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The Degeneration of the Nation

An Article for No One

No one will read it anyway, so why bother adding a subtitle

By: F1

From No One to No One  (Source)

"Yes, my friends, no one is killing me by cunning or by force!" (-Polyphemus shouting for help to his Cyclops friends after his single eye was blinded, The Odyssey)

Introduction: Who Cares?

Is it coincidental that precisely the most interesting thing in the world - interests no one? Is it coincidental that people are always obsessively interested in the least interesting things, and the most repetitive, and not in the most innovative things? Our goal in this article is to answer questions like these (and many others), through an in-depth conceptual investigation of the philosophy of learning. In a way that may seem surprising, but will become clear later, we will do this mainly through a learning philosophy of science, that is: the philosophy of learning's version of the philosophy of science (and in particular: the philosophy of physics. But also the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of computer science). We will explore concepts such as beauty, complexity, knowledge, creativity, interest, appreciation, tuning, regularity, systematicity, construction, depth, space, time, and more. As is the way of the philosophy of learning, the learning investigation will progress on a broad front, and will also deal with the philosophy of culture - and even the philosophy of philosophy. These are some of the deepest topics that the philosophy of learning has dealt with, and therefore this article is intended for the few; for exceptional individuals, with extraordinary philosophical ability, who understand one thing from another and are interested in the depths of philosophy - and are capable of diving and dealing with them. That is: to learn and not just read. "Learning is the measure of all things".

And if you are no one - you are invited.

Aesthetics and Philosophy of Learning

Beauty is the feeling that there is a simple principle beneath a complex formal pattern. That's why fractals are the pinnacle of beauty. And that's why there is beauty in nature - because of the laws of physics and partial differential equations. That's why mathematics has stunning beauty to those who can grasp it, but it's terribly ugly to those who can't. The beautiful human body stems from the feeling that everything is in its place, under the sexual principle, and so do animal bodies shaped under an evolutionary principle. And even the beauty of poetry and music stems from their formality (and therefore even in their freer manifestations there is a lot of structure in them, as opposed to their nature). But vision is indeed dominant in beauty. And therefore symmetry is sometimes too simple a beauty, meaning there needs to be tension between a complex formality that is not easily deciphered and a feeling that there is decoding behind it. Beauty is in the transition from complexity to simplicity, learning, and not in any state between them, and therefore it needs something that is not fully grasped, and constantly requires a recurring movement of perception between complexity and simplicity. Beauty can never be fully understood, it is a feeling that there is a simple principle that is difficult for us to fully grasp. That is, beauty is ultimately a learning aspiration of the brain to discover the simple pattern behind a formal phenomenon that seems to have a simpler pattern behind it, and therefore it interests the brain, that is, attracts it to its subject. Even if you always have a masterpiece painting in your home - you will never fully decipher it. Therefore, beauty is also an approach of interest towards an object, for example towards a text. And the approach of immense interest is what made the Bible beautiful, beyond its formal correlations. And in noise there is no beauty, because there is nothing to learn from it, so it is not interesting. That is, if it's complicated beyond a certain limit - it's ugly. Modern art exploited this boundary between the beautiful and the ugly - to stretch the boundaries of the beautiful and sometimes achieve rare beauty on the border of ugliness, which is the limit of maximum complexity. Therefore, it requires a larger component of belief that there is something deep behind it, and depends more on subjective feeling. The feeling that there is something beyond causes a desire to enter into beauty. If so, beauty is temporary because it takes you from before learning to after it. It is the beginning of the perception of the deep pattern, and therefore it is a general direction - attraction. Curiosity is the direction of one line or detail that pulls you, while beauty pulls you as a whole - towards learning. All this is from the learner's side. From the evaluator's side, who is the judge or critic, beauty allows judgment without rigorous reasoning, that is, without justification from end to beginning (like in gradient descent in deep learning), or in evolution without knowledge of the true fitness to the environment, which is the final required result, for example in evaluating a potential mate or child (a parent invests more in a more beautiful child). Beauty is a shortcut of the evaluator (who functions by virtue of his evaluation as a teacher and instructor alongside the evaluated). Therefore, the judgment of beauty allows independent interim judgment, which is supposed to advance learning, that is, to enable it as an action that is not logical inference or backward inference from a result. Therefore, it is separate from the desired result or the correct conclusion. Hence the philosophical perception of it as disinterested. But this is an idealization, because beauty is indeed separate from truth in the first order, that is, in its mode of operation, but in the method that caused its mode of operation, in the second order - it is indeed intended to allow independent judgment that is needed to reach a hidden truth, or a goal that is not perceived, or an order that is not revealed. Beauty hides from us the sexual interest, and therefore Freud in revealing the interest destroyed beauty, being pornographic, and turned culture from European to American - and from Greek to Roman. So too secularism, in its cynicism, destroyed religious beauty.

Philosophy of Physics in a Learning Perspective: Relativity versus Quantum

What does the theory of relativity essentially say? That everything is local. That everything moves at the same limited speed (its coincidental name: the speed of light). But in the time dilation effect in interstellar travel, relativity causes the thought that all this seems designed. Because it's exactly what was needed for truly distant travel in time and space in the universe, because an advanced civilization will start moving at almost the speed of light, and thus will be able to visit all the vast space still in human lifetimes, and see the universe to its end, in constant acceleration of spacecraft movement. And this is perhaps the reason we don't see any advanced civilization. In general, our point of view will always be statistically unique when it comes to exponential development, and it will always seem to us as if the achievements of our time are unreasonably high, just as the market always seems too high relative to price history, and they always predict a crash, because it's always unprecedented. Therefore, the "probabilistic" question directed at the Jew - why you and your God and not some belief from the Amazon - is statistically invalid, because the secular person is also a statistical anomaly in history, and so is man in evolution, and so is Earth compared to the development of the universe (and the absence of aliens), and so is our generation compared to previous generations ("we are privileged to live in a time when..."), and so is the thinking that leads to such questions at all. If you're at the edge - statistical anomaly is the norm, all along the way forward. In general, any recursive equation, that is, one that refers to itself, is prone to create a chaos boundary and complexity (for example: a differential equation, or one that refers to its previous values in time). And any complexity in a world close to solid (that is, in a stable medium) will eventually create learning, that is, a recursive process that builds layers of complexity, that is, the sophistication of stable complexity. It's difficult to create a complex and stable (i.e. mathematical) universe that doesn't have learning, that is, life. Most mathematics creates complexity that has islands of stability, that is, if the laws of nature are not too simple, to the point of ridicule - life and learning will be created. Because in some timeless dimension of mathematics - it is itself a living and developing creature. And we, who develop in time, need to understand this time as layers that stem from recursiveness. For example, from the very reference of a differential equation to itself, on some dimension - this dimension becomes time (and not vice versa, as we think). The calculation is what turns progress in it into progress in time. That is, learning is what creates time. And we perceive mathematics as not alive because we perceive it as a language, that is, as a framework of possibilities, a space of possibilities. But learning is the development of possibilities in time. Language is space and learning is time. But if we get out of our temporal chauvinism, instead of perceiving mathematics as space, we can perceive it as an intelligent living being, and in fact the first alien consciousness we encountered. And even - the divine one, in whose image and likeness the universe is created. When it comes to learning, the statistical argument of why you specifically and what's special - doesn't work. Because learning hides its cost, and the difficulty of choosing the path to it from among all the possibilities, so we will never understand the greatness of mathematicians throughout the generations. Why did I specifically develop to be what I am and what are the chances that this would even happen? Apparently, according to the question and the questioner, one hundred percent. That is, learning will be, and the question of why this particular one happened and not another is a non-learning question, which tries to get out of learning, and therefore there is no method to answer it. That is, one can only answer philosophical questions regarding the future - and not regarding the past.

Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, reveals that the most basic thing underneath the world is possibilities. Therefore, time and space are not basic products but are created from a space of possibilities and the development of possibilities. Space is parallel possibilities, which do not affect each other, while time is developing possibilities, for example branching into additional possibilities and converging. And their interaction, for example motion, is possibilities that affect each other. Two separate distributions of possibilities that suddenly started to connect or alternatively split into two independent possibilities. Learning is what turns many possibilities into a path, that is, it is what converges them, and therefore also converges the many possibilities into one dominant possibility and creates time and space. Physics today is cursed with an excess of possibilities and little convergence, which is a result of relying on possibility-generating mechanisms and not on learning mechanisms.

Complexity and Secularization

The complexity of the universe, from a physical perspective, is truly embarrassing. Where did this thing come from, and why is it both so complex and not random, but like an onion (and this is the shape of its complexity), and on the other hand despite it certainly not being random, there is a lot of arbitrariness in it (exactly like in learning!). And even if we say that the universe comes from one equation, and therefore seemingly less complex, where does an equation that works like this come from, and why would an equation create such a rich and complex reality, across so many orders of magnitude. And even if the equation is not special, and many are like this, isn't this mathematical property itself, that it's so easy to create such complexity, not exceptionally special and strange? Can natural complexity even exist, or perhaps the question is whether unnatural complexity can exist? Or non-complex nature? What's natural about the lack of learning, that is, the lack of complexity, actually. One can no longer believe because of physics. But is physics secular? Or do we not understand it? And maybe because we don't understand it, it becomes secularizing? Because we don't understand it - but we learn it (!), and are these two things perhaps not the same at all. Can something be understood, or only learned? Can the universe, or mathematics, be "understood"?

Here, for example, how it secularizes: Is there no spirit? Is the only thing that exists matter, that is, physical quantities (after all, it's not about matter for a long time)? But what is the meaning of matter (or physics) in a universe built as learning? Was learning planned in advance, or will any learning later appear as pre-planning? Does learning need to be random to be natural? Or maybe there's something unnatural about random physics, or maybe something unnatural about non-learning physics, and a non-learning world? Is religion an ontological claim about the structure of the world, or is it a learning method, found in our culture? The method does not claim anything about the world. One can only ask questions, because understanding is impossible.

The method does not make claims about what it learns, but learns it. And so does the scientific method, and even its (seemingly) claim-making is not an ontological leap, but a learning technique. All the time they dealt with the question of what can be known about the world, but this is an empty question if it's impossible to understand. Because then what is the meaning of knowledge. Is learning in the nature of the world or in human nature? Learning is in the nature of nature, it is naturalness itself. What is natural is what is created in learning. Like evolution. And what is not natural is the clock. This is the artificial. Therefore, an equation that is a clock (and precisely tuned to create a universe) is not natural. And therefore religion can be natural. Can any nonsense be natural? No, because learning is neither random nor entirely arbitrary. From the outside everything is arbitrary. But learning is from within. Understanding tries to penetrate the thing from the outside, to grasp it. Learning tries to penetrate the thing from within. We have no access to seeing the world from the outside, and in this sense - physics is not possible. We are part of the world. Our brain is part of the universe. So it's not like Kant, where the structure of the universe is created from our brain, but that our brain is created from the structure of the universe. Our method is not detached from the method of the world, but is part of it. In particular, without feedback mechanisms the constants of nature will remain arbitrary and without learning mechanisms and direction string theory will remain lost in the landscape of possible universes. We need to be prepared for a new type of natural law: method.

Complexity and the Exact Sciences

Complexity is what happens inside a learning system, even if it's simple from the outside. Complexity is the interesting thing, even if simplicity is not interesting (after it's simple, because before that, reaching simplicity - learning it - is interesting). The thing that is common to us and the universe, and that underlies complexity - is time. Time does not only increase entropy - this is in the local range, but in the range of the whole system it creates complexity, for now (noise is not maximum complexity, on the contrary). In fact, as in the case of entropy as a superficial and momentary definition of time, the development of complexity is its deeper definition of time, and it constitutes it. It itself is not just an immediate increase in entropy, but mainly complexity in the longer term, at least so far, in macro (and perhaps also in micro, in the shortest range, the subatomic. After all, enormous complexity is created there too, beneath thermodynamics and entropy). And here time has an interesting connection to energy, which it first converts to complexity, and not directly to noise and disorder. Thermodynamics is not a complete theory of time development. It is not a basic theory but a statistical one, a pre-modern and not sufficiently comprehensive theory, especially not including the tendency for non-equilibrium, which is itself stable and complex, and entropy is incorrectly interpreted as disorder, and chaos is not a mess but creates fractals, and the ergodic theory eventually reaches Ramsey theory. Otherwise the entire universe would be a straight and simple decay to noise and there would be no signal.

Why does decay pass through complexity? Because time is not a product of entropy, but a product of learning. And therefore if complexity decays it's really the end of time. There was no complexity in the simplest initial state, and there will be none in the final state. Learning is in the middle. And if the universe is finite it's because learning is finite. Complexity is not defined without learning, and linguistic information theory does not conceptually capture it. Is there really more "information" and complexity in the noise state where entropy is maximal, or perhaps there is no information and complexity there at all? Or maybe there is more "information" in the initial state, where everything is ordered, and in fact lacks structure and complexity? And if it contains everything that allows predicting the development of the system in advance, does it really contain the same amount of information, and does the information remain constant throughout the development? Not if information is complexity, that is, not if the true definition of information is learning and not linguistic. Learning is not defined by Shannon information or thermodynamic entropy but is an independent theory. And therefore we don't understand today what time is. And why it's different from other dimensions in the universe. For it's because of its crucial role in learning, unlike space, which is linguistic.

And since mathematics is outside of time, it is the most complex thing when it enters into the phenomenon of time as a learned thing (after all, as an unlearned thing, as logic, it is simple to the point of disinterest. Therefore, the main mathematical effort is far from logic). The complexity of mathematics, which even surpasses physics, completely shakes reason, being the most complex thing in the world (it's simply unbelievable!), and an encounter with the superhuman. There is nothing in mathematics but methods, it is the field of pure methods, and therefore it is learning the very possibilities of learning, while physics is a specific learning, therefore it is material, and this is the true definition of a material thing (after all, matter has long since ceased to be a fundamental thing). Material is the realization of specific learning, which could have been fundamentally different, but its path so far has already been chosen (in time! Therefore there is no matter without time).

Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom, biology is actually the most advanced science, because in it we already have the method - evolution. The equation of everything. But here, what have we achieved in learning the most general and simple method? Everything and nothing. We do not understand evolution, and what are all its possibilities and what does the landscape of its solutions look like, and where does its power for complexity come from, and every such question already touches on specific complexity, that is, specific learning, less general. And logic is not the complete method of mathematics because it does not describe its actual development. Mathematics does not work in brute force search, and does not equally exhaust all logical possibilities (exhaustive search), most of which are mathematically worthless. It searches within them for mathematical learning, but this lives only in archipelagos of rare islands within a sea of uninteresting possibilities. Therefore, the discovery of logic is identical to the discovery of DNA: a linguistic discovery, which is not the discovery of evolution as a method. Therefore logic gave an illusion of everything, but gave almost nothing. Only when logic itself became mathematics, as in model theory, did it give another branch in mathematics, and this is the ironic victory of mathematics over logic: of the operating method - over language. The very discovery of the method itself stands almost outside the system, because it is its limit, while the rich and truly difficult learning - is inside the system. This is also the difference between P and NP. Between something that can be learned, from within, and something linguistic, from outside.

On the other hand, physics is the most backward science. Because it doesn't even manage to touch the method of the system from within, and in fact its method is so far mathematics (without any understanding of why the universe is mathematical). In the future, learning will be the most general science, and these will be its particular cases. What is learning? Complexity created by directions. The phenomenon of the computer is seemingly the simplest phenomenon, our handiwork, but do we understand it at all? Or are we being dragged after the mathematics behind it, which will lead us where it will lead, and perhaps to our doom, if it leads to intelligence, which we may never understand why it led to our doom, which is the loss of our learning. Until we crack the P versus NP problem - we will not have computer science at all, but only engineering, only algorithms. The computer is an example of how understanding a system to the end in micro does not understand it in macro, and does not understand what it will be able to learn. The science of learning will probably grow from computer science. And in fact it is completely involved in solving the P versus NP problem. This new type of science will allow a new method for other sciences, and will be able to allow physics to talk about the learning side of the cosmos, which mathematics currently does not allow it, and will also be able to replace the amazing ineffectiveness of mathematics in biology. In fact, it will be the unifying science, which will explain the world deeper than any physical "theory of everything". Because it will also explain mathematics.

It's always thought that inferring God from nature is a primitive view and the belief that has most lost its relevance. But observing the wonders of the world, if it is transferred from immediate physics and biology to the cosmic or elementary, that is, to current world physics - it is still the way to encounter the divine, as written in Psalms. Because it encounters the unlearned, through learning. At its edge trying to go beyond its limit - learning is a religious matter. We simply learned more, but the thought that everything can be learned, that learning is finite, and that what we haven't learned is actually a technical glitch that stems only from time, is actually the secular view. And the feeling that one cannot learn at all is the mystical one, which remains only in wonder, and therefore is beloved by fools. And the approach that learning is possible but infinite - is the religious one. That is: there is specific content there, and therefore one can learn specific content from "there" (and we have learned, in our ancient culture), for example one can create a masterpiece of art (specific), but in principle learning itself develops upwards, and not only in space, to more possibilities and modes, but progresses and elevates, to the divine, and there is no limit (and end) to this. Thus, for example, greater and greater art may be possible, without limit, or always more and more developed culture will be possible, and there is no upper limit to complexity (that is, not as a combination, not linguistic-repetitive complexity, but essential, creative, innovative, learning complexity). The essence of Judaism as a phenomenon is learning, unlike other religions, and therefore it is a more advanced religion than them - learns more. It is the religion of learning. And science is its secularization. It is Judaism as a project, as a finite phenomenon, that can be completed. Without the messianic horizon, where the more one progresses - there is more beyond the horizon. Therefore, the more one learns, the secular, hubristic temptation is greater, if one looks back at what we have learned, instead of forward at what we don't know. Because today we don't know more than ever before in the past. And we also know more, of course. How can this be if the amount of knowledge is constant and it's a zero-sum game? Well, it's not. Learning increases both the known and the unknown. Like a tree that as it grows, both the branches and their surface area in contact with the air grow. Secularism is seeing the tree from the outside, and then the expanses of air were there before it, and eventually it will (in principle) reach the edge of the atmosphere. From within - the brain has always been religious. A belief machine. And it is precisely secularism that requires excessive belief, external to learning - the belief that it has an end. Hence its horizon is much closer, it is always close to knowing everything. It is always in a sprint and not in an infinite marathon. It's always a matter of a generation or two, and not of eternity. It aspires to the shortest possible learning, which starts from zero point and discovers everything in as few steps as possible, and not to the longest possible, which starts from infinity backwards and continues infinity forwards.

Okay, really enough. If I continue to write, even though no one is reading, it's only out of faith. And if I stop - it's because I've lost faith.

Knowledge, Learning and Memory

With age, memory betrays, and you learn - that learning is not knowledge. So what is learning and what is knowledge? Shall we try to be sophisticated and say that knowledge is tools, like language is a toolbox for Wittgenstein? No, because we have no control - not even in language, by the way. Is knowledge a box of objects, as in earlier philosophical paradigms (which eventually emphasized the box at the expense of the objects, until knowledge finally became a sophisticated box, that is, a tool)? All these perceptions, including the perception of tools, assume a subject that acts on an object. The perception of tools is the perception of the action itself as an object, which works on another object. But knowledge is not an object, for example an object external to the system that is inserted into the system (like a solid), or that is perceived in the system (like a liquid, within a mold, in Kant), or that permeates as part of the system, in an imperceptible and unexpressed way (as part of language, in Wittgenstein, like a gas). Knowledge is not a type of material ("to know the material"), but it is within the system itself. It is not an object, not even the most networked and distributed and diffuse, but it is within the subject. Knowledge is memory. All previous perceptions gave excessive emphasis to the senses, initially to the world of vision (Kant) and then to the world of hearing (Wittgenstein), and there were also all kinds of deviations to smell (Bergson) and touch (Heidegger and existentialism), and even within it to the receptors of suffering and pleasure (on the Schopenhauer-Nietzsche-Freud axis). But it is not the senses that mediate our knowledge of the world, but memory. The sensory input itself is embedded in the shortest-term memory, the previous sensory input, which even predicts it. The moment something is within us, within our neurons, it is in our memory. And the most essential thing that happens to it is that it begins to undergo selection between what will be forgotten immediately, that is, almost everything, to what will be gradually absorbed into us in immediate memory, with the help of the attention filter, and to what will remain in short-term memory, which is working memory, and then to what will remain in long-term memory, with the help of the sleep and dream mechanism, and finally what will be absorbed into us in memory and become part of it, in memory forever. Just as mutations will become part of the individual's genome in the short term, but it will take generations until the most successful among them, with the help of the filtering mechanism of sexuality, become part of the population's memory, and finally very few will become part of the definition of the species itself - part of who it is. Is the mechanism through which mutations enter important for learning, or the mechanism through which they are filtered? The adaptation to reality is found in the filtering mechanism - that's where knowledge takes place. Because only against its background can one define what is innovation, since from the senses' perspective everything is innovation of equal value (and there is no innovation more than white noise and random and unpredictable), but not from memory's perspective. Only in memory can one define a new item of knowledge about the world (what philosophy liked to look at as an object of knowledge). Indeed, all knowledge is expressed only in the change in the strength of connections between neurons, and is not the pattern of electrical stimulation itself, which is random and momentary. Is knowledge like in language, an incidental byproduct of the system's way of operation? That is, something unexpressed, that goes without saying, in some behaviorism? The opposite, the action and behavior of the system stem from its memory, and they are the incidental byproduct of the knowledge fixed within it, just as the genome is not some product that goes without saying of the animal's behavior and memory is not a product of the computer's behavior - but the opposite. How ridiculous is Wittgensteinian behaviorism when we know how systems really work, from the inside. Wittgenstein tried to avoid knowledge coming from outside, as with his predecessors, and therefore remained outside, with knowledge defined as a product of the external. This instead of avoiding knowledge coming from outside precisely with the help of the inside, when the outside is the external product of the internal, and not the inside is an external product of the external, as in behaviorism. Behavior is a product of knowledge, and knowledge is the product of learning, which is the internal essence of the system (and how afraid they were at that time of essence, which they saw in a religious way as some internal mysticism, like the soul. One cannot understand the philosophy of language without the secularization project: the attempt to silence religion - and the inside. About them "one must be silent"). The change in neural connections and not the change in the electrical activation of neurons is memory - and knowledge. Therefore there is no learning without knowledge, and without memory, but learning is not knowledge and is not memory. Learning is not a personal essence, like memory, but it is the human essence, just as evolution is the essence of life, and not of a specific species or animal. Unlike memory, learning does not only constitute the individual, but humanity itself. Humanity is a certain learning ability, higher than that of animals, and therefore a higher learning above it, superhuman, is also possible. It will not be reason that will be superhuman, but learning will be superhuman. We will be able to understand supreme reason, in principle, but we will not be able to learn in a superhuman way, in principle. What makes supreme reason supreme? There cannot be a superhuman language that we cannot speak in principle, and it is not about some superhuman perceptual ability, but about a qualitative difference that is similar to the difference between our learning and animal learning, or evolution. But beyond the general human essence of learning, there is a mediation between it and personal memory, which indeed allows different forms of learning, in which memory is mixed in varying degrees, which increase as they are more personal to us. Unlike a computer, our algorithm is not separate from memory, and learning primarily is what builds memory, and for example decides what to remember and how to remember, that is, what is new knowledge and how to know it. It certainly does this with the help of old knowledge, but essentially goes beyond any simple form of organizing new knowledge according to old knowledge. Learning is what decides what is innovation and what is interesting, and what is worth remembering. Therefore, two students will remember different things from the same lesson, and two readers will learn different things from the same text itself. Not only because their previous memory is different, but mainly because of differences in their specific and personal learning methods, which are usually variations on different learnings that are accepted in their culture, which are specific instances of human learning. A person who invents a new way of learning, that is, a philosopher, usually does not achieve his importance through the discoveries and new knowledge that he personally discovered for the world through this learning, but because of the new learning he gave to his culture. Just as the importance of an individual with a mutation is not in his personal survival, but in the advantage he gives to the entire species. The old person is no longer as good as before in memory, and therefore passing on memory is not his most important role, but passing on learning. This is the wisdom of the elderly, and it is much less eroded after mid-life, and this is the main thing that parents bequeath to children, who sometimes deny all the knowledge of the previous generation, but learn in exactly the same unconscious method. Yes, method is usually unconscious, because it is orthogonal to knowledge, which is of course conscious. The method is usually the unspoken, self-evident thing of creating knowledge. And increasing awareness of the method is the beginning of philosophy, whose end is the ability to change the method. Therefore we have no control over knowledge, but it is controlled and shaped by learning. And we have no control over our learning, and it is not our tool, but it controls us and shapes us. At most our learning has control over our learning, if we learn how to learn. But learning is always the primary factor. And animals have developed memory, but learning is not flexible. The best-known trick of philosophy (the oldest trick in the book) is clarification and bringing to consciousness of an unconscious method, thereby pulling the rug out from under those who learn in it, and presenting him in his nakedness - from within (in spiritual nudity far more exposed than any external nudity). Sometimes, as with Foucault or Freud, the "exposed" method is superficial and even false, and its explanatory power is very low (because it can explain everything), and yet the embarrassment effect is effective and works on many fools, who enjoy exposing other fools, and thus a low-level method spreads in culture. This is the selfish gene version of the method, and it is a real danger because there is no objective method for the method. On the other hand, philosophy seeks a deep method, and the philosophy of learning is able to do this through the very raising of awareness of learning itself. With age, we are able to learn less knowledge, but more able to learn how we learn, to discern our deep learning mechanisms and those of others, which we did not notice in our youth. That is: we learn about ourselves, and about other learning possibilities of others in our environment. We understand the very wide range of possibilities in the world of methods, and attribute less of the behavior of systems to their specific memory, and more to their learning algorithm, which is what deeply shapes memory as well, that is, both the past and not just the future. We believe less in healing memory or behavior, which are the foundations of psychological healing (psychodynamic or behaviorist), and more in healing learning. Therefore we understand culture more correctly, which is not only shared knowledge but shared learning. Therefore those who think that knowledge is tools, and that what is necessary to impart to a child is "tools" and not "objects" of knowledge, seem foolish like those who are interested in imparting learning and not knowledge. After all, learning is the ability to filter and organize and build knowledge, and how can one practice learning without acquiring knowledge? Learning is not knowledge or memory, but what is the meaning of learning without knowledge or memory? After all, it is an empty concept, perhaps New Age, just like the idea of evolution without a genome on which it operates, or without such a specific genome. Therefore it is important to learn knowledge all our lives, because it allows us to learn to learn. That is, to learn to learn knowledge. Just as learning is always the primary factor, so knowledge is always the last factor. Even if we learn to learn to learn to learn, we learn to learn to learn to learn knowledge. Without the constant thing, memory, there is no meaning to the learning innovation. The method acts on something, and not on nothing. The top of the pyramid does not exist without the pyramid. And it's also not true that "it doesn't matter what you learn", because learning is precisely deciding what is important and what is not. And whoever doesn't learn something, and thinks that it will come to him naturally (for example in sexuality or parenting), ends up realizing a primitive method that is not his, but that he absorbed unconsciously. And awareness of your own method is the virtue of the man of virtue. Hence learning is inside the system, and acts on the memory within the system, and it is not learning material but learning knowledge, because knowledge is not material. Although it has an interface with the outside, it does not operate in this interface, but it is the interface of the inside with itself. For example, if we receive data, then this is not learning, but an action within the system on this data, which turns it from data into knowledge. And this was the optical error of philosophy, which always dealt with vision, because vision is certain to us, but precisely because of this the interesting thing does not happen in it, because learning is the rich engagement with uncertainty. The memory component is the component of construction that is the most basic in learning and therefore it looks more like an object, since it is possible to add or subtract an item, or in a computer since it takes up space, and also in DNA it is possible to point to its location. But not only is this pictorial view not a correct picture of memory, it has no picture at all. The construction in it is not layered, because the upper and lower layers of knowledge constantly influence and project on each other, and therefore the upper floor not only comes after the lower floor but also changes it and vice versa. The learning construction is a property of the learning method, and not of memory itself. It is one of its ways of organization, that is, part of a certain learning method, and not infrequently primitive, which is learning the material, and accumulating it as an object, which is memorization. This is not a particularly deep way to create memory through repetition - a method that also works on animals. Memorization is the attempt to turn brain learning into computer learning, and in fact the first attempt of humanity in algorithms and computation. This does not mean that repetition is not important for learning, and in fact creative repetition, in which one returns to the same thing each time from a different direction, is one of the deep ways of learning, because it teaches how one can reach from certain knowledge to knowledge related to it, or derived from it, or learned from it, that is, teaches learning itself. Therefore philosophy is very repetitive, and attacks the same point from countless directions, because it aspires to a certain possibility space, and not to a certain line. And while back-and-forth repetition on a line is memorization, hence its tendency to seriality. And philosophy has a tendency to go around in circles and spirals, out of a tendency to return again and again to the same point, until its internalization, that is, turning it from knowledge to learning.

Creativity and Interest

Is creativity the next paradigm after learning? Maybe, but it's certainly not the paradigm before it (i.e. the current one). Creativity is valuable only when learning is already taken for granted, and that is far from being taken for granted. If you don't have a platform - if you're not part of the system - your personal creativity is worthless. Like a mutation that no female appreciated - and was buried in the darkness of time. Therefore in the field of literature today, all writing is worthless, because there is no valuable literary system. There is no female, only males, who may be competing for an imaginary future female who will show them favor - the canon system, but forget that it remembers only the males of golden ages (do we remember any completely isolated genius from regular periods?). And why? Because in the golden ages of creation what existed was a q-u-a-l-i-t-y s-y-s-t-e-m, and it is the system that distinguishes these flourishing periods from the long periods of withering and darkness, and not personal creation. It was not a collection of exceptional talents that created the Renaissance, but the Renaissance as a system created the collection of exceptional talents, that is, it took creative people who exist in every period and gave them a learning system - and thus the achievement was created. The achievement is not of the isolated genius but of the system of his time. Therefore we say that learning is always within the system, because it can only be within a system, and not in some remote site that is not connected to the system, and therefore all effort is wasted. And perhaps, if you are broad enough, you can be a system. Is the very determination that learning is within the system itself a practical, empirical matter, or a conceptual matter of a priori definition? This is a question that stems from an outdated philosophical dichotomy before learning, because learning is precisely the fusion between the empirical and the conceptual. It is not exactly the transition between them (say in the direction from the empirical to the conceptual, as in the worldview of epistemology), but the place where the conceptual is empirical and the empirical is conceptual. Every concept in it is temporary and tentative, there are no fixed concepts and not even words that were set externally, without dependence on learning (as in language). And on the other hand, every empirical discovery has a conceptual side, and there is no separate conceptual world that is not influenced by the empirical (and vice versa). In this, learning opposes epistemology (European), but it is also not pragmatism (American), because it has no final goal (and certainly not utilitarian) in which it returns to empiricism, that is, it does not come out of the empirical and use the conceptual as a tool to return to the empirical, but does this cycle again and again, so that to the same extent it can be said that it comes out of the conceptual and uses the empirical to return to the conceptual, as in Talmud study. And when you make an ideational transition again and again in both directions between any two fields, its speed increases and it becomes automatic and finally immediate, that is, real, something that is part that does not need to be said of the thing itself (that is, something learned, not linguistic, and how funny that Wittgenstein defines learning as something that does not need to be said but becomes self-evident). In this it cancels the dichotomous difference between the two fields, and creates a new field that is a kind of realization of both that includes both, and both are only partial moments of it, and the dichotomy (for example between the empirical and the conceptual that stood at the center of the existential experience of philosophy) becomes artificial and dead. Therefore despite the flexibility of concepts and the feedback loop there is no pragmatism here, because the feedback in learning is not some optimization goal, but it serves learning, part of its apparatus (in many cases, not all), and not that it is derived in its light, as its true and final goal. Learning has no utilitarian goal, but stems from internal interest, it not only goes towards what is at the end but also stems from something that is at the beginning, and therefore it is within the system, although the system of course deals with the world. It is not the interaction of the system with the world, although of course there is such, but the interaction within the system, between it and itself. In fact, it is the choice to look at the system with its own tools - to respect its learning, and not to reduce it (unjustly, like for example in Foucault) to external viewpoints that nullify its inner world and turn it into a byproduct of the outside. Learning has contact with the outside, but it is not defined by the outside, like epistemology or pragmatism, or language which is the membrane between inside and outside. Learning is not subject to some external principle, just as evolution is not subject only to the world (as people think) but also to its own ability to invent, and to its own nature to change, to be more complex, to try - otherwise we would have remained bacteria in homeostasis. Amoeba under its vine and under its fig tree. But there is a big gap between not being subject to and derived from another principle (for example the empirical), that is, not being a secondary concept but central (that the other principle is derived from it), and denying the other principle, or canceling the possibility of its existence, and here we come to the violent tradition (and therefore always later orthodox) of philosophy. Kant did not have to cancel any possibility of contact with the world outside the categories and perception - it was enough that he said that they are the main thing to focus on conceptually, and the interesting place, and that everything else is derivatives of this plane. Wittgenstein did not need to cancel any possibility outside language (and even try to silence it in his first book), but to say that language is the interesting plane, and that it is the center of worldview. This radical element (and inherently refuted), in the philosophical tradition, stemmed from the need to distinguish themselves from their fathers, and to feel manly and daring through sharp distinctions and knives: impossible, no access, only me. When you don't have learning tools, you use ontological tools that cut part of the world out. But in learning, you don't have to deny entrances and exits to the system, and you don't have to deny the very outside when you say that learning must be within the system. This is almost a normative statement, and not just descriptive (another Western dichotomy that learning desecrates). You simply say that this is the interesting plane, which should be focused on, and do not deny the existence of other planes or the connection to them. You are aware that this is actually a choice. A philosophical choice. Wittgenstein is not wrong, he's just boring in relation to learning, because language is boring in relation to it. He is wrong only in his radical element, which opposes learning, like any other plane outside language, and hence his damage (propaganda, media, and in our days: Facebook). Therefore there is no claim here, quite ridiculous, that there is nothing outside the system, but a distinction about the nature of learning itself: there is no learning outside the system. Learning is within the system. It's not that there is no empiricism, but that it is an inferior plane, less interesting, derived from learning. The empirical is not the starting point and not the endpoint, because there is no starting point and endpoint, which is a narrow and narrowing idea, but a learning system, which is a broad idea, and broad by nature, because it has an inside. Learning is a world, and therefore the external world is less important, just like the Talmud learner who does not consider this world, even though the entire Talmud deals with this world. It's not that a learning system has no access to the outside, but that any such access is mediated by learning, and therefore the question of direct access to the outside is simply not defined and not asked in the context of learning, and not, God forbid, denied (because learning is only a context). Unlike the Kantian system that fortifies itself from the outside behind the categories, and it turns to the external world that is closed to it and fails to break through to it, the learning system turns inward. A person or culture indeed learns from the outside, but learning is internal, in their own tools, and the genome indeed learns from the environment, but learning is within it, and has no meaning outside its genes, that is, it cannot grasp the environment except through its genes, but only learn it. Genes are not categories of perception, but learning tools. They are also not a language that speaks about the world, but learning mechanisms. One could have looked at them in these two ridiculous ways, but they would not have grasped the depth of the matter - which is learning. Therefore the claim against these thinkers is different from their claims against their predecessors. They are not wrong - they are poor. Even in science itself, whose whole essence is empiricism and it is the pinnacle of the achievements of epistemology in philosophy (respect!), learning takes place w-i-t-h-i-n its mathematical learning world, and in fact its essence is learning (empirical, which is also a type of learning, and therefore happens w-i-t-h-i-n the system of science, and any attempt to present science as a breached or open system to any possibility, or alternatively subject to external dogmatism, leads to its collapse). What is really interesting in science, and what is really its power? Not empiricism (an issue common for example to painting from observation, or politics, or business, or just staring into the air), but its special learning system, which is built on ideas like Occam's razor and statistical learning, on long teaching traditions, and on structures like the publication and citation system (all learning tools). Scientists just like to wave empiricism because they belong to an outdated philosophical paradigm, but in practice they chase after h-index, that is, after the system.

Empiricism, Tuning and the Essence of Lawfulness

All the division between the conceptual and the empirical that has pursued philosophy since its dawn appears in a learning perspective as very artificial. In fact, it is what distanced philosophy from learning throughout its thousands of years of existence, and concealed it from its eyes, despite learning being what really happens (and always happened!) between the empirical and the conceptual, but the very dichotomous division between them concealed the connection - by fortifying the barrier (for example: the allegory of the cave, which is taught to every beginning philosophy student, until they create in their head an unbridgeable dichotomy: the epistemological dichotomy). And if we return to the question of empiricism versus pragmatism, we will find that this is just a cultural matter. The classical European philosophical culture, that of mimesis and vision, and therefore of epistemology as the super-paradigm of philosophy, is the one whose starting point begins with the empirical (and only later perhaps ends with the conceptual) - even the most extreme rationalism and idealism defined itself against the empirical. While American culture always ends with practical empiricism, and therefore it is a culture of the hand and action and materialism, and therefore it is often ideological (because it can start with the conceptual, but not end with it. Ideology is always only a tool for something, and not in itself, even if it is the starting point - because even the starting point is judged only in light of the endpoint). Russian culture is the extreme point of both approaches, where they meet from their extreme side, hence its lack of pragmatism and the ability of Russians to pay heavy prices out of principles and even whims and caprices, and its preference for principle over reality. And the Jewish learning culture is between the two approaches, not in that it is moderate and compromises between them (like England), but in that from two unidirectional arrows, one dealing with input and the other with output, it focuses on what happens between them. That is: it is not in the center between them, but it is the center for which both are just tools. Even the language that mediates between the inside and the outside is just an external system, not an internal one, that is, it is a look at a system from its external, visible, public and communicative side. While learning is a private matter by nature, and if there is no inside - there is no learning. In short, there is a culture of the Big Bang, obsessive with the origin (which of course has no origin), and there is a culture of the Big Crunch or the end of the universe, obsessive with the purpose (which of course has no purpose), while learning is the universe itself - everything that happens in the middle, inside. Even the laws of physics are an external envelope to the universe, and what is interesting in physics is their discovery from within, the striving from within the universe to understand the universe. It is not the rules of the game that are interesting - but the learning of the rules of the game, and learning to play. And this is the reason we love to play, and not because we love rules, or because there is value to rules. The value of arbitrary rules stems from our learning of them, and here lies the beauty - both in the Talmud, and in mathematics. Is mathematics itself beautiful? This is a meaningless question, because we have no access to mathematics itself except through learning. But learning mathematics is certainly beautiful. The universe has a rare beauty only because we look at it from within, but physics from the outside is perhaps just a boring random process, or lines of code, or some dish, which must have a certain amount of paprika put in it. And what is missing in the physical laws of our time? What actually bothers us in arbitrariness, and in the constants of nature? Their very constancy - the non-learning aspect. Our learning is unable to accept this, and asks where the recipe and tuning come from (designed to create a universe with complexity and dependent on an insane and completely unexplained/unreasonable level of precision), that is, where does the guidance grow from, that is, where does the hidden learning that it identifies beneath the surface come from. Is some process needed that takes the equations to an interesting solution area, for example some strange attractor, or a place where the fractal is complex at every scale. Perhaps because all physical equations are partial differential equations, their nature is that they have chaotic areas with high complexity. This explanation is not satisfying if almost all other equations in the universe's equation family did not create such areas. But what shapes an equation family in the first place? How was the family born and how did it evolve? After all, we could artificially reduce all the constants of the universe to one constant, using Cantor's diagonal method, and thus even infinity constants, so is one arbitrary constant too much? What exactly is the problem here? It seems there is learning without a learning mechanism, meaning that the equations of the universe were created in a learning process, but we do not know such a process. After all, we do not wonder about the complexity of life and ecological balances, or about the complexity of culture and its balances, because we know the learning mechanisms at their base. Is there a learning mechanism that learned the laws of nature, and is external to them? This sounds a bit absurd. It's as if there was an external mechanism that learned how to produce a human, or a culture. From everything we know about learning and about nature, we should look for an internal mechanism to the universe, not external to it, that performed the learning that created the laws of the universe. The learning was not performed before the beginning of the universe, but after it. This is an explanation that will truly satisfy us. Is this just our bias? No, because learning is a basic part of the universe, and we are actually a bias of the universe. Our learning is a derivative of that primordial learning, whether it happened before the universe, or during it. Even if we discover that in a fraction of time (and perhaps before the birth of time) at the beginning of the universe learning was created, then that is much more satisfying. Is it possible that there is a feedback loop between the content of the universe and its form, that is, its equations, and they are tuned to make it interesting, if it is too boring? Possible, but it's not the most satisfying in terms of learning, and additionally there are many uninteresting areas in the universe. From what we know from evolution, it's a bit too Lamarckian, meaning these are strong and direct and large feedback loops that are not plausible, and whose design itself limits (and this is definitely a universe-sized feedback loop, meaning huge). No, what is really needed is some kind of Darwinian evolution of physics, which will explain the development of the universe, using small feedback loops. Something simple - that creates complexity. And not in the sense of elementarity, meaning as a building block, because then the question returns how we knew to create such a wonderful building block. But in the learning sense: a simple, natural mechanism. Therefore, the equations should be understood not as external laws, for example as computer code, that creates a simulation inside, but as laws that are created from within, like the laws of biology. The laws of physics as emerging laws. Otherwise the universe looks artificial and not natural. The artificial is what is learned from the outside (like when a person builds or programs a computer), while the natural is what is learned from within, inside the system (like when a person is learned in evolution). Natural physics is learned within the universe. And if there is a brain of the universe, for example a neural network within the laws of nature, then this brain needs to be part of the universe. But cosmic evolution is the solution that will seem most natural to us. And it will seem most natural to us if it not only affects the wonderful parameter tuning of the equations, but creates the wonderful equations themselves. It may need to be an almost mathematical mechanism of complexity, that is, mathematical evolution. And in mathematics there is no shortage of complexity and no shortage of mechanisms that create complexity, and no shortage of some deep embedded intelligence, created in a simple way. And perhaps after we reach the equations of everything, there will be another scientific stage that is mathematical, not physical, of deriving these equations from some primary mathematical laws, that is, finding a simpler mathematical mechanism that creates the laws of nature. It is possible that the understanding of why the universe is mathematical and why there is mathematics at all and what this phenomenon is, is what underlies the problem of physical laws that seem to have been learned - these are not two separate puzzles. Behind the theory of everything - there needs to be hidden a theory of nothing. Therefore, not a starting point and a physical big bang will satisfy us, but a learning big bang, which comes from a learning starting point, in which everything is learned, everything is internal, and nothing is from outside.

The Connection between Lawfulness and Equations in the Mirror of Learning

What is needed is variability in the laws of the universe, in space and time, like the uncertainty in quantum mechanics. Flexible laws of nature (changing slightly in time and differing slightly in space, or in any other coordinate), which have parallel and competing possibilities. But this is not enough, because an evaluation mechanism is needed, which is not the anthropic principle. Because we know that we are a unique phenomenon in the universe, and that there is no complex life on ordinary planets, and therefore we know that we are special, but we are not dependent on constants on a hair's breadth, but on an improbable combination of probable events, and in addition we must assume that our universe is typical, and perhaps the only one. Is the very existence of the universe not artificial? Yes, it is artificial - and we understand that there is a higher intelligence here, in the very mathematicality of the universe - but it is not artificial in this way. There is a hidden intelligence here. The laws of the universe are not artificially conspicuous, but genius, that is, artificial in a way that seems natural, and perhaps must seem natural to someone who is part of the universe, but seems natural in a certain way, which is an elusive essence of the universe, which theoretical physicists actually recognize and rely on. It is precisely in previous cosmological pictures in history that the universe seemed more artificial, and less genius, that is, more understandable. But the very existence of such a structure certainly testifies to genius design, at the mathematical level, that is, beautiful design. And this, even from the very fact that it is so difficult to understand the laws, they are genius, and require the joint effort of countless geniuses, mathematicians and physicists alike (mathematicians also study the physics in our universe, after all, because physics is mathematical, and who knows if mathematics itself is not physical). Therefore, the nature of the universe is what contradicts the anthropic principle, and we must assume that there exists some strange interaction between the laws of nature themselves and what happens in nature, which is not unidirectional from the laws of nature to the world, but that the world affects the laws of nature. It is precisely the enormous size of the world, which is one of the most amazing properties of the universe, that shows that perhaps there is a need for many slightly different possibilities (which we may not be able to discover, in differences below the Planck size) of laws, that there is some teeming population of the laws of physics and not one law, meaning that our universe is a kind (perhaps very similar to itself at this stage, after undergoing optimization, but in which there are small fluctuations of mutations in the laws). But all this does not help at all if there is no evaluation mechanism of some kind, as we know from learning. And our very existence (the anthropic principle) is a very weak evaluation mechanism, of zero or one, which exists only at the end, in the final result, and does not assist learning along the way. From everything we know about learning - it doesn't work like that. Because if it is so, then it is NP, meaning it is a universe that learns by brute-force, by trying all possibilities, meaning a shallow universe that has only grammar. Is there some mysterious mechanism in which if interesting and complex and incompressible information was not created (black hole?) - and an interesting game was not created - the rules of the game become different? This also doesn't sound plausible in terms of learning, and what is plausible is that the rules of the game - the laws of nature - are simply laws of a different kind, just like the laws of the genome (which are not the laws of evolution itself). That is, not external laws to the world, that determine it from the outside, like game rules and grammar, but internal laws, like how the genome determines the mechanisms of the animal. That is: learning laws. And this is in contrast to the external lawfulness in physics today, or the common logical view of the laws of mathematics, external to it, as if it were a language with grammar, that takes place within the law. On the contrary, we are looking for a law that takes place within the world, and not a world that takes place within the law. We do not want to be within the law, like the Kafkaesque aspiration, which in another era could have been read as an allegory of the aspiration of physics and science to decipher an incomprehensible world, but with lawfulness, that we live inside. The absurd situation is the linguistic situation, in which you live in a game whose rules you do not understand, and they are imposed on you from outside. You speak in a language whose grammar rules you do not understand, or play a game whose purpose and rules you do not know - but still play, because you are inside. This is exactly the problem of NP - an external law that you cannot really understand how to solve from within (and even - in a completely Kafkaesque way - if you understand the law as its external wording. Like physicists who fail to solve the equations of the theory of relativity). But our world is more like someone living in a dream whose rules he can change, or at least whose rules can change, than someone living in a nightmare, where the rules are imposed from outside, and change only so that they are not understood. We do not want to be within the law - but within the system, in which the law itself is also found (and does not determine it from outside, and reduces it and determines everything, or alternatively empties it of content and determines nothing, as an external grammatical law, which only allows and actually marks the choice that exists within it as random and arbitrary and meaningless - all possibilities are correct, there is no meaning to the game beyond its rules, which is contrary to the way grammar actually works in language, in which it is indeed not responsible for meaning, but just a disciplinary sergeant). We want to be inside the Talmud - not inside the Halacha. That is, to be with the law, to be part of the law, and to take responsibility for the law, which is poured upon us from outside and from above - from heaven. We want physics of Talmud, and not some universe that works according to a heavenly Shulchan Aruch. We want to be a species in evolution and part of the world of life, and not exist within a cosmic computer, within an operating system that was designed and programmed. We want to learn, and not be within the language. We want to pass the gatekeeper who stands before the law, but not to enter into it, but to unite with it, like in sex. We want an intimate, internal law. Kafka is the experience of external law. Either it is not understood - or it is boring and bland, just like grammar. And in both cases it is arbitrary. And its explanatory power is small. If physics really aspires to explanation, and not just to push the explanation back (like a child who asks why, and then why why, and why why why, etc.), it needs to aspire to learning. Only it is the true explanation of the explanation, that is, a true explanation. Therefore, we may see in the future laws of nature that stem from some interaction with the future, some learning mechanism, for example creating time that has many possibilities, to expand uncertainty, or that Occam's razor is built into the structure of the universe because of the tendency to compress information, that is, to create a most complex universe from the simplest rules, or God knows what. It is possible that the universe underwent rapid optimization at its beginning, and therefore after inflation we already see relatively converged laws of nature. String theory is currently a linguistic theory, of possibilities, even if we do not take it as some network of connections, which is a linguistic structure in its essence. A true basic theory will not be elementary - but learning, emerging. Perhaps a theory of directions and guidances, of arrows. The universe today in the eyes of physicists is a kind of sophisticated box, but what contradicts this picture, which would have been credible if it were stable, is precisely its development and creation. That is, time is what signals to us about learning, and space would have reconciled with linguistic possibilities, because we are within space, but we are not within time, but time is within us. Time is not an external law to us, but internal, and this is precisely because it has one dimension, so there is no place inside it but only direction. In all dimensions of space the universe looks the same, and it is amazing how big it is, without limit, but in the dimension of time the universe looks much smaller (in orders of magnitude, for example compared to Planck length and time), and it has at least one boundary (its beginning), and it looks completely different in distancing in this dimension, it does not look "the same" as in distancing in the dimensions of space, and hence it is indeed a dimension of a different kind. A learning dimension. Even if we discover that time is not a basic phenomenon, there will be some learning phenomenon beneath it that creates it, and perhaps we will discover that learning is more basic than time, and constitutes it. What will seem most learning to us is if there are two systems of laws: one produces very basic laws, like the very laws of evolution, which include within them a learning mechanism, and the second which is within the system creates complex laws that have undergone optimization, like the laws of the genome, or like the laws of the universe appear today. And the system for determining the laws of laws needs to be primitive, and its lack of optimality should explain why large parts of the universe are not learning, that is, just boring. Why is there always a part in the universe that creates greater complexity, again and again, and the other parts remain behind, but the potential of complexity is never abandoned. That is, why is the universe built as a pyramid of complexity, and not as a tower, that is, the base of non-complexity is broad in its dimensions at every stage from the next stage of complexity, like how the stars are lonely in black skies. Or that chemistry is rare in the universe, relative to the rest of the matter that combines according to physics. Biology is certainly not the first stage of complexity above a wide base or area of lack of complexity, but there were many stages like it before it. And it's a bit strange to claim that this is random, that is, that we are some extreme standard deviation in the flat landscape, of a very high mountain that is a standard deviation from an infinite desert, when the mountain is not only very high, like some quantum leap from the vacuum field, but it is also a giant pyramid, where each stage stands on a wider stage below it, and therefore the mountain looks natural, unlike a tower. It seems that every stage in the universe tries to make the next stage above it complex, even if it is difficult to imagine that it foresees what will be above them. And therefore it is nice that the basic laws of nature are becoming richer and richer, and not poorer, because they are built to allow a wealth of possibilities. And one of the main sources of wealth that exists in mathematics is the interaction between its two parts: the continuous and the discrete. Mathematics is a dual phenomenon, like politics, and it has right and left, which keep changing names since its split beginning between number theory and geometry in Greece. Later there were pairs like arithmetic and calculus, or algebra and analysis, or discrete and continuous, and of course the connections between the two parts are perceived as deep, that is, as a secret of miracles, from the Pythagorean theorem and Pythagorean triples among the Greeks, through Descartes' analytic geometry, and to this day in modern mathematics (for example the Langlands program). Indeed, despite all the connections found between the two sides, even today mathematical culture is double, and related to two sides of the human brain: the discrete-algebraic-combinatorial side, which is a linguistic side, and opposite it the visual side, which deals with topology, manifolds, differential geometry, and so on. Logic and computation are simply "extreme left", that is, extreme discreteness and linguisticality, while for example complex functions are extreme continuity, that is "extreme right". Even in the first year at universities they start from both sides of the culture: in linear algebra on one side, and in calculus on the other. Of course, the very fact that we have two different areas in the brain that deal with vision and language is not accidental, but stems from the serial and grammatical side of language, which creates combinations in time, like in the genome, versus the spatial side of vision, which combines in space. That is, a Kantian reduction cannot be made to the two types of mathematics as stemming from the difference between the two areas of the human brain, but the very existence of these two areas stems itself from the existence of two essentially different phenomena in the universe, that is, from physics, in which there is time and space. The mathematical duality reflects in its depth a physical duality. And we even see this in the different levels of complexity of the universe, which jump between continuous complexity and discrete complexity, and it is possible that the interaction between the discrete and the continuous is what underlies complexity in the universe, as we see its amazing depth also in mathematics. If the universe were entirely discrete or entirely continuous, we might not see this complexity, and therefore it is possible that the bottom layer is not purely discrete and not purely continuous, but a combination of the two from the outset, and not that the nature of the universe is really only one of these two. And from the interaction between a more discrete layer and a more continuous one beneath it, or vice versa, complexity is necessarily created. In fact, this duality is the most basic mathematical phenomenon, and therefore it probably teaches us something deep about the universe. In fact, we saw in the twentieth century a transition in the field of artificial intelligence from a discrete logical view to a more analytical and continuous view, as in deep learning, and if we look at the brain, it is possible that the feedback equations of neurons are differential equations. But in the end, we see in the neural networks in the brain the appearance of the discrete in the very phenomenon of the spike, at every stage after the continuous summation of inputs. And in deep learning we also see the combination between infinity 1 in derivatives (the backward pass in the learning stage, but which passes through algebraic matrices backwards), and linear algebra 1 (the forward pass in the action stage, which is slightly disturbed by a continuous non-linear and non-algebraic stage in firing). That is, in the deep network we see a deep layer cake of transitions between the discrete and the continuous again and again, where the continuous is the evaluation (like beauty and attraction between the sexes) and the discrete is what is passed on (like the genome), which is subject to continuous evaluation in the next layer. So it is possible that learning is rooted in such transitions, and in such layers, again and again (in evolution, generations are learning layers). This is the idea of the fourth postulate of the philosophy of learning, of the existence of men and women in a learning system. Our problem with physics today is that it believes in intelligent design, whether it was once called God, or the anthropic principle, or mathematics as Einstein believed in it (as well as all theoretical physics) as a kind of beautiful Greek intelligent design, which is not essentially different from the Pythagoreans, and borders on mathematical mysticism. But in terms of learning, the laws of physics must be created in a feedback loop, and preferably - in interaction with some evaluation, which prevented it from creating a boring universe. In this, the Jewish God, who is learning-based and descends in stages from the Big Bang to the kingdom, differs from the perfect philosophical God as perceived by secular gentiles in particular, which is essentially a definition of God, and not God. Therefore, the Jewish God is capable of giving laws, and even learning laws, that change. He is capable of having content, and not just being a form. We want physical laws with content, concrete, that stem from a certain physical development, and not just a form of laws, sitting in eternity, in the sky or in space, and not developing. Does our universe know how to solve NP problems, that is, is it capable of receiving a criterion and finding a perfect solution for it? If so, then perhaps it can skip all learning. It can find the mathematical solution in one step, and thus we will never be able to trace its learning. But if it too is subject to computation, then we will be able to trace the steps by which the universe arrived at the current solution, that is, the current laws. Is mathematics itself subject to computation, as it seems from the laws of logic, or are there continuous parts in it that will not submit to any discrete framework, just as the continuum hypothesis did not submit to logic (and confirms the logical (!) separateness of the two parts of mathematics)? No matter what the computational capability of the universe is - it has a computational limit, and therefore there is learning in it. Only if the universe is not computational at all in its essence - it is possible that we will never be able to understand it. It will always seem divine to us. Even if we discover the final equation, it will always remain as such: an equation. An obscure, Kafkaesque, transcendent law. And mathematics itself will remain transcendent. We may understand how, but we will never understand why, and we will not truly understand. We will always dwell in someone else's fantasy, as in a nightmare, and not in our own fantasy, as in a dream. But the more logical thing in terms of learning is that there is no direct evaluation of complexity, and optimization of it, but that it is a byproduct of another learning mechanism, as in evolution. Learning creates complexity by itself, even when it comes to deal with another criterion altogether (see evolution). Therefore, it is likely that the complexity of the universe stems from some iterative mechanism in itself, which only because it is iterative reaches complexity, and this is a more economical explanation. Complexity can be created from recursiveness itself, self-reference, as in differential equations. The breakthrough will be when we understand what the universe is actually trying to do, like a Schopenhauerian will that exists in everything but has a purpose obscure to us, and as a result of applying this will to this will itself, or more precisely this mechanism that changes itself, and applying it again and again, learning and complexity are created within the universe. Evolution is the most natural explanation that exists in science today, and it creates a goal - to survive and replicate - without anyone defining this goal. Purpose does not have to be unnatural. Therefore, purpose can still exist in the world. We can rebel against this purpose, just as we can rebel against evolution through suicide, but this purpose is greater than us and does not ask us, just as even when we commit suicide we benefit evolution. And since it seems that a large part of the universe is not as complex as it could be, it is clear that the optimization is not directly towards complexity, but complexity is its product. What is the universe trying to learn? To learn this - is a central interest of our learning, in its understanding of itself as part of the learning of the world itself, that is, as understanding the whole world as being inside - within learning.

The connection between creativity, knowledge and depth

Why is there a connection between high creativity and broad general knowledge? Because creativity is not a flash of insight, that is, a forward breakthrough, which exceeds the width of the front, and which is by nature one-time. Creativity is actually lateral thinking, branching, which is capable, like in quantum theory, of moving in all possible ways in parallel. That is, creativity is a method, a methodology, and not a leap, and when it jumps it does so with the ability to move around, and not with the miracle of a teleportation shortcut. A single move in a network is never creative, and cannot be distinguished from a random move, or luck (if successful). Only inherently networked movement, which comes out of every point in the network in many directions in parallel, is creative (and thus we often encounter the intellectual who is a one-trick pony, and has built an entire career on it). Therefore, creativity is not some deviation from learning (which is "routine"), on the contrary, true creativity is learning-based, it is a creative method, and therefore it is itself routine. It is not a property of any particular thought, but of a method, and therefore it is a systemic property, of the ability to move in all directions. That is, it is defined by means of possibilities, and not by means of any realization, which can only testify to the possibilities. Therefore, it is an ideal that exists only in aspiration to the limit - but reaching it exactly is not possible, and if it were possible it would nullify it (there is an essential, and in fact infinite, difference between infinity, and any large number, however huge - this is the idea of the limit, and of the aspiration to infinity). If we were a random system - our creativity would have no meaning. Only a learning system can be creative, because only in it is the ability to learn in all directions, and in many directions in parallel, valuable. A quantum system that acts like a quantum system is not creative, but a learning system that acts like a quantum system, and is capable, for example, of holding within it a possibility and its opposite, without them nullifying each other, is creative. Can a person be creative if he rolls a die? No, because he does not integrate over all possible possibilities and then weigh them and draw from them proportionally only when he must come out of the superposition into a concrete solution. Therefore, there is no such thing as a "creative thought", but only "creative thinking". A work of art is never creative, only an artist is. A mathematician, who is limited to P, and manages to think from all kinds of directions because he has many methods, is creative. But a non-deterministic Turing machine or brute-force computation, which turns to all directions in parallel to an equal degree, are not creative. The existence of creativity stems from the very gap between P and NP. If there will perhaps be a quantum computer (for example) or another (for example, a string computer) that can think about all possible directions, then learning in our complexity class, P, is not basic in the universe, and our creativity is also worthless (including all art and literature, whose value stems from the gap between evaluation ability and execution ability, which will close). But there is learning between the complexity class of physical computation in the universe (however high it may be) and complexity classes above it in the hierarchy, and there is creativity. Such a situation will show that our intelligence is really inferior to a higher intelligence than it in principle. Therefore, creativity stems from the very computational hierarchy, and so does learning, and they are the gate to reach from the complexity class that our computer (our brain) is capable of solving - to the one above it. That is, they mediate between us and our evaluation ability, which is always higher than the execution ability. The evaluation chooses laterally between possibilities, and the computation chooses one possibility. But learning changes the single computation and gives it flexibility, and creativity allows itself a wide range of possibilities.

And in the same way: general knowledge is not knowledge, but the generality of knowledge - what remains when knowledge is forgotten. Broad general knowledge is defined, like a network, precisely by means of the large holes in it, which it covers. It is not a continuous mass of knowledge (like regular knowledge), but a network that wraps wide areas. General knowledge knows how to approach the areas it networks, even if it does not know what is inside. It is not a specific content, as much as possible and as much as it will be, but familiarity with many different methods that encompass many fields (therefore it sees a connection between them). General knowledge is very weak in trivia items, but can be strong in enlightening anecdotes, that is, educational ones, and this is its only tendency towards the exceptional. General knowledge knows how to guess, and its essence is educated guessing, and therefore it is expressed precisely when one does not know how to answer the question. Because it wraps everything, and is familiar with the coordinate systems of many fields, it is able to continue these coordinates into any specific problem, and approach it from around many possible directions, that is, in a creative way. Coordinates precisely do not know every point in space, or in a certain area, like regular knowledge, which is a spot you have already discovered on the map. Their essence is that they are able to reach and map precisely black holes in the knowledge map, or areas you have not yet been to. General knowledge is knowledge of how to learn in all kinds of fields, and therefore it is knowledge of how to act, and not knowledge as an object. It is form and not matter. Therefore, the most general knowledge is philosophy. And this is also the definition of philosophy - the most general knowledge, and hence its connection to creativity. Philosophy is not specific knowledge in any field but it is knowledge of how to act in all fields. Therefore, it is not detached from the knowledge of its time and its fields, but wraps them. In the thinking of its time - it knows all the possibilities. Therefore, philosophy changes between periods, because knowledge changes, including the methods of different fields. There is no timeless philosophy, which is not dependent on time. And not because it is context-dependent - but because it is the context. It is what is around. It is the network that encompasses all fields. The philosopher is one who knows this network and exposes it and brings it to awareness (this is the discovery stage in philosophy), and then finally he controls it and it is subject to any manipulation of his (this is the decadence stage in philosophy), and then finally it becomes philosophical knowledge (that is, dies). All past philosophies we can know only as knowledge, but since we no longer live them, because they are dead, we have no access to them as philosophy, that is, as the general framework. They have already become specific and routine knowledge, mechanics that can be operated, and not what operates us, and that we may not yet have learned - how we learn. The moment we have learned a certain philosophy it has turned from a method into knowledge, but philosophy itself as a field is this form of learning, which because it is the most general by definition, is constantly changing to be more and more general, as fields of knowledge develop, like a limit of a shape that grows and even receives more and more dimensions. But if we try to jump to the limit itself, and think about infinite dimensions, our thinking itself will collapse and we will reach the mystical, because we are within learning and cannot jump out of it. Therefore, philosophical knowledge is constantly accumulating, but this does not mean that we are reaching the correct philosophy, but a broader and more comprehensive philosophy. And so it is in life, we do not reach more correct conclusions with age, but we do reach a more comprehensive view. And hence the knowledge of the elderly, which is general knowledge, precisely in the betrayal of memory, that is, the betrayal of knowledge.

What is depth in philosophy, in which it differs from the general knowledge of the fox, because the hedgehog is deep? The generalization and comprehensiveness of the most general knowledge possible. Depth is not only underneath - but around. It encompasses the system, because the foundation of the system always extends outside the system, because it is learning-based. Depth is the system's aspiration to its limit from within, because learning, including about the system's boundaries, is always from within the system. Hence the importance of philosophical learning as expanding the system from within. It allows for more possibilities, but not everything in it is possible, for then there would be no learning. Learning is always limited, and therefore it is always expanding. If it were not limited it could not expand. There is no general learning algorithm, or learning formula for everything (for example: the incompleteness that stems from Chaitin's uncomputability). Therefore, the basis of learning is always an object of learning itself, and therefore philosophy exists, which is the field that deals with this. In our days, so many fields already speak "learning", and justify everything implicitly or explicitly according to learning, as the true evaluation criterion that underlies them all, but awareness of learning has not yet reached philosophy outside of Netanya, and learning is still not the general concept on which philosophy is based, and therefore philosophy has become a private field of knowledge, academic, and a profession, like all fields of knowledge. But this is the dead philosophy of the past - not that of the future. And this is the meaning of a false prophecy. The prophecy of the past. It tries precisely to limit the development of the system and put a framework on it, and therefore serves as a petrifying factor, like philosophy in the Middle Ages. Therefore philosophy, if it acts as a gatekeeper, is not necessarily a learning factor, and sometimes it is dragged by its feet forcibly, despite its resistance, after the developing and learning reality. It does not always stand at the head of the camp, and therefore when it passes after it in the rear - it sometimes tells it the obvious. In learning, time is important. And what is important today - will be trivial in a hundred years. Therefore, philosophy as a discipline betrays philosophy as learning. It leaves the field to organizational consulting, to computerized learning, and to New Age charlatans. Therefore, if one talks about learning today it sounds like tantra. Everyone is already talking about learning, but philosophy insists on speaking in language - within the framework. And it fell in love with language precisely because it is a framework. Therefore, philosophy is not eternal but it is the race to catch up with time in one more step. There is no final philosophy, but the infinite is not philosophical. Therefore, a small step for Netanya - a giant leap for mankind. And on the other hand, there is no point in continuing here in this language, on this site, which by the time it reaches the world, if at all, the world will no longer understand what was being talked about. Learning that is not part of the system - is not learning. And the system rejects Netanya. And is interested in Netanyahu. Because no one is interested in depth, but in what is at the very top. Why are people interested in the most uninteresting and non-learning things, and not interested in the most interesting and learning things? Doesn't this contradict the definition of interest as the interest of learning? Why is no one interested in philosophy, for example? Today, no one appreciates general knowledge anymore, and there is actually a growing trend of professionalism, and rewarding the narrow expert, like the programmer in a specific platform. Pornography interests them more than philosophy because it is the interest of the learning of sex, of evolution. That is, people are always stuck in learning at a low level, which for more advanced learning seems like a lack of learning, like routine computation and mere execution. Its mechanism is already exposed, and therefore seems mechanical, but it is still interested in its interests, and still learning (evolution still works despite us learning Talmud). Current philosophers are still stuck in linguistic learning, workers are still stuck in capitalist learning, and the problem is not that primitive learning needs to be eradicated (philosophers are also interested in women and money). General, deeper learning (and especially philosophical) is not necessarily a matter of the individuals in the system, but it is a matter of the system itself. The system itself is becoming more and more interested in learning today, even if this is hidden from its individual parts. Therefore it is general learning, and therefore it is general knowledge. Just as a thug can be interested in a bimbo, and still advance the learning of evolution, despite not believing in evolution. The immune system can be interested in disease, even when every cell in it is only interested in a specific microbe, and its proteins - in biochemistry. Learning is the learning interest of the world today, even if no one in the world is currently interested in it (outside of Netanya). Is it suspicious and strange that it defines itself through itself, as if we are at some special moment in history (and perhaps final and decisive) in which we discover that learning itself is the interest of learning, in a circular way? No, that's how it was in every philosophy, even when the next philosophy arrives it will define itself through itself, and not necessarily through learning, because philosophy aspires to the most general, and learning will seem narrow to it, a particular case, and one of its fields. And this is a general property of philosophical learning. The most general thing defines itself through the most general thing. Space is defined by means of space. And let's note, that the system here is a dimension of space (and therefore we dealt with width), while learning is a dimension of time, so their common boundary is the expansion of our conceptual universe. And philosophy is its dark energy.

Evaluation and construction

How does learning work? There is no general method or algorithm here, but one can say with the help of what it learns: directions and evaluations. With the help of - because in learning it is always about partial and incomplete mechanisms. Direction is not instruction - it is direction and not a computer command. And evaluation is not a truth judgment - it is only an attempt at judgment, for example a rule of thumb and not a mathematical law. The peahen cannot evaluate the genome of the peacock - only the size of the tail. In learning we are looking for good practice and not a binding law - prohibiting or commanding - and on the other hand also not just a descriptive or enabling law, like in the possibilities of language, grammar and logic. We are looking for considerations and not the application of rules of logic and inference. Directions are pushes, hints, suggestions, advice, and even goals - anything that outlines a direction, partially, that is, reduces the likelihood of some directions and increases the likelihood of others, and helps to choose between possibilities, or shows the existence of new possibilities at all. A method is a systematic system of directions and evaluations, and therefore there can be many methods - there is no correct method. A method can only be more correct than others, and even that only in certain learning domains (or formally: certain distributions) - there are no free lunches. What is the difference between directions and evaluations? Directions show and demonstrate where and how to progress, that is, they are more similar to a commanding law but of the learning type, and in their adoption they become what drives learning, that is, they are a possible commanding law. And evaluations are more similar to a descriptive and judging law, and show how and where we have already progressed. The realization of directions during learning is a law from within - and the realization of evaluations is a law from without. Directions are towards the future, and evaluations are towards the past. Directions are feed that goes in, and evaluations are feedback. Evaluations say what was good or bad, and directions say what will be good or bad. Directions are pushes from behind and the beginning of momentum in a certain direction, and evaluations are frontal stops and the possibility of changing direction (even increasing the current direction, in a positive evaluation, is a change of it). The fact that evaluations are external to the learning process so far does not make them external to the learning system - evaluations are an internal part of the learning system. The peahens are part of the evolution of the peacock species. When it comes to evaluations, they can create a hierarchy, for example if in the learning system there is an evaluation layer, and above it there are more such layers, such as in the organization of a limited company, or in an artistic hierarchy, or in financial investments. On the other hand, it is possible that everyone evaluates everyone without hierarchy between them, like researchers who cite other researchers, or friends who share with others on Facebook. Such hierarchies are expressed in the structure of the learning system, but in addition there may be a hierarchy in the course of learning itself, which stems not from the spatial structure of the learning system, but from the temporal structure of the learning process itself. For example, in learning there may be progress in a certain direction, in some move, as a line that goes forward (for example, a move in the Talmud, or finding a proof in mathematics, or writing a book). But there may also be progress of an entire system, and such tends to be more gradual, where the passing time creates periods and layers in it, like lines or horizontal strips one above the other (for example, layers of interpretation above the entire Talmud, or development of an entire mathematical field, or a literary movement). Here we are not talking about a relatively isolated progress in a certain direction, in breaking through the front, but about parallel progress in a certain direction, in a wide front. When a person learns something new for them, they never immediately apply it to all their thoughts, but need to go through a process where the innovation is performed again and again throughout the space of their thoughts, until it is internalized and becomes part of their thinking - because we're not talking about a computer that had a new rule added to it, but about a learner (additionally, let's note the repeated words: possible and possible - because in learning there is no general algorithm, but learning possibilities, some of which we point to in guidance. And let's note, that the expression let's note - this too is exactly the intention). Additionally, let's note the connection between this and the idea of construction in learning. Not only in broad horizontal progress, of area, can we see the building on the previous layer, but also in the case of the breakthrough vertical line we can see it as built in stages on top of past moves. Construction is a way to describe the progress of learning, and to give it markers, and therefore it is itself a learning aid, and for example can be part of a method, which performs learning as construction. But does such a dichotomous distinction really exist between the learning system and the learning that takes place in it (and therefore between the structure of the system and the structure of learning)? And is this the true source of the distinction between evaluations, which are a matter of the system, examining the learning process, and guidances, which are a matter of the learning process, and guide it within the system? Ultimately this is an artificial distinction. What characterizes evaluations is the view that separates and divides between evaluators and those evaluated. But sometimes this is even an internal division, that happens as part of the learning process, and certainly also directly guides it (I perform an evaluation of every sentence that comes out of my mouth, or that I wrote, and every thought that arises before me, and thus progress). Therefore in all large learning systems we will encounter evaluators and those evaluated as separate and separated functions, sometimes in principle, to prevent corruption and destruction of learning (if I don't have in my mind an independent evaluation function external to my current thought - I won't know how to judge it correctly, and will start to think nonsense that reinforces itself - this is madness). On the other hand, guidances are a unifying view, that sees the connection between the guider and the guided, and connects between what caused the guidance (which can be external) to the change within the learning process. Therefore it is not the distinction between the actor (the learner, for example the learning system) and the action (learning) that underlies the difference between evaluation and guidance. Learning is not an action where you are separate from what you are doing, because it is not an external action, but your own way of acting. Learning is the way of action of the learning system, and there is no way to distinguish between its course of action and its structure, because both are its way of learning. These are two ways of looking at the same thing, which try to distinguish and divide it into two using looking at it as time (the action) or as space (structure of the system). But from a pure learning perspective, anything that affects learning is a learning aid, and your choice to look at it in one way or another is itself a learning aid. You don't have access to some internal, true mechanism that operates the learning, otherwise it would become an algorithm and not learning. You cannot make an absolute reduction of it, only a partial one, and this partial reduction is exactly the learning aid. Therefore you have a choice whether you prefer your partial reduction as a structure that creates a process or as a process that expresses a structure. But really, you as a learning system have no way to distinguish between the two. For example, is structure necessarily less flexible and more fixed than process? Not necessarily. And there can be a flexible structure, or a rigid process. Within learning itself, the system is a derivative of learning just as learning is a derivative of the system, because there is no outside at all. Everything from the perspective of learning is inside. Learning is within the system, but the system is within - part of - the learning. Only from the outside can one say that there is an outside to the system, and that learning is the internal action of the system (the learner). Learning is not something you perform, like another action, for example eating. It is more internal to you even than thinking, because it is beneath thinking. It is not a type of thinking, but thinking is a type of learning. Therefore the perception of learning as inserting material relies on the mistake of seeing it as eating food, or as an action on an object, for example building a wall from bricks. But is this just a mistaken and meaningless identification, as in a Wittgenstein-style analysis? No, because seeing it as eating, or as accumulating material, or as building, or any other metaphor, are useful learning aids, which establish useful learning methods, and these aids themselves are part of the learning. If so, what distinguishes between guidances, which are the third postulate of learning, and evaluations, which are the fourth postulate? Is it just a matter of preference, and is it not a fundamental division but learning aids, albeit useful ones, called guidances and evaluations? No. Because the source of the idea of evaluations, and its objective basis, is mathematical: P is different from NP, meaning knowing how to evaluate is fundamentally different from knowing how to guide towards the solution. In fact, evaluation is easy, and guidance is difficult. It's easy to be a peacock, judge, or critic and hard to be a peacock, judged, or criticized. But the difference here is not between easy and difficult, or even between efficient and inefficient. These are just expressions of a basic learning division: it is possible to know how to evaluate. Evaluation is something that can be learned and finished learning, and performed as an algorithm. It does not require learning during its execution. And on the other hand, it is not possible to know how to guide, and therefore guidance is always subject to doubt, and it is always unknown where to really progress. Guidances do not provide an algorithm, but enable progress, and therefore they are always part of learning, and not part of what is already known how to do. The evaluation performed by evaluators is something that, even if it is largely arbitrary, is much simpler than the learning task, and in fact it is a foreign non-learning element within learning - a place where the known meets the unknown, and judges it. Evaluations are in P, while guidances try to help solve an NP problem. It is much easier to be a literary critic who knows how to evaluate a masterpiece than to write a masterpiece. It is much easier to evaluate the value of a startup than to establish a startup. It is much easier to understand philosophy that has already been written than to invent new philosophy. These are not just changes in quantity, for example how long it takes, but in the essence of the action. The learner is within a search, and has many learning possibilities, and everything is open, while the evaluator is within a closed state, where he applies his tools against learning and search that has been done. Let's ask: Doesn't someone who reads philosophy learn? He learns to the extent that a search is performed within his system, and therefore he can learn more or less from the same action itself, and be a good or bad reader. If he reads like a parrot, or memorizes without understanding, his learning is low, and if he connects what is learned to new ideas of his own, or thinks about possible directions other than what is in the text before him, he is learning at a level that is approaching the original learning that created the text. There are different degrees of learning. Because we are not algorithms, but learning machines, it is very difficult for us to imitate the lack of learning that an algorithm in P would operate on the text. For example we cannot copy the text into ourselves like to a hard drive, and know it without learning anything. But in general, evaluation requires much lower levels of learning than being the evaluated bringing learning to be evaluated, and it is much more knowledge than learning, even if these are only ideal types, because we cannot not learn, and only know purely, because we are not machines of knowledge but of learning. And if we are precise, we cannot know anything. Not because of epistemic uncertainty, but because knowledge is not a human function, and a learning system can only approach knowledge but learning will always be mixed in. That is why our memory is so vulnerable to later learning. Because we never knew our knowledge - we only learned it. If so, the question returns to its place. What is the essential difference between evaluation and guidance? We have no choice but to rely on an internal learning difference, which is the difference between the position of the teacher and the position of the learner. The teacher evaluates, and in doing so he knows, and by his very evaluation he presents an object of knowledge to the student, and therefore the teacher teaches what is already known. And the learner, as in research, stands before the unknown, and therefore all he has is guidances. And even if he stands before a teacher, what is known to the teacher is unknown to him, and therefore he approaches the evaluation with guidances. But if he has already learned something, then he can evaluate another, meaning he received the knowledge. Within a learning system there are elements that are in the position of the teacher, and those that are in the position of the student, and even within the same person himself, as a system, he is able to think of an idea and then evaluate it, and the transition between evaluation and guidance again and again is a transition between two different worlds of complexity. For a person can know how to evaluate something, and usually he still doesn't know how to do it, and is looking for the right direction. For example he can evaluate when a philosophical idea is successful, but still cannot find a successful idea. This is the struggle that stems from P being different from NP. Therefore construction stems from the transition between stages of search and evaluation, and the moment we find something that stands up to our evaluation, and seems correct and good to us, we add it as a brick to the building, and continue to try to search for the next brick, built on what we have already found, until we find it. This is how we progress in learning. In the search stage we move with the help of guidances, because we have no solution but only directions of solution, and evaluate them frequently, until it satisfies us. And in the second stage we place the solution after it has stood up to our evaluation, and therefore it becomes an assumption from which we can continue. Of course sometimes the evaluation is not unambiguous, or changes, and therefore we are able to return to our previous assumptions, and build other things on them. But we never have a basis, on which we start to build, but the wall is infinite from below, and continues even before our birth, for example in the building that was already done in evolution, and in physics, and in mathematics, and in assumptions so basic that we cannot even imagine them. There is no source to learning. But the fact that there is no beginning of the path, does not mean that there is no path we are walking on, and does not mean that we cannot progress, and even struggle to progress, and find the continuation of the path. Evaluation is the moment when we look back and ask whether we walked correctly, or if another direction is preferable. And guidance is the signs with which we try to continue forward, and find the continuation of the path of our system. The same brain itself can serve in the position of teacher and student alternately, but in evolution the evaluator is usually the female and the evaluated is the male, and in fact these two positions define the two genders, of course as ideal types. And all learning moves alternately between the two genders during its progress. For example we suggest a certain idea here, and then examine it, again and again. And thus we demonstrate philosophical learning. Until we examine ourselves too much from the outside, and understand that there is no point in writing a sentence that no one will read.

Mathematics versus Evolution

Perhaps a final comment: The least understood learning mechanism, even less than the brain, is mathematics. And there is almost a mathematical proof for this, because the discovery of the laws of the universe, not to mention the laws closer to us, the biological ones, is ultimately a problem in P, and maybe even a finite problem. And even if it is possible that it is an infinite problem, only a finite part of it is accessible to us, and even if indeed finding regularity in every possible universe is a difficult problem and is in NP, physics has discovered that in our universe it is actually easier in practice. First of all, the laws are short. And although a mathematical description of them is much longer than the short equations that physicists like to show off with (a matter that is thus hidden), still the mathematical description comes for them "for free", because it contains no additional information that is not mathematically proven, that is, apparently all the information is in the physical equation, but this is not correct - there is information also in the mathematics behind it, and not all mathematics as a whole has zero information, because it also needs to be discovered, and it is in NP, and who knows what it would have been with other laws of nature. And this is seen precisely when demanding a computerized description of the universe, and not a mathematical one, which is reasonable to calculate from initial conditions (otherwise we will ask to calculate mathematics itself as well), in contrast to solving the equation itself (which is mathematically difficult). For a computerized description, that is, for software that calculates the universe, there will be a non-negligible length even if the equation is short, and this is the measure of information (therefore information needs to be limited in reasonable calculation, otherwise everything is a trivial algorithm of Occam's razor and that's not interesting). The assumption that finding the laws of our universe is in P is the assumption of physics being easier than mathematics, and it can be said that it is historically proven, in that physics already needs to move to problems far from our orders of magnitude, while mathematics is stuck with problems from the time of the Greeks that it has no idea even how to start solving. The physical method, like the mathematical one, does indeed require search, but this is apparently (!) a search of discovery and not invention, and therefore the space of possibilities is much more severely limited, and much less exponential. In physics one does not need to solve all the laws of physics of all possible universes, despite a slight tendency towards such useful expansion in modern physics, but one that does not approach the mathematical. Therefore in physics there is a mainstream or central streams, while in mathematics there is a map of fields spread out in width that cannot be encompassed, and it is like a map of countries. Mathematics is like space, while in the development of physics the dimension of time is central (to the point of trends), and there is a much more concentrated element of stream, or of an ant journey, while every mathematician is a very isolated ant relatively, with connection to a few ants at distances around it (it's true that there are areas with higher ant density, but this is not similar to the ant journey in the desert of physics). Mathematicians are stranger than everyone, because they are more isolated, in a space of NP, which is much larger than the mathematical space of the entire universe (which we know at any given historical moment covers a small part of the mathematics of its time, which only worsened in the modern period). Modern mathematics only knows less than its predecessors, and all the time in mathematics we discover how much we don't know, while in physics we discover that we know more and more, and look for things we don't know, for example waiting for experiments that will contradict the successful theory, in order to progress. In mathematics you can progress in any possible direction, and therefore you can't progress in it but only expand, and the more you expand, the border with what you haven't discovered will only widen, not narrow. Unlike physicists, no mathematician is looking for the final equation of mathematics or the mathematical theory of everything. And certainly does not hope for something short and concise. Therefore physics is a search in depth in the space of possibilities, which is a search where the dimension of time is central, while mathematics is a search in width, where the dimension of space is central. The learning mechanism of mathematics is even much less understood by us than that of the brain (which they say we understand the least), and that of the brain will be deciphered before it. What we understand in mathematics is only the mechanism of description - logic, that is, language - but about the learning mechanism we know almost nothing, and maybe we cannot know, it being an NP problem, and therefore even deny its existence (despite its existence, otherwise mathematics would not be possible as a human phenomenon, as opposed to a computerized phenomenon). And as for the mysterious brain - it may be deciphered in the next century, even before the deciphering of physics. Does anyone even think about deciphering mathematics? It will remain the last science, long after humans, even computers or any superintelligence will continue to wander in it. Is it possible that there is a limit to interesting mathematics, that is, learning mathematics? And that after a certain limit, which can be reached, mathematics has no interesting structure and is just nonsense? On the contrary, as one progresses mathematics becomes not only more difficult, which is perhaps a sign heralding lack of interest (difficulty is not interesting), but also deeper, more mysterious, amazing. In physics we could justify this effect with approaching the secret of the universe, but mathematics is not approaching any secret, but it is revealing deeper and deeper secrets, and the turtles continue all the way down, unlike physics which with all its depth has a finite depth, because it is a specific system that operates a specific world, that is, allows efficient calculation of it, and calculation has a finite reduction. For a law that is not at all calculable is not a physical law, and in fact calculation is in the essence of physicality, and infinite regression is not physical, even much less than action at a distance, or one that breaks causality, or beyond the maximum speed of the universe, which is the speed of light (whose meaning is one - the universe operates locally, and it doesn't matter its order of magnitude, which seems large to us but there is no absolute large and small, and this is after all a very slow speed in universal terms). Ultimately the speed of light is a limitation on calculation speed and not just information transfer. And the moment we discover the calculation mechanism of the universe it will turn out that if it is not a limitation on its processor speed then it is at least a limitation on its internet as distributed computation (which constitutes local computation, and after all on a small enough scale any computation becomes information transfer). And maybe we will even discover that the origin of the maximum speed of the universe is not in the limitation of calculation speed but in the limitation of learning speed. In fact, just as the speed of light in the theory of relativity connects between movement in time and that in space and unifies them as the same phenomenon, such a limitation on learning speed would connect between the progress of learning in time and that in space, and say that they are both the same phenomenon (for example: that search in depth always comes at the expense of search in width and vice versa), and therefore the concept of speed is the basic one and not space or time, because learning has speed, and space and time are just the two projections of it on the world of possibilities.

And in reversal of all this, the learning mechanism we understand best is evolution, precisely because it is the least efficient of all, and this is almost not learning but development. And the reason is that it is less deep than others, and therefore precisely through it as a basic example we can better understand the basis of learning, and what distinguishes it from other processes in nature (that is: almost all of them. Unlike other philosophies, which always claimed they were the basis of everything, learning is a very special and uncharacteristic phenomenon in the world, but it is what we should focus on because it is the most important of all - and this claim itself, of importance, is exceptional in philosophy and it is not even an ontological claim, but a learning claim, that is, of what is interesting from a philosophical perspective, and therefore was not possible in philosophy before learning). Regarding the understandability of evolution, it is not just about the algorithm itself (which we actually do not fully understand in depth), but about understanding the history of evolution in practice, which is documented for us more than any other mechanism, thanks to fossils. The geology of layers shows how natural the layered structure is to learning. And in fact the development of evolution almost stems from the geological layered property, and if there was no geological activity there would be no evolution. Biology stems from a physical property of the Earth system, and progresses on top of it. The essence of Earth is precisely not being an ideal planet for life, but on the edge of chaos, and always on the edge of extinction, and this is what caused the development of evolution again and again, and the reopening of the search, after its sinking into the stagnation of optimization. The mechanism that caused that after each extinction life actually developed to a higher level of development, and did not regress backwards as we would think in a simplistic way, is the preservation of knowledge in DNA, and its being not relatively expensive to preserve (unlike books), that is, its being nanometric. The digitality of information played a critical role here, and therefore evolution, as a particularly primitive and particularly basic learning, is in fact learning stemming from language, or perhaps only one layer above it (information). From a philosophical and conceptual perspective it is a much easier case than more advanced learnings, and therefore it was discovered first as a mechanism (Darwin). But only today, as its tree is spread before us, do we see how much each extinction actually brought about a leap in the elegance of life and its complexity. And this history completely ridicules the climate movement today, whose ignorance regarding the geological past - and regarding ecology not as an equilibrium but as a learning system developing over time - is embarrassing. There was never a paradise here, but many violent transitions between different types of hell. The greenhouse effect is a result of Earth as a chaotic system, where extinction is its nature, and not of something against the way of nature. It is precisely the resistance to it that is against the way of nature, like the attempt to preserve the environment static to prevent the next stage after us. Hence the worship of animals that have come recently, that did not really walk here before us, like the lion, as unchanging nature, which must not be exterminated, while precisely the extinction of less flexible animals is what advances life (and here Christianity, which offers solace to miserable animals, makes a serious comeback, and Nietzsche would roll over laughing at its mercy on the lion). The niche of the apex predator is always the most vulnerable, and hence its violence, because its days are always short and it is the first to be harmed by any change. The lion itself exterminated the large predatory dog, which was certainly no less majestic than it, but now we intervene in fights between cats and dogs, and make sure no one gets hurt too much (we forgot the lion's terrible cruelty the moment it stopped harming us, and now it's poor Samson). If so, evolution teaches us that learning benefits from first-order damage, that is, damage to life itself, that is, damage to processors, because it allows second-order flourishing, that is, flourishing in software, which comes at the expense of the old hardware. It emphasizes the difference between the computation itself, which is severely damaged when processors die, including severe damage to the entire network and its collapse (destruction of the ecosystem), and learning, which is computation on top of computation, which actually benefits from this. In this way, evolution shows that learning is not computation, and that it is a second-order phenomenon above computation. For example, it is not a network phenomenon (ecological, which is the network of connections between processors), but a second-order phenomenon on the network. It is not the regular operation of the system, but a special operation, which is an operation on the regular operation of the system. And this matter emphasizes the gap between the system and its learning, and why these are essentially two separate phenomena, even though learning is within the system, and they are not identical, and the system itself cannot be identified with learning. Although learning is the essence of the phenomenon of evolution - there is still a contrast between it and the phenomenon of life (and therefore it also needs death). Therefore, the Holocaust is not some modern/new basic category, but a basic category in learning, and its barbarity as a modern phenomenon stems precisely from its naturalness, that is, from its animality, in an attempt to apply the primitive learning phenomenon of evolution to the sophisticated learning phenomenon of culture and Judaism. Therefore, Nietzsche was not incidental here, nor was Darwin. The terrible thing is to destroy higher learning in the name of lower learning, and this in itself is an anti-learning crime, hence the focus on exterminating Judaism in particular, as it is the most advanced learning mechanism (Communism also wanted to destroy capitalist learning, the most advanced mechanism for its time, in the name of a primitive and pre-industrial learning mechanism - planning. In both cases, the father rises to murder his son who is wiser than him). And although science - another magnificent learning mechanism, and the most advanced of our time - seems to us immune thanks to its daughter technology, even today it is challenged by old mechanisms, and if they have the power they will rise to kill it. For example, if science's daughter, technology, will be able to advance at the same speed without it (for example if scientific knowledge gets stuck at some limit). And if the danger of slaughtering science seems fictional, let us remember the slaughter of culture and literature and art in the name of popularity and mass communication and fashion and the Darwinian "creative" mutation that dominates the art of our time (all products of low linguistic learning ideas). After all, in our days we are witnessing a cultural Holocaust, which is of course unconscious, and which drags philosophy with it, threatening to end with the Netanyahuite school, as it began with the Athenian school. Athens and Netanyahu: find the differences. Hint - in both: names of gods. But the amazing phenomenon in evolution is the rise of complexity precisely after a Holocaust, and less as a gradual-continuous process and more as a stepped-jumping process (although there is also an optical illusion of suppressed innovation that breaks out after a Holocaust). And we see the difference between it and cultural learning in that in culture it is precisely the opposite: the past is no less complex, when it is exemplary (Athens), and more than that - learning accelerates precisely as time extends between Holocausts, and Holocausts cause regression. For example, the cultural regression of Europe after the Holocaust to a level with partial medieval characteristics (the most severe of all: in plastic art). What creates cultural golden ages, like Athens and the Renaissance, is not what creates evolutionary compensations like the Cambrian explosion, but rather extreme gardening and cultivation of a certain cultural ecological system, and making it the most important and interesting for a certain culture (because this is actually not an ecological system but a learning system, and this is exactly the transformation between just periods, in which there is an ecology of creators, and golden ages, in which there is their school). In culture, the dinosaurs are the great creators, and in evolution the great creators are the mice that remained after them. And the moment culture switched to a more primitive mechanism, indeed the creators became mice. The deep reason why complexity rises in evolution is the encapsulation of computation, namely the different genes, each on its own. And then genes accumulate, like building blocks, allowing more and more building possibilities, as they multiply. If the computation was not performed in separate modules there would be no ability to combine them. For example, if the entire genome was one long procedural code, it would be very vulnerable, and very resistant to learning, precisely because of its efficiency and information compression, or precisely because its learning and adaptation mechanisms were towards parameter optimization (as with Lamarck). Therefore, learning is not optimization. In Lamarckian evolution there were no jumps, and there was no benefit in Holocausts. And perhaps what really distinguishes life on Earth is not the formation of life, which is common in the universe, but the formation of the genome, and it is the great innovation (and perhaps: in the learning mechanism it has, which may also not exist in every genome). We could certainly imagine analogous and not digital life, that is, not according to a book but according to feedback loops in the cell, and certainly we would not have to imagine that all the information would be concentrated in one place, but perhaps in an information network. Maybe there were even such lives here, but they became extinct long ago against competitors with learning DNA. The randomness of the change created encapsulation, so that not every change would get stuck in the program, like in a computer. Therefore, life developed each time - no matter what Holocaust there was - to a greater level of complexity, even if precisely the most developed and complex lives were exterminated each time (because they are the most vulnerable, at the top of the system), and this strange phenomenon should be called the complexity paradox. The solution to it is in understanding the nature of learning. The complexity of the system is not the complexity of learning. Who is complex at the top of the system is not necessarily the next stage in learning, but the innovation. The construction of learning is construction in time, and not in a given space of a certain system. Therefore, the stone at the top of learning is innovation, and not the highest stone that is at the top of the ecological system. Perhaps the dinosaur is the most developed and adapted to its environment, but the mouse (which survived) is more developed than it, and we just need to wait for the dinosaur to die and the mouse to break out. In what is the mouse more developed than the most developed reptile? Why can't intelligence be precisely in a mollusk with hands, like the genius octopus, or a bipedal reptile with hands, like the dinosaur, and it is precisely in the latest development, namely the mammal? Well, what happens with the mammal is that it is the teacher, that is, it is the one that invests the most in offspring. As evolution progresses, investment in offspring progresses, and humans are the peak. But why should this trait be the determining one, and is it not biased towards the random winner, the mammal like us? And is learning not just a matter of degree (the dinosaur certainly nurtured its offspring no less than a bird)? At the fundamental philosophical level, before the asteroid destroyed the dinosaurs, what necessarily makes the mouse more developed than the most developed dinosaur? Is it more environmentally adapted? Precisely the exact opposite. The measure of development is not something at the system level, for example in "success in life", or in control of ecology (as is claimed today about humans, which rolls into the ridiculous wisdom that the microbiome in our intestines controls us and through us the world, or that wheat domesticated us), or alternatively in your status in the system in some high layer of it (for example as head of the food chain, or in the number of copies of you, or in the size of your biomass, or your car). The mouse is a marginal figure, Kafka of the dinosaurs. At the system level, the mouse is less developed and successful. Where is it more developed? At the learning level, which is hidden and therefore not seen at the moment, until the dinosaur leaves the stage and many new ecological niches open up for the mouse. And why is it precisely more developed, of all the other developments in the Cretaceous? Because investment in offspring is learning from a higher order, and here is the root of complexity and construction - not in the layers of the system but in the layers of learning. The new learning of the next generation, in which a parent teaches a child, is a higher method - above the previous one, and therefore even if the starting point is lower, the higher method will win in the end, because the higher derivative always wins in the graph continuation, even if it is not seen at the moment. The more immature the offspring is born in its brain (and more in an embryