is forced to embarrass the world at first, in order to clear an empty space for learning. This is the purpose of the question with which the philosopher opens, which unlike other questions his goal is not to answer it, but to open a space for thought, and not to close it afterwards with the help of a necessary and proven and correct answer, but at most a possible answer (which actually demonstrates a beautiful performance of an answer - an exemplary learning move). Every question enables learning and does not force it. And therefore philosophy should be read not as preaching to convince, but as having a theatrical dimension (so it is also preferable to read religion - as providing an exemplary answer, and not a necessary truth). Philosophy pretends to be a student in order to be a teacher - asks a question in order to guide learning. And this is the right way to teach - the teacher presents his own learning to the students. He is an exemplary student. And intended to inspire them.

Therefore good philosophy never convinces us - and always inspires us. In fact, convincing philosophy is mathematics. Inspiration on the other hand is learning of the highest order, because inspiration is when you learn from the example the high method, and not specific content. And sometimes this method is so high in the hierarchy of methods (method of methods etc.) that you yourself cannot define it and it is abstract, but still helps you. Because from every example you can learn from it itself, or learn from it a method (higher), or learn from it a method of methods (even higher) etc. - and the highest level of learning is inspiration (when you can no longer get above it, and even this is barely possible). And sometimes the feeling is precisely of depth instead of height. This happens when the Direction you identify is more in effort from within the past and into it - hence the depth in digging - than just towards the future lightly, like inspiration which is flight from here onwards. That is, there are two opposite directions in time in the Direction, but since both do not progress in time but in the planes of learning, they are felt as rising up or down, although in fact the only thing measured is what distance in meta is achieved in effort (rise in orders - first order, second, third etc.). Therefore the second most important philosophical trick, after the question, is to take the question to the meta level, to the second order. And so he always embarrasses the non-philosopher because he pulls the rug out from under, or rises from a higher point of view, and therefore the opponent has a feeling of an unfair trick - without being able to define why. Because the very definition is already entering the philosopher's meta space. And therefore this is a way to attack opponents, because the opponent puts up a wall, and the philosopher floats above it or digs under it by dealing with the second order, and then lands (or comes out) where he wanted to get to - beyond the wall, by returning from the second order plane to the first order plane. Here for example we now rose to talk about ars-philosophy, and now we will return to philosophy, and this is because we preferred to float a bit before we land finally and are subject to opposition, exactly as we opened with a question about the solar system - and then rose to the meta level. Well, here is the learning quartet, and we will classify it according to Jewish learning methods: Peshat [simple meaning], Remez [hint], Drash [interpretation] and Sod [secret].

* The first postulate is the way of Drash: Learning will replace language, and from here everything is already interpreted. For example: that the cultural, intellectual, philosophical and methodological place that language occupied in all disciplines will now be occupied by learning. For example: that the philosophy of language should be replaced by the philosophy of learning. For example: that just as there was a "linguistic turn" so there should be a "learning turn". And so they go down to the details in all areas of human thought and activity - this is a project and work plan for an entire generation, and for countless writers and researchers and artists and practitioners in all fields - to replace language with learning (exactly as it was a project of this magnitude to place language at the center of perception). And also within learning itself there are countless forms of learning and developments of the idea (as there were in language) - and this too is part of the project (as it was with language, well you understood). The exit from such a nucleus of one replacement (language←learning) goes on and spreads through its interpretation more and more, and replaces more and more the previous perception (because it is difficult to replace perception, and it is clear that we start from a linguistic perception of learning and only gradually move to a learning perception of learning). Interpretation is an exponential method, which stems from repeated application, because interpretation is learning as an operator on existing knowledge (for example on a text): the method as a tool.

* The second postulate is the way of Sod: Its meaning of preserving the "inside" and the need for an "inside", because "learning is always within the system", is that the secret is immanent to learning. The secret is what is inside, and the outside has no direct access to it. The teacher cannot play and arrange the inside of the learner - learning requires ignorance not only towards the outside, but also ignorance towards the inside. Do not know yourself - because if you know yourself to the end you will no longer be yourself and not a learning system (not that it is possible). Therefore the commandment know yourself is so strong - because it is impossible, and therefore touches the secret within you, which is of your essence. This was also the mistake of the Enlightenment in its aspiration for knowledge. One should not know - one should learn.

* The third postulate is the way of Remez: Direction as the elementary particle of learning is always a hint (that is, a direction and not material), that is, not something that forcefully moves learning (like causality or logical reasoning) and obliges it, but enables it. It is not clear exactly where the hint hints, but still it works, and since there are always many hints, then the direction becomes apparent. This is the main reason to elaborate on things in philosophy, because it is difficult to grasp the hint the first time because it is difficult to change perception like crossing a wall. Therefore if we had written only the four postulates they would have been mere hints, although they contained everything needed and they say everything. Therefore we need to discuss them, but the whole purpose of the discussion is only to clarify them with the help of many additional hints. And only these masses of arrows will allow crossing the wall. Of course with someone who does not want to understand hints and learn - there is nothing to do. We will not enter into him and force him, but only continue to wink at him. Philosophy is an infinite wink.

* The fourth postulate is the deepest way, when learning strips off its clothes, which is also the simplest, namely the way of Peshat: In practice, look at the world. Why are there so many agents in learning systems? Why are they always so redundant, but also in competition? This redundancy, if we examine its dynamics, will manifest in dialectics. On one side will be those inside who are closer to the outside world side, or at least to the side of learning as an external goal, and they are those who will judge and evaluate those who are closer to learning as an autonomous internal occurrence, in the depth of the system and more disconnected from the outside, on the other side. Out of provocativeness, we called the first group - the more external - women, and the more internal group men. This is learning as eroticism, as a kind of dynamics in which men try to innovate and women judge them, and choose the successful ones. And this duality is indeed the simplest revelation of learning that we see in the world everywhere empirically. This is how we see learning on the surface - in systems within which we are (for example in economics. We do not see our neurons within us). And therefore this is the way of Peshat - the shallowest way of learning which is also the deepest. Because we are deep within these systems - deep within evolution, culture, society, and other huge learning systems surrounding us. We will always be between learning systems that we are within and learning systems that are within us - in the learning hierarchy of the universe. And even if a post-human era replaces us - it can never erase our irreplaceable place in the learning chain that led to it, and that it too is only another link in it, endlessly. Because learning touches eternity - because by its nature it is to infinity. And through it (and only through it) we too are part of an infinite chain. It is not upon you to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.

Philosophy of the Future

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The Degeneration of the Nation

An Essay on the Four Postulates of Learning

Learning is the future: A very brief essay that analyzes learning into its components and characterizes them - according to the four rules developed in the concluding Netanya seminar. The essay before us parallels them to the four main branches of philosophy, which receive a learning version: The philosophy of language is replaced by the philosophy of learning, ethics is transformed into the ethics of learning, epistemology is formulated as learning epistemology and aesthetics as learning aesthetics. This is how it's done: Learning about learning

By: The Diligent Student

Wittgenstein, behind you  (Source)

What is a learning system? We'll agree that the solar system is not a learning system. But - why isn't the solar system a learning system? Well, let's note that what characterizes learning is change, and the solar system maintains its state, and the stars continue to revolve. But if so, then there is also change in the solar system - the stars continue to revolve. If so, perhaps learning is a change in change itself - a second-order change? Or third? And so on? But such changes also exist in the solar system, there is acceleration. And perhaps in learning the change includes surprise, and is not predictable but open? But even in the solar system such changes can occur, and even one-time developments, like a comet falling into the sun, or surprising ones like the appearance of an object from outside the system. And if the change needs to be something not known in advance that has a substantial impact, then it's possible that a new and dark planet could be caught in the sun's gravitational pull, whose influence on the system is only noticeable in the long term, but it accumulates to an enormous impact (and if this isn't a revelation of a secret, what is?). And if we characterize learning as development, meaning as something that is built, or as purposeful development, as something that is built towards a goal, then the solar system also developed in its creation (the gas disk turned into stars, all the asteroids fell into the stars, etc.), and it is also developing today towards its end. The sun is constantly expanding and heating more and more distant planets - and in another billion years Earth will no longer be suitable for life due to heat and Mars will warm to Earth's current temperature. But perhaps it's not about adaptive development, which responds to the environment, or there's no optimization here? In fact, its development can also be described as an adaptive and responsive process, since objects that come from outside and are caught in it eventually fall into one of the objects in it, and even its initial development was such that after many collisions from countless objects, few large objects were created, with relatively orderly oscillations (anything that didn't - collided or left the system's boundaries sooner or later) - in fact it became a more and more orderly place over time. And is the solar system really not a learning system? After all, this text was written in the solar system. Is there no learning in it?

Why distinguish the Earth system, or life on Earth, or humans, or even myself, from the solar system? What constitutes the difference between them? Is it the impact, meaning I am negligible in the solar system, but if in the future we blow up the Earth (or, as sometimes suggested, the Moon), will the solar system already learn? And perhaps we'll argue that there's no importance in all these distinctions, but that these are different degrees of learning. If we insist - we'll claim that even a falling stone is a learning system of degree zero, or very low. And maybe one day physicists will actually use an interpretation of learning for the laws of nature, or find learning behavior within string theory (say), and indeed gravity will be explained through learning interaction, and the stone will actually learn about the body pulling it in its fall? If so, what is the meaning at all of high-degree learning versus low-degree?

Is all this just in the eye of the beholder, namely the learner, namely in my eyes? Isn't this a regression to epistemology? Does learning limit us, by its nature, to the learning system itself that we are in? (After all - we cannot know or understand anything except through learning, in a kind of learning version of Kant). Is there anything objective at all that constitutes learning, or does every text constitute learning of its own, and every learning process is limited to its own learning, without the ability to say anything about general learning? Isn't there a regression to ontology in such a question, in Greek style? Isn't there in the struggle of definitions in this text, in a parodic Wittgensteinian style, a regression of learning to the method of language?

The First Postulate: Learning Will Replace Language

Well, as those who are not philosophers of language, we will not ask what is the meaning of learning, or of a learning system, and we will not be interested in its definition. In fact, it's not a particularly interesting exercise in the general sense. As learners, we will not ask about the meaning of the sentence "the solar system is a learning system", or its correctness, but we will ask whether it is interesting. Does it open a door to learning? And is all this investigation interesting, meaning does it teach us? Is this idea, that the solar system is a learning system, or that it isn't, and this investigation, is it innovative? Or is it a repetition of Wittgenstein as an exercise in learning his philosophy? Or perhaps - does it contain within it new philosophical learning? And if so, what is the innovation, or the new opening for innovation that has opened? How does this advance us?

This certainly depends on what learning process we are in. For example, if we are learning to write a poem, and we write "the solar system is a learning system", then this could be an opening for a parodic poem about the philosophy of learning. And if we are in the context of physical learning, perhaps this could give us new ideas about the development of the solar system, and new tools - learning ones - in its conceptualization. And the exact same thing if we are engaged in philosophical learning: Is this investigation interesting as a new philosophical method of investigation, or perhaps as a new argument? Or is it an imitative investigation, meaning of low learning value? In any case, we are unable to detach ourselves from the learning process we are in, and we discover that what matters to us is interest.

And it turns out, as Wittgenstein understood well, that his investigations are quite foolish, and not much new is learned from them, and there is no great interest in defining whether the solar system learns or not. It's a kind of children's game that stems from the fact that it's difficult to define things, because concepts are ultimately vague, without clear boundaries, and this thing itself stems from the fact that concepts were not given to us from heaven anyway (or according to unwritten game rules), but are constantly changing in the process of learning language. In fact, at the beginning of this text it was clear to us that the solar system does not learn, and we only needed to clarify to ourselves why, and at its end we might actually consider that it is a learning system, and this is because this text created a change in the idea of learning in our minds, and turned it from a limited idea familiar to us in a certain context - to a broader and more abstract and more philosophical idea (and this without defining it at all).

But if so, how can we still say interesting things about learning? ...if not through conceptual investigation? How can we learn about learning? And after all, learning about learning has value and interest - because it assists learning itself, and in fact this is the essence of philosophy. Well, we need to examine different learning processes in different learning systems - and characterize them. We need to create learning aids - and learning assistants. We even need to learn how to improve learning - to be the organizational consultants of learning in the world. And in this we need to find learning failures and characterize them, like the definitional investigative Wittgensteinian failure.

A learning philosopher does not try to define the undefinable, but tries to innovate new definitions, to conceptualize new conceptualizations. He is not the conservative of language but its creator. A philosopher's success was never in defining something existing, because there are holes in every definition and a definition was never found for anything and a solution to any philosophical problem, but in inventing new concepts, and finding new problems, and most importantly - new ways of learning (therefore: Wittgenstein in his time a giant, Wittgenstein in our time a dwarf, and so are all those who are small Wittgensteinians who continue to follow him). A learning philosopher does not try to prove his arguments and claims, but to learn them. The proof is a pretense of necessary learning, and mistakenly became the standard in philosophy, but proof at its best is just learning a way to go - a form of argument, or method (at best).

Therefore the best thing a philosopher can do is not to be Spinoza - meaning not to hide his true method in a false method (say, geometric). We read Spinoza without reading his proofs and he did not provide an interesting argument (interesting proofs) but interesting claims (interesting propositions). We learned nothing from his geometry for philosophy except what not to do. A philosopher is required to be honest and document the true learning through which he arrived at his philosophy (as long as it is interesting and something new is learned from it) - including the errors he went through along the way - because only from this do we learn to do philosophy, and learn his method firsthand (and not secondhand through his polished arguments - polishing is hiding the way the tool was created). A good philosopher is a teacher of a new method - and not of a new doctrine.

The main problem with philosophers is that they learn from mathematics as a field of abstract thinking, and therefore are interested in definitions and proofs. But even in mathematics itself the definition is nothing but a learning aid, which allows learning some concept, and the purpose of the proof is not only to prove a specific theorem, but to be a tool that the learner can use to prove other theorems with its mechanism. This is how mathematics really works - as a field of learning, not as a logical field. In fact, logic is a Spinozist presentation, which often happens after the historical mathematical learning itself, because initially the definitions are dirty - see infinitesimal calculus - and only in a refinement process of hundreds of years do they become the crystal that the Spinozists teach today in Calculus 1. Even modern precise definitions are usually later formulations, generalized, beautiful, not to mention the proofs that undergo amazing simplification and shortening processes, while turning sequences of claims into general concepts and structures and mechanisms, on the way to becoming a beautiful truth that descended from heaven at Sinai.

Therefore, although there is a sequence of claims here, it is not a proof sequence, but a learning sequence: building a new worldview - this is what philosophy does. Along the way it of course clears and destroys the previous picture with a critical method, but this is usually not particularly difficult, because every child knows that it's easy to destroy a tower and difficult to build. Why? Because the stones in the tower are indeed one above the other, meaning built, but they do not prove or force each other. Because philosophy builds in its learning, but does not prove anything, and any philosophical child can read the greatest philosopher and find countless holes in his claims. And even if a certain philosopher does screw his claims as a necessity to each other, like a Lego building and not from cubes, and let's say he even manages to glue them to each other - the child will be able to knock down the entire tower in one blow even if he doesn't dismantle it, because you can always disagree with the basic assumptions. Even if you connect a philosophical tower to the floor with a nail - the situation in philosophy is that you can disagree with the floor itself in a second and turn it over, and propose a new floor. Therefore what matters is the beauty of the tower. And this is the reason people are interested in philosophy and want to believe in it - not because it forces them, but because it attracts them. Like a girl (or like the Torah). And because it is interesting and learned, meaning: more beautiful towers can be built on it. And Spinoza built a beautiful tower.

Therefore, we must propose a learning theory of learning, otherwise we will fall into internal contradiction, if for example we propose a Wittgensteinian linguistic theory of it. We can learn our theory of learning for example from many learning cases, and find what is common between them, in the hope that this conceptualization will benefit learning itself. But this conceptualization will necessarily not be final, and if someone finds a new and more effective learning method - it will change the conceptualization. The conceptualization itself is a learning conceptualization. There is no final conceptualization in the world - and the end of any final, non-learning conceptualization is to be a false conceptualization.

But even more than learning from the places where learning works well, the conceptualization must learn from learning failures - because as one whose purpose is to assist learning, its external definition of learning is its limitation, which is not necessarily beneficial to it, and it is artificial. If we want to assist learning, then our conceptualization does not stem from the purpose of conceptualization in itself, as if this is what is expected of philosophy, but it is instrumental and helpful. Therefore the right place to start it is in places where learning does not succeed, because there we will surely help, and by conceptualizing the failures we will help remove them. And if we can improve learning and deepen it even where it succeeds, then this will be a particularly helpful helpful conceptualization. That is - the purpose of conceptualization (any conceptualization and not just philosophical!) is to help learning. Conceptualization is a scaffold of a tower - meaning our tower (as a meta-tower) is a tower of scaffolds for other towers, which helps them not to fall, and in the best case even a tall crane, which helps them grow taller.

But why is there necessarily a connection between the scaffold and the crane? Aren't these two different functions, for which there are different conceptualizations? Isn't there a difference between helping those with learning disabilities learn more and helping the gifted learn more? Therefore we need to distinguish apparently between two kinds of conceptualizations: one against failures, which is restrictive, and the other for achievements, which is opening. Aren't these two aids contradictory, and as aids isn't it better that they be separate? Why does the negative definition, the negating one, need to be attached to the positive definition, the affirming one, if these are not logical definitions but only aids? Is organizational consulting for a failing organization similar to organizational consulting for a successful organization?

The Second Postulate: Inside - Learning is Inside the System

The answer is that it is much harder than it seems to distinguish between the two situations, the one where correction is needed and the one where encouragement is needed (and there is no direct connection between them and situations of failure or success), and an aid tool that can help in one can harm in the other. In fact, the assumption that we know from the outside, outside the tower, what is right for the tower, meaning that we have some ability to perceive the tower from the outside in the learning process - is the most common and severe learning failure. We are not external consultants standing outside the tower, in any learning process, but we are inside the tower. The learner uses any aid given to him - from within. If we define here any aid tool (including any possible sentence we write for his use), the learner will always be able to use it only as part of a learning process, without direct access to the solution that is (perhaps!) outside. He cannot skip learning, and if we skip for him then this is not learning, but dictating the solution. And we ourselves are always within learning. And even as philosophers. The thought that we can be teachers of the world is an arrogant thought, and anti-learning. Philosophers need to understand that they too are students. Maybe wise students, skilled and with a passion for learning, but not teachers. Learning can only be done from within.

Therefore assistance to the learner can only be from the learner's own point of view. And if the learner is mistaken or actually succeeding in the direction he chose to develop in - only he can learn this. And if he does not know this, and is mistaken between the two possibilities, we will not be able to help him if we offer him a crane to raise the tower when he actually needs a scaffold to strengthen it - and vice versa. We may actually cause a bigger learning mistake - and the collapse of the tower. Therefore it is not up to us to regulate learning, and we cannot learn instead of the learner or for him, but only explain to him that he needs both a scaffold and a crane, and that he himself cannot see his learning from the outside - and the conclusions that follow from this. The very nature of learning is such that there are no proofs from within, no definitions at the boundaries, and no view from the outside - otherwise there would be no need for learning, and this would not be learning.

Learning happens in situations where you don't know how to solve them - what you already know you don't learn. Teachers do not teach, but provide learning aids - and learning takes place within the learner. A book, for example, is a learning aid, and not the content of learning (different things can be learned from a book). And also a lesson. Teaching is an illusion, and there are only tutoring lessons - because a lesson can be given, but if the student does not learn, learning has not occurred. Even a parent to an infant can only help his child learn, and cannot forcibly teach him - and if the child is unable to learn, not on us, then the parent will not be able to help. You cannot force anyone to learn - not other nations, and not your spouse (in fact war is an attempt at mutual teaching - hence its destructiveness).

Forced learning from the outside is not learning, but training and programming, and indeed it is done towards those who are unable to learn, such as an animal or a computer. And if it is done towards someone who is capable of learning - then it is the paradigmatic example of the immoral. The reason that murder, rape and theft are immoral is the external coercion, from outside the learning system. The wrong is an action by force on the system from outside the system, meaning a change that is not learning, and therefore there is no respect for the internal space of the learner (which is within itself - and this is important to emphasize - a learning system). Thus for example betrayal and lying and invasion of privacy and brainwashing and manipulation and oppression and violence are an external change made in you, which does not stem from your learning, of your internal system, and deny you your freedom - meaning your ability to learn. The crime is the invasion of your black box, in which learning takes place, and change in it with tools external to the system, which are not part of the system.

If we are for example within the system of painting development as painters, meaning within the learning of painting (or any other field), and someone comes and inserts an external consideration (for example money. Or a consideration that is not of the artistic matter - for example political. Or a consideration that is not mathematical, in learning mathematics - for example emotion) then this is learning corruption and in a severe case also moral. The more external the intervention is in the system, and disrupts its learning tools, the more anti-learning it is - and its damages to learning are greater. For example: systematic bribery. Or random beating of the learner - random cruelty is more severe than cruelty that is exaggeration of feedback above any need (and above what is effective for learning), because it is more harmful to learning (and therefore terrorism is more severe than fighting). But also too much and random positive feedback (like constant praise) is anti-learning and corrupt. Everything that tries to bypass the learning system and its tools, and its learning interface with the outside - and to influence the system directly from within is anti-learning. Like doing a child's homework for them - they didn't learn anything. And certainly what tries to eradicate the internal learning space is anti-moral, while the moral act is to expand it - learning expands the learning space and does not reduce it (therefore finding a new proof in mathematics is a moral act! And so is any learning breakthrough. Also new philosophy). The categorical imperative is learning. Therefore learning is the moral parameter (morality is a matter of measure - and learning is the correct ruler).

Therefore, it is impossible to perform any immoral act towards what is not a learning system, and regarding learning systems - the question is how much they learn. For example, the learning of a computer or bacterium or even a mosquito will not seem to us to be of great value, while a human is a learning system of much greater value. But the destruction of a culture, people or entire species with learning abilities or an entire galaxy will seem to us a greater crime even than the murder of a person, because the learning there is greater. The murder of a person who is about to die, when he will no longer perform learning, is less severe than the murder of a baby whose entire learning is ahead of him, but a fetus has not yet become a significant learning system. Lies and betrayal are manipulations (and if the lie is about something that doesn't matter to you, that is, a white lie, there is no crime in it), and therefore they are not an erasure of all your learning like murder, but they are a change with an anti-learning component within you. But in contrast, ongoing deception is more severe, and control through addiction is more severe, and full brainwashing is more severe, while physical coercion is even more severe. We see how the harm to learning corresponds to the intensity of evil in the act, where the worst possible act is the destruction of the universe, and the best is its creation - which begins all learning. This is not coincidental, because our moral hierarchy as learning systems stems from learning itself as the only value. Learning is who we are.

Therefore, humans create enormous learning systems. And therefore the destruction of the economy or art, for example, as enormous learning systems, or the burning of the Library of Alexandria - are enormous crimes, on a scale even greater than killing a person. The murder of Einstein, at the peak of his learning power, is a much more severe murder than that of an ordinary person. Why, for example, is rape more severe than theft? Because the penetration in rape into the system is much deeper and more irreversible than in theft. Because what is forced is precisely the element of choice, that is, learning, innermost to the system in its evolutionary learning. Pain in itself is not a reason for morality, although pain by coercion can affect the system from the outside, and therefore be immoral. To the same extent, even pleasure caused without consent, to the extent that it enslaves the system (let's imagine such a drug) is immoral. And this is also the reason why slavery is a terrible thing and work is not - because work goes through learning and respects the inner system of the person, and slavery bypasses it and nullifies the inner system. This is the meaning of turning a person into an object. And if it becomes possible to break into the human brain, it is an even more severe sin.

But heaven forbid we should draw from this the conclusions of progressive education, for one who does not teach sins against learning no less - he sins both against the learning of culture and against the learning of the child. In fact, if the teacher has no access to the learner's interior - and should not have (one who treats the inner learning algorithm as his own is a programmer and not a teacher) - then he has no way of knowing for certain if he has taught, but only if he has created a learning aid, that is, learning possibilities. Just as I as a writer have no way to force the reader to learn what is written here, and he can remain impervious to it and locked in a critical position (in the case of the learning refuser), or perhaps in a better case learn completely different things from it. Writing is only a learning aid, both for me and for him - it creates an opportunity for him. In fact, if I had caught him and put him in a re-education camp where he had to regurgitate what I wrote, or founded a philosophical cult - then certainly no learning would have taken place here, but anti-learning. Learning by its nature requires doubt, and freedom is the inaccessibility of the inner system from the outside, that is, the secret. The moral demands that you do not know, and therefore the teacher is himself learning to teach. He is always learning how to teach the student. There is no recipe for teaching.

Since morality is created from learning (personal, social, evolutionary, etc.) we can see it as a guide - a learning aid - to distance ourselves from the thing most harmful to learning. When there is no process accessible to us outside of learning, then learning is not only our epistemology, but also our ethics (and also our aesthetics, our ontology, our political theory, and our philosophy of religion, as can be shown). There is, in fact, nothing for us outside of learning. We have no other internal process, alternative - all neurons learn, they are all part of a learning system. We have no external perspective whatsoever on learning. We are learning.

The Third Postulate: Direction - Learning is Unidirectional

Since we approach the world and ourselves only through learning, not only do we have no access to the necessary internal causality of our development and processes within us (as if we were software and procedure), we also have no external description of them. We cannot dismantle the tower of ourselves - because we are built from it. We are the tower of ourselves. And every action, even an action of dismantling, will be performed by us, that is, by the tower (even suicide will not be its final dismantling, but only destruction). We have no access to what operates us from behind us, which is our entire learning history. We have no ability to look back, only to continue to be operated by it, to continue to learn forward. We have no eyes in the back, and even if we look back, then our back will turn behind us. Our desire to look at ourselves from the outside is equivalent to the desire of a hand puppet to meet the hand behind it that turns it. The learning process of which our current state is only one stage exists behind us in time, but not in space. We are not able to see even one step back, because we have no causal access to ourselves, but only learning access to the future, and in particular to our own future. We have no ability to see the past but only to turn to the future (we can remember the past, as a special case of future learning, in which we use memory for learning). The memory in our brain is a state in the present learning of the system, and in fact does not reflect the past, but what we learn from the past for the future. The past behind us is dead and inaccessible to us, and therefore time always moves forward - because we are learning towards the future.

Therefore, we must remove any explanation of our learning and also any description of it, and choose a synthesis between them - Direction. The explanation is suitable for one who has access to his own past, and is not aware of the unidirectionality of learning, while the description is suitable for one who deludes himself that he can see himself from the outside, and does not understand the property of the internality of learning. Only Direction is both unidirectional and internal, and therefore suitable for conceptualizing learning choice. This conceptualization is necessarily partial, because Direction is not a cause. It is like a learning aid, it is a sign to go in a certain direction, but the sign is not the cause of walking, and also not a description of the walking process, it is something that helped the choice. Therefore learning has only aids, and not instructions. Why is Direction unidirectional? Because it appears at a junction where there are many possibilities, and it disqualifies some, for example those that turn left, but does not say which of those turning right to go. And if we go back, we arrived at this junction from many possibilities, and we have no ability to find our way back and our route using the signage.

A more mathematical image is a one-way function. Indeed, we can calculate it in one direction - but not in the opposite direction. It is accessible to Direction but not to reconstruction. Thus there can be something that indeed directs us in a certain direction (and useful! not arbitrary), but we will not be able to reconstruct the process backwards, or reverse it - but we will be able to evaluate this Direction in the future according to its results for example. Another image is evolution. As organisms we know how to develop further, and choose with whom to reproduce (these preferences and mechanisms are ingrained in us), but we have no idea within us how we developed until now. We have no awareness of the mechanisms that push us from within, and our genes, but we can still perform very sophisticated and very interesting (and successful!) learning in choosing a mate and raising children. Culture, in fact, is not aware of what created it, and artificial memory aids, such as historians, need to be used to offer reconstruction. But even without them culture would develop, from its internal learning mechanisms. Learning from the past is a must - not so the past itself.

Therefore causal thinking is doomed to failure, and everything that seems to us as causes is always Directions, because if there was a cause, that is, a necessity, there would be no learning but action. Therefore, the self-perception of a learning system (from the outside it may look different, and therefore an outside perspective should be rejected) is always of Directions for learning, and not mechanical causes for a course of action, as in nature. And if we say that a cause made us - we mean Direction. Therefore always (even philosophers) cite as many reasons as possible for a claim - after all, if even one cause was correct and sufficient it would be enough, while only in Directions is there sense in multiplicity (and in attacking from many angles, as we are doing now). Causes exist only for a computer - because its innards are open to us. If we could see the cause - it means we could see ourselves from the outside. But in fact, we have no ability of mental vision at all, and this is just an illusion (a kind of learning method within us that is built like vision) - and we only have the ability to learn unidirectionally from the present to the future. We always take the next step, and even going back is the next step.

We cannot enter into the apparatus that is ourselves and look at it from within and say: this is the reason why it acted this way. And to the same extent we cannot detach from the apparatus that is ourselves and describe it from the outside, or find the internal cause from the outside, or the external description from within. Philosophy unfortunately has not really come out of the description according to which man is deep in a cave within the world, and from within it he sees and learns the world, and therefore he has a fundamental inaccessibility to the outside (and this cave can also be language). Learning teaches that the cave is not between us and the world: behind us - the cave.

But this cave is not a mine, and we cannot extract from what is behind us our unconscious, for example, or the hidden assumptions of language. There is no space within us, only time. Only the previous learning. The gap between us and the world, which created the idea of the cave in the first place, stems from the fact that man is time that exists within space - and there is a fundamental gap between time and space.

And what are the roots of time and space? Space is a space of possibilities, and time is a sequence of learning. To move between possibilities means: simulation of space. Thus you examine within you different learning possibilities and create a mental space (which is completely similar in your spirit to physical space - not for nothing comes the expression virtual space). The problem of learning is the impossibility of seeing your own nape - as opposed to the problem of seeing without glasses, which is the problem of the cave (even if the glasses are language).

But, if we are precise - you don't see anything anyway, even vision itself is a misleading cave-like conceptualization (and epistemological). You only build possibilities (as opposed to proofs). Understanding is not correct looking or correct picture or a view that imposes itself on you - understanding is building. And such building is always a possibility among building possibilities, and not a necessary building, which you deduce - and therefore understood. You have no access to your nape from which you can progress based on solid justification, there is no basis behind you but a cave - there is no space there that you can tour but time that has passed. And therefore any progress forward is not proof. It is learning.

The idea of man as a proof and justification machine is not correct and too rigid and limiting (internal causality), but also the idea of him as a language machine alone leaves without end playful degrees of freedom and misses the essence of man (external description) - and what is true for man is true for any learning system. Both descriptions are thesis and antithesis, while learning is a possibility growing from between them. Not without freedom like causality and not arbitrary like language, because learning is based on partial foundation. I learned something new *according to* something previous, and not *because of* something previous (as a necessity). The previous something enabled the new - did not necessitate it. Even a mathematician who learned and found a mathematical proof - if he tries to reconstruct to absolute precision all the details of the steps that led him to the solution will eventually encounter a black block. He had of course all kinds of signs along the way that helped him, and he will be able to point to them, but there was nothing that forced the learning of the proof (as opposed to the proof itself), and on another day he might have proved something else, or gotten stuck. In every progress, there were always dark parts of unexplained and unnecessary jumps over an abyss between the bright and clear parts to the learner.

The scientific idea of necessary internal causality in a system (or in a person) is actually the idea of computer software - a necessary procedure moving within you where each step determines the next step. On the other hand, the idea of language is actually the idea of computer language - a space of possibilities determined by means of language. But the important idea is precisely computer learning, which is between the infinity of possibilities of programming the software to its programmed operation. Every piece of information or Direction to a learning algorithm does not determine its operation, but directs it in a certain direction. It will try to change according to it, but there are countless ways to change according to it. Nothing forces learning. Therefore it has only aids - helping someone to do by themselves is superior to doing instead of them, and one should always leave freedom to the learner (learning and partial freedom is the ideal - and not absolute freedom). The vulgar postmodernist mistake is deriving absolute interpretive freedom from infinite possibilities, due to lack of the idea of direction.

Therefore in a learning view of language, meaning is not fixed, and also not free for our play like Derrida, but shows direction. And therefore if we chose a certain direction through it we cannot say that it forced us, but only helped us - it changed the space of possibilities (opened some, closed some). We can never blame the other - it's not because of your wife. Your responsibility. We can never blame our teachers or our parents, despite their influence on us - because we are students, and not robots on one hand, or word processors on the other hand (that is, an enabling linguistic system only and not learning, like internet protocols). We were not written and not written in - we are the ones who read them. Our teachers are no different from books - they are learning aids. We should thank our teachers only for the possibilities they opened and closed for us - and not for the necessity (learning ideas will solve the conceptual problems of the field of psychology stemming from its movement between explanation and description). Closing possibilities is not a necessity, but it is a negative Direction: go right means do not go left. But dragging you forcefully to the right is anti-learning.

The possible is superior to the necessary. The common mistake in philosophy is the thought that mathematics deals with the necessary, but it deals with the possible. The axioms are the enabler, and mathematics checks what they enable, and if there is a contradiction it finds it, and if the possibility is not interesting - it refines the axioms until they create an interesting system. The problem with contradiction is not the contradiction itself, for example as a metaphysical problem, as if we committed a cosmic sin and lightning will strike us from the heavens, but simply that contradiction creates an uninteresting possibility. That is, contradiction is not just anti-logical but anti-learning, and more precisely the meaning of it being anti-logical is its anti-learning, because logic is a learning system. In fact, one of the great promises in mathematics of the 21st century is to find the learning parallels of the linguistic ideas of the 20th century, and for example to establish mathematics on methods in a learning system - instead of on sentences in a logical system. To cancel its playful side in favor of a learning-developmental side. After all, just as we built the foundations of mathematics on language, we can build it on learning. And then we can find learning in all branches of mathematics - learning of manifolds, learning of groups, learning of functions etc. (and reinterpret concepts such as limit and derivative in a more generalized learning-developmental way, thus finding new topology).

In any case, the current mathematical definitions of learning (for example Probably Approximately Correct and learning of concepts - which are defined as subsets of the example space) are not sufficient (at least general learning of algorithms is needed). Therefore, a supreme task imposed on mathematics in the coming century is to find a definition for learning that will clarify it and make it useful in all branches of mathematics (and perhaps even be able to induce new understanding in philosophy). Since learning is a building process, theorems about what cannot be learned will become impossibility theorems, which are always difficult theorems to prove in mathematics, and thus learning will be able to help solve open problems in various branches. The main hope is that theorems about which efficient algorithms cannot be learned will allow a new approach to proving P!=NP. That is, the way in which mathematics can benefit philosophy (and vice versa) passes through learning inspiration and not formal, and not through formalism - as in the language period. In fact, learning can induce mathematics in which proof is identical not to a linguistic text, but to learning how to prove, to an algorithm that knows how to prove. And of course learning mathematics will also have an influence on physics and other sciences. Instead of physics of laws we can build physics of methods for example. And biology certainly suits mathematics of learning more than mathematics of laws. And thus learning economics is also possible etc. And finally the whole idea of causality will change even within science - and in every other system. And learning will be perceived as more basic - and finally more intuitive and natural - than causality.

The idea of causality is actually supposed to say why this and not otherwise, and also why it must be so. But Direction succeeds in saying why this and not otherwise - without the unnecessary addition of why it must be so, because it answers the question from within learning and not from outside, and within learning Direction is sufficient. We do not need forcing causes, that is, extra-learning, to justify this or that learning choice, but intra-learning causes, that is, Directions (like considerations in Talmud study do not need to hold as inference in mathematical logic, but according to what is legally accepted). In fact this is exactly the learning idea: the understanding that we are in a learning system, and according to the learning process we performed we reached a conclusion, is sufficient to justify the conclusion, out of understanding that there is no other way, and if we reach another conclusion - this too will happen only through further learning (like in court they don't really prove, but bring evidence-Directions, and it works, and is also not arbitrary). The cause is a force that pushes in a certain direction, and Direction is just a certain direction, while learning is just the force, and its flow according to the Direction is sufficient justification for why we got here (and not there). There is no metaphysical justification from heaven for what we learned, because it is not in heaven, and in earthly learning, that is, within the system, this is how it works - and it's okay. Just as Kant understood that even without metaphysical access directly into the world it's okay. Learning is okay. And no more is needed. And no more can be.

The Connection Between the Three General Postulates

I wrote this entire part in the middle of the night when I couldn't sleep, and now in the morning I'm both tired and don't know how to get out of it, but a scholar won't hide this. And it seems to me that the proper title for those engaged in the philosophy of learning is student of philosophy (equivalent to the Talmudic scholar in Talmud). Unlike all the philosophers who wanted to be teachers - we want to be students and establish the society of learners. Any engagement with learning from within philosophy about the world also has an inseparable aspect of learning within philosophy, precisely because learning is always within the system. Therefore, all philosophy can be seen as meta-philosophy, because philosophical learning will always be meta-philosophical learning. In a trivial sense this is also true for other fields - every painting is both learning about the world and learning about what painting is. Because all learning is also a demonstration of method. This symmetric property is the duality of demonstration: it demonstrates the thing itself but also the method, and it stems from the fact that every learning example is a Direction, meaning it can be taken towards the thing itself or towards the method, depending on how one wants to learn (and the deep student understands that these two things are sides of the same coin and actually unite in his mind into one supreme and abstract - and necessarily more philosophical - meaning).

What distinguishes and defines philosophy is a more intimate connection between philosophy and meta-philosophy, and in fact their unification and equality. Philosophy is defined as what applying this dual operator (of meta-X) equals itself - it is the fixed point of the operator (meta-X=X). In it there is no difference between the method and the method of the method. Otherwise there would be an infinite regression here (the method of the method of the method of...). That is, if we start from development in a certain field, and rise to its method, and from there to the method of its method, and so on, we quickly reach philosophy, whose method is identical to itself - the method of philosophy is philosophy. It's like a series of natural numbers (polynomial) where we want to know its pattern, between every two numbers above it we write their derivative - that is, the difference between them, and above every two differences the difference between them, and so on, until we reach a simple methodical pattern of constant difference, and above this pattern we reach a zeroing difference and in all the levels above it to infinity. Therefore every philosophical claim is also a claim about the history of philosophy and its future - about learning in it. And philosophy too is a system in which learning is trapped. One cannot get out of philosophical learning. That is, one can but then it's no longer philosophy. This is actually the connection between the first and second postulate: why is replacing language with learning related to the learning interiority (we are looking for connections in the network and not necessary derivation, as scholars)? Because in philosophy itself learning means that one cannot get out of philosophy, while language means that there is nothing inside philosophy. In language philosophy is only a framework, and in learning it is only content.

And what is the connection between the second and third postulate? That just as one cannot claim that because everything is within language then language is disconnected from the world (the postmodernist fallacy, which parallels the solipsistic position in epistemology), but simply everything is expressed in it, so one cannot claim that because everything is within learning then learning is disconnected from the world - but simply everything is learned in it. Precisely the understanding that the cave is within you - is what allows you to solve the problem of the cave externally: how do you learn about the world, how does the world affect internal learning. Because there is no justification here but only Direction, and because the world is ultimately inside your cave - it enters into your learning. For example, a process takes place within you where your brain learns from a certain datum. The external is expressed in internal learning, but only learning is accessible to you, not the world. You cannot justify it - certainly, because you cannot justify learning. The epistemological problem is the problem of one who demands learning to be justification and proof - and physics to be mathematics, and man to be nature according to science. Man works according to nature and the laws of science, but his learning works according to methods. Just as a learning algorithm works according to the laws of the computer, processor and software - and yet it is not a fixed algorithm but an adaptive learning algorithm. Because what matters is not what happens at the level outside the system (for example quantum mechanics in brain particles) but the learning dynamics of the brain. We can go backwards in the learning sequence only as learning moves - to say: I learned this because of this - and not as causal moves - to say: because of this thought came the next thought. The first statement is within the learning system and the second is outside it. The laws of nature are outside our system (we learned them indirectly!), just as a computer would have to indirectly learn its processor capabilities and structure. It has no direct access to what it is - its logic, but if it learns then there exists a (logical!) space in which it has access to learning considerations and choice of options according to experience. That is, there exists a space of Directions within which it is located. And Direction by its nature - unlike cause - is unidirectional. In cause one can logically go backwards, and it forces forward, and in Direction there is none of this - its power is in its weakness.

Learning is strong precisely because it manages to give Direction, which is neither obligation nor arbitrariness. Do you know why I loved? Because of an apple. Not because of the apple, but also not arbitrarily, but with the help of the apple. For no one knows the path of the spirit. Therefore there is no reason for love, but it is also not blind, and this can be said about every choice in life (although love is the most complex learning choice in evolution, because it is the most important choice in it, and therefore the question of why you loved raises confusion). Indeed there were Directions that led to love, but they are like attraction and desire, that is, they only pointed to a direction and did not point to the goal. Therefore learning always has many arguments that bring, like a network of Directions. And this is the type of content that really exists in the world, when you want something that has real content, and not just external form, then you discover that the content itself is not some material, but partial form, that is Direction - and usually a very rich collection of Directions, like a book. That is, the content is not made of countless small particles (like bits of information for example), but of countless small forms (each of which shows a direction, and all together can show a path, or document learning).

Unlike the rules of the language game, and unlike free play, learning has no rules but also no abandonment - it has methods and methodologies, that is, something that allows a new state in the system from a previous state, like a function. The rules are like axioms, for example the structure of the space of possibilities, but what gives mathematical content is the functions within it, which change the possibilities. Functions give a dynamic dimension but they are not procedures, that is, they do not create a predefined sequence of actions, but create a whole space of functions, of possibilities for change, that is, they are like Directions. A function for example tells you right. And there are also functions of functions, that is, like methods, functions that create functions from other functions, or Directions of Directions. For example combining two functions or adding random mutation (these for example are methods in evolutionary learning).

Only because we are learning systems, we can understand how learning looks from within the system - as free choice. The concept of freedom is a concept we would not have reached if we were not learning systems, and the fact that we are trapped within a system with this strange concept shows that we are in learning, because it is essentially unidirectionality. One cannot reduce my learning backwards to causes or even to rules just as one cannot reduce evolution to the rules of evolution, because many things happened in evolution, and in another evolution with the same rules other things would happen. Therefore evolution is also its specific content, which consists of countless Directions along the way (for example: watch out, lion! Tasty, strawberry). Just as our brain is perhaps identical to the brain of ancient man but its learning is completely different because of the different culture, which is the array of Directions within which the brain grew.

Therefore there is much to say in a learning process, to discuss it (the very possibility of discussion - which is not instructions - is made possible thanks to Directions), and to teach it, without anyone understanding how it works. We can learn in a very interesting way without knowing the algorithms of the brain, and live in an interesting way without knowing the algorithms of evolution. A person can be a great artist or great scholar without ever wondering about his method. And precisely a complete understanding of the algorithms will uproot learning, because learning from the outside is not interesting, like a child whose parent solves the problem for him and doesn't let him cope - then he doesn't learn. Therefore teachers present questions to students - and not just answers. Learning requires respect for the black box - while domineering is an attempt to break into it. This is the difference between a good parent and a bad parent - and between a free state and a totalitarian one. The role of a parent as its name implies is - instruction. To teach the child (not just raise him, care for him, or entertain him - all these are merely teaching aids). This is the reason there is childhood at all - so that the brain learns culture. Otherwise we would be born adults. Lack of understanding of what learning is is the cause of the education crisis that rolled into the cultural crisis, because the philosophy is not correct - and from it incorrect methods are derived and from them incorrect actions are derived.

Therefore philosophy, despite being ethereal and abstract, often turns out to be the most important factor in history - as the fundamental factor. Its power is nil, no one reads it, but it is located at the top of the learning hierarchy. And therefore its influence on culture, through students and students of students and students of students of students (who already do not know philosophy at all, or are aware of what stands behind their ways of perception and learning) - is exponential. It is like the lion, which stands at the top of the predation hierarchy, or the human super-predator, which have a tremendous impact on the entire ecological system, including creeping things and bacteria that have never heard of the lion or human. It is the super-learner, at the top of the intellectual pyramid, and its insights gradually percolate (sometimes it takes generations) to the last person in the world, who suddenly recites to you a very watered-down version of Kant.

Therefore in the humanities and art and mathematics one still feels the direct influence of philosophy, but further on, through the social sciences, sciences, economics and technology and religion etc. etc., only the method is distilled from it at a very abstract and elementary level. And therefore we encounter the phenomenon of "zeitgeist", that is, miraculous historical phenomena such as "the linguistic turn", in which philosophy has within two-three generations an impact on the consciousness of the masses and all of humanity at the most basic and powerful level - as something that somehow magically unites all these phenomena in countless disciplines into a kind of historical generalization. And why? Because language was a method. And so is every philosophy that succeeded. And therefore it spread like a virus, which perhaps in the wider world they don't know who the first patient was, but he had a tremendous impact. Philosophy is patient zero (or more precisely the great philosophers). Because philosophy by its nature performs acts of hybridization - for example mating ideas unnaturally, like a person mating with a monkey and causing AIDS - and it is a mutation at a very high and rare level. Only learning explains the power of philosophy, because it is not content that spreads, but a new way of thinking and method. And this is also the difference between ideology and belief and philosophy - in them it is about content, and in philosophy it is about method. Therefore small Judaism has (and had) global importance, because it is a method of methods, being the culture most dedicated to learning - and sanctifying it most in the world. This is the connection between the third postulate and the first: the highest derivative of a phenomenon - the Direction of the Direction of the Direction of etc. - is very weak in influence on the short term, but its influence in the long term is decisive. And Socrates and Abraham testify to this. And so is the meaning of replacing language with learning - from one sentence (and one simple learning move) a whole world is derived.

The Fourth Postulate: Learning Consists of Males and Females

The last postulate is a kind of internalization into the learning mechanism of the two sides of the problem we have discussed so far of finding a middle ground between causes and description. This is not just a theoretical problem, but the current central problem of lack of learning adaptability in culture, which is expressed in a cultural crisis (in art, literature, humanities, education, and even in declining innovation in sciences), and also in lack of learning thinking in public discourse (which creates severe misconceptions in the conduct of people, companies, economies and countries). This problem is created because of a perceptual lack of middle ground between too rigid and defined a framework - rules, causes, procedures - and too much arbitrary freedom - explosion of possibilities without any criteria, because when there are no learning tools then linguistic tools create a problem. Precisely defining the framework creates too sharp a dichotomy between sterile oppression and sterile freedom, when only the transition between them is fertile learning, which exists not in the absolute but in the partial.

The problem can be likened to sublimation: direct transition from gas to solid state, while learning is the flowing liquid (and therefore its formations are the most beautiful and rich in nature, and in fact even the beauty in nature that we see in solids stems mainly from the action of water, or its melting as magma, and also the beautiful formations in gas, like clouds, stem from liquid, because the developing learning dynamism is what creates fractals). From another direction, this can also be likened to the central problem that exists in the computer user interface: either a rigid procedure that is not open to the user, or a space completely open to user freedom (examples: word processor, Facebook network) - without middle ground. Therefore the computer currently does not learn from the user what to do, and there is still no effective shared learning, but only use. In contrast, ideal human-computer relations are teaching relations. Man will teach the computer to do things instead of programming it. Learning relations are the ideal relations, also in terms of their effectiveness, because control also exhausts the powers of the controller. And absolute control means absolute inefficiency and absolute exhaustion - if we had a slave that we had to detail everything he does (every muscle movement) it would be better for us to do it ourselves.

Learning is like a third direction of synthesis, mediating but also perpendicular, between epistemological philosophy and philosophy of language. The fourth postulate is good advice for learning, and is not a basic aid of any learning system like its predecessors, but a particular case that has been empirically proven to be very general in effective learning systems. In fact: it is a tool for designing learning systems and analyzing them. This rule establishes duality within the learning system itself and internalization of the problem (sometimes the way to solve a problem is to internalize it): within every learning system there are two types of processes/agents. These two types correspond to males and females (and they are actually the reason for the existence of two sexes), but a more accurate description of them, which is easier to generalize, is creators and evaluators.

As we have seen, the ethical criterion is more related to the external conditions that allow learning at all, in creating an internal medium, and therefore to the second postulate. The epistemological criterion is related to the third postulate, because it is related to the atoms of learning, to the fabric it is made of, and to the question of what are the kernels of knowledge - and to the understanding that all true knowledge is only partial, formal and Directional. The illusion of solid knowledge, as material and filling content, was the epistemological obstacle: knowledge as particles instead of as a field of Directions, and posing the question of knowing instead of the real question - the question of learning. In contrast, the fourth postulate is in the middle ground between the two postulates preceding it. Between defining the exterior of learning as occurring within a system - the large criterion, and its basic, minimal and Directional particles - the tiny criterion, there is the medium criterion - and it is the aesthetic criterion. At this resolution we should see every single learning system (large), which has countless Directions (tiny), as composed of a large number of agents within it (neurons, animals, mathematicians, writers, economic entities, Talmudic scholars, etc.). And then we notice that there are two fundamental types of agents, or functions, whose dialectical dialogue creates learning: the creative agents and the critical-evaluative agents.

Sometimes, like in neurons, each agent is both: it evaluates the signals from the neurons that entered it and changes the strength of the connection to them according to their success (to predict its firing), and then it creates from them a weighted signal, which exits from it to other neurons, in relation to which it is the creator and they are the evaluators. This creates competition - and this is the reason there are layers, to differentiate between the two roles (short circularity is problematic in evaluation, and this phenomenon is called corruption, for example if a neuron evaluates itself). Each layer evaluates the previous one and creates the next generation of signals - exactly like generations in evolution (and there corruption would manifest as incest). And so it is in Google's original algorithm - each site evaluates the sites it links to, and is evaluated by the sites that link to it, and there are sites whose main value is in their evaluation of others (Hubs). Also in the social network, there are the content-producing writers, and there are those who mostly read and respond and like and share, that is, do the evaluation (although there isn't much hierarchy - but this is the reason the network is not a quality learning system). In economics there are entrepreneurs and producers, and on the other hand there are investors and capital owners, and there are several such layers, up to the stock market, where there is a layer of sellers and a layer of buyers after it (also the evaluating boss is in the role of the capital owner in relation to the producing worker under him - and this is the reason there is hierarchy). In science too there are scientists who innovate and there are peers who evaluate and journals and institutions. Also in thinking (or in intellectual learning) there are many thoughts competing for the brain's attention at any given moment and from them few are chosen for speech and from them few are chosen for writing and from them few are chosen for publication and from them few are chosen for reading. And in art too there is a layer of creators versus layers of curators and critics and collectors. Also males and females: the females choose the competing males evaluated in their eyes, and then give birth themselves, that is, produce new combinations from them, which are supposed to compete in finding favor with the next generation. And the most developed place of this in human experience is the competition of men for women's evaluation - and therefore it is worthwhile to choose them as an image for evaluators and evaluatees.

In this context we should note the difference between artistic systems and other systems - the difference is not in the internal structure, but in its connection to the outside of the system. In artistic systems all the layers are within the system, and there is no learning connection to outside the system, and in other systems the layers are also connected to the outside, for example to nerve data (senses, pleasure, pain), or for example to survival in evolution (a layer of a certain species is not independent but connected to the species it eats and to the species that eat it - in the larger ecological system). From here we get the learning autonomy of art and the systems with learning autonomy as art. This autonomy must of course be actively defended, because it is not some immanent property but simply the way the system is built and wants to be built (its ethos). Therefore there is an isolating convention from the outside in art - that only what is within the system matters.

Hence, pure art is a pure learning system. Art is what happens when there is learning without feedback from the outside, and every system when it is more self-contained - becomes artistic. For example the peacock, if there is no strong external evolutionary pressure of predators on it - begins to grow an artistic tail, as a response to the pressure of evaluators that has been released from external constraints. Or the artistic dances of birds of paradise - because they live in paradise on earth and have abundant food. So we also see artistic engagement as a luxury and leisure, as something that belongs to the aristocracy or to those who have removed themselves from the system, and as evidence the inferior artistic product of contemporary bourgeois artists who go to study art as a profession in academia within the regular structure in society. Art flourishes more within religion, because although religion has external evaluation - God's will - we are quite isolated from this will, and religion isolates us from other pressures. Therefore the beginning of art was in worship.

Since there are no external evaluators for the evaluators in an artistic system (and even if there are they are not part of the system's learning), this system is characterized by a very developed taste of the evaluators, and a very complicated form of evaluation develops, which has no simple reduction, called aesthetics. Aesthetics is created from the very existence of competition without an external criterion, because if the evaluation was simple everyone would be able to meet it (because the system is built to be as independent as possible from external constraints - and therefore very free). Therefore aesthetics becomes more and more complicated all the time - without external constraint the peacock's tail will grow to infinity. Therefore in every aesthetic system aesthetics is never a fixed goal but a moving and changing goal, and there are fashions in it.

On the other hand, mathematics and science are the complete opposite, because the criterion is very clear and external: proof that even a computer will confirm or empirical confirmation. But since in practice the external criterion is not enough, precisely what is not externally defined in them and is still considered a criterion is already pure aesthetics - and therefore the beauty in pure mathematics is breathtaking. Because mathematicians have absolute freedom to explore in an aesthetic direction - and more than anything they seek and build beautiful structures and proofs (and ugly directions are abandoned). That is, we see that there is some aesthetics in every learning system (even the most formal), because in all of them there is evaluation. And if there was a system that can be reduced simply to the outside, it would not fulfill the second postulate of internality, and therefore would become trivial - and not learning. For example - mathematics without an aesthetic criterion, where a simple computer constantly proves formally correct proofs without any purpose and prioritization, which would create absolute and trivial garbage (a random collection of logically correct statements is not mathematics). And if we knew the solution to the game of chess - it would become non-learning, and only because we do not know how to solve it is there beauty in it.

Philosophy is less beautiful, usually, because it does not have developed evaluation mechanisms - there are no philosophical critics for example and there is denial and even alienation from the aesthetic criterion, because philosophy deludes itself that it works according to arguments and logic (and see for example the ideological ugliness of analytic philosophy), or free mystical-playful musings (the enormous aesthetic weaknesses of continental philosophy, which is written like bad experimental literature). And this is despite the fact that on the face of it philosophy should have been very beautiful, considering that there are few external criteria - but the ethos is anti-aesthetic. On the other hand, the philosophy of the past was often very beautiful (what destroyed the foundation of a dominant beauty tradition in philosophy was accidental: the loss of Aristotle's original writings and reliance on inferior summaries). The main problem of philosophy is the slowness of its learning, due to the fundamental difficulty of evaluating new thinking (outside the existing domain), and therefore its evaluators are usually the next generations. Thus an ethos of innovation developed in it (who was the first to think of an idea) at the expense of an aesthetic ethos (who expressed an idea in the most complete way).

In this situation philosophy relies on learning built on masterpieces and classics. This is a form of learning built on exemplary examples - what characterizes it is that the example itself contains its aesthetics. That is, each such example is not only an object of evaluation, but also an evaluation mechanism in itself: an aesthetic statement. When you have learning from examples, especially exemplary examples, then the examples are agreed upon, but what is learned from them is not agreed upon, and from each example one can project in many directions (this is a very complex Direction). Therefore a philosophical example, aware that it is an object of learning, must compete also in its ideational richness, in its potential, in its ability to contain depth Directions (methods) and not just surface Directions - that will enrich future generations. Therefore learning has the potential to bring aesthetics back to philosophy (Wittgenstein did not succeed, and precisely after him very ugly philosophy was written. Because precisely because it was a philosophy of language - the crooked philosophies created crooked writing). Philosophy from the family of the philosophy of learning should be a philosophical learning aid, and the meaning of it being aesthetic is that even the layman can evaluate it, and therefore learn from it and through it.

Thus philosophy will be able to return to the artistic world, as a genre of writing - and become a more enjoyable and widespread genre, that is - more interesting. Because what characterizes artistic learning is that it is learning from examples. What is the work of art and why does it exist? Every work of art such as a painting, book or symphony is an example for learning, which aspires to become an exemplary example for future learning, that is, a masterpiece. And every body of work of an artist aims to demonstrate learning in many examples, hence the importance of the multiplicity of works in art, alongside masterpieces (the masterpiece does not stand only by itself, because then it would be ignored, because it does not contain enough Direction to method - the less good works show the method). And then from what is recognized as a masterpiece one can derive learning in many ways, which indeed often materialize in the history of art, and the example is a junction from which learning can develop in different directions. The Direction opens possibilities (and closes others, usually those that have already been exhausted, or less interesting for progression from it). Hence the sense of completeness and uniqueness in the masterpiece - this unique state is created from the fact that the work is a learning junction. From it they progressed in several directions, or it allows several directions that are understood, and it is their intersection. That is, this state is created only in retrospect, but it is not arbitrary, because the work was such that it allowed progression in several arrowheads from the outset (and this is not simple).

The unique beauty of the unique work stems from the uniqueness of the learning example (for example - the common ancestor of many animals. The Bible - from which many traditions emerged. The first novel. The first Kafkaesque work). Many and different evaluators, with different criteria and different evaluation directions (and from different generations and different cultures!), all found it beautiful and appreciated it, that is, there is a wealth of things that can be evaluated from different angles. For example: in the masterpiece book there is also convincing realism like never before, also deep emotional description in an original perception of the soul, also exceptional landscape descriptions, also an innovative ars-poetic dimension, also the invention of a new plot structure, also a new language etc. etc., and therefore a sea of works and streams in different directions can come out of it. And certainly from its combination with others, from crossbreeding between them, new breeds can emerge. Therefore it is a beautiful man - who finds favor in the eyes of many women and brings many and different children. Therefore there is no beauty without art history, and the paintings of ancient man have lost a lot of their context, and they are beautiful in our eyes only as precursors to our paintings. There is no beauty detached from a learning system. Even the beauty of breasts stems from an evolutionary learning system (hence the tendency to nudity in art history - this is the place where two aesthetic evaluations intersect).

Summary of the Postulates

To summarize - let's now summarize the four postulates of learning. These postulates are slogans and aids that we arrived at by examining countless learning processes of various types from here to the edge of the solar system, and we discovered that they are beautiful and useful rules of thumb in our organizational consulting for learning systems. The philosopher is the organizational consultant on behalf of himself to the world, who advises without being asked - therefore he is forced to embarrass the world at first, in order to clear an empty space for learning. This is the purpose of the question with which the philosopher opens, which unlike other questions his goal is not to answer it, but to open a space for thought, and not to close it afterwards with the help of a necessary and proven and correct answer, but at most a possible answer (which actually demonstrates a beautiful performance of an answer - an exemplary learning move). Every question enables learning and does not force it. And therefore philosophy should be read not as preaching to convince, but as having a theatrical dimension (so it is also preferable to read religion - as providing an exemplary answer, and not a necessary truth). Philosophy pretends to be a student in order to be a teacher - asks a question in order to guide learning. And this is the right way to teach - the teacher presents his own learning to the students. He is an exemplary student. And intended to inspire them.

Therefore good philosophy never convinces us - and always inspires us. In fact, convincing philosophy is mathematics. Inspiration on the other hand is learning of the highest order, because inspiration is when you learn from the example the high method, and not specific content. And sometimes this method is so high in the hierarchy of methods (method of methods etc.) that you yourself cannot define it and it is abstract, but still helps you. Because from every example you can learn from it itself, or learn from it a method (higher), or learn from it a method of methods (even higher) etc. - and the highest level of learning is inspiration (when you can no longer get above it, and even this is barely possible). And sometimes the feeling is precisely of depth instead of height. This happens when the Direction you identify is more in effort from within the past and into it - hence the depth in digging - than just towards the future lightly, like inspiration which is flight from here onwards. That is, there are two opposite directions in time in the Direction, but since both do not progress in time but in the planes of learning, they are felt as rising up or down, although in fact the only thing measured is what distance in meta is achieved in effort (rise in orders - first order, second, third etc.). Therefore the second most important philosophical trick, after the question, is to take the question to the meta level, to the second order. And so he always embarrasses the non-philosopher because he pulls the rug out from under, or rises from a higher point of view, and therefore the opponent has a feeling of an unfair trick - without being able to define why. Because the very definition is already entering the philosopher's meta space. And therefore this is a way to attack opponents, because the opponent puts up a wall, and the philosopher floats above it or digs under it by dealing with the second order, and then lands (or comes out) where he wanted to get to - beyond the wall, by returning from the second order plane to the first order plane. Here for example we now rose to talk about ars-philosophy, and now we will return to philosophy, and this is because we preferred to float a bit before we land finally and are subject to opposition, exactly as we opened with a question about the solar system - and then rose to the meta level. Well, here is the learning quartet, and we will classify it according to Jewish learning methods: Peshat [simple meaning], Remez [hint], Drash [interpretation] and Sod [secret].

The first postulate is the way of Drash: Learning will replace language, and from here everything is already interpreted. For example: that the cultural, intellectual, philosophical and methodological place that language occupied in all disciplines will now be occupied by learning. For example: that the philosophy of language should be replaced by the philosophy of learning. For example: that just as there was a "linguistic turn" so there should be a "learning turn". And so they go down to the details in all areas of human thought and activity - this is a project and work plan for an entire generation, and for countless writers and researchers and artists and practitioners in all fields - to replace language with learning (exactly as it was a project of this magnitude to place language at the center of perception). And also within learning itself there are countless forms of learning and developments of the idea (as there were in language) - and this too is part of the project (as it was with language, well you understood). The exit from such a nucleus of one replacement (language←learning) goes on and spreads through its interpretation more and more, and replaces more and more the previous perception (because it is difficult to replace perception, and it is clear that we start from a linguistic perception of learning and only gradually move to a learning perception of learning). Interpretation is an exponential method, which stems from repeated application, because interpretation is learning as an operator on existing knowledge (for example on a text): the method as a tool.

The second postulate is the way of Sod: Its meaning of preserving the "inside" and the need for an "inside", because "learning is always within the system", is that the secret is immanent to learning. The secret is what is inside, and the outside has no direct access to it. The teacher cannot play and arrange the inside of the learner - learning requires ignorance not only towards the outside, but also ignorance towards the inside. Do not know yourself - because if you know yourself to the end you will no longer be yourself and not a learning system (not that it is possible). Therefore the commandment know yourself is so strong - because it is impossible, and therefore touches the secret within you, which is of your essence. This was also the mistake of the Enlightenment in its aspiration for knowledge. One should not know - one should learn.

The third postulate is the way of Remez: Direction as the elementary particle of learning is always a hint (that is, a direction and not material), that is, not something that forcefully moves learning (like causality or logical reasoning) and obliges it, but enables it. It is not clear exactly where the hint hints, but still it works, and since there are always many hints, then the direction becomes apparent. This is the main reason to elaborate on things in philosophy, because it is difficult to grasp the hint the first time because it is difficult to change perception like crossing a wall. Therefore if we had written only the four postulates they would have been mere hints, although they contained everything needed and they say everything. Therefore we need to discuss them, but the whole purpose of the discussion is only to clarify them with the help of many additional hints. And only these masses of arrows will allow crossing the wall. Of course with someone who does not want to understand hints and learn - there is nothing to do. We will not enter into him and force him, but only continue to wink at him. Philosophy is an infinite wink.

The fourth postulate is the deepest way, when learning strips off its clothes, which is also the simplest, namely the way of Peshat: In practice, look at the world. Why are there so many agents in learning systems? Why are they always so redundant, but also in competition? This redundancy, if we examine its dynamics, will manifest in dialectics. On one side will be those inside who are closer to the outside world side, or at least to the side of learning as an external goal, and they are those who will judge and evaluate those who are closer to learning as an autonomous internal occurrence, in the depth of the system and more disconnected from the outside, on the other side. Out of provocativeness, we called the first group - the more external - women, and the more internal group men. This is learning as eroticism, as a kind of dynamics in which men try to innovate and women judge them, and choose the successful ones. And this duality is indeed the simplest revelation of learning that we see in the world everywhere empirically. This is how we see learning on the surface - in systems within which we are (for example in economics. We do not see our neurons within us). And therefore this is the way of Peshat - the shallowest way of learning which is also the deepest. Because we are deep within these systems - deep within evolution, culture, society, and other huge learning systems surrounding us. We will always be between learning systems that we are within and learning systems that are within us - in the learning hierarchy of the universe. And even if a post-human era replaces us - it can never erase our irreplaceable place in the learning chain that led to it, and that it too is only another link in it, endlessly. Because learning touches eternity - because by its nature it is to infinity. And through it (and only through it) we too are part of an infinite chain. It is not upon you to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it.

Philosophy of the Future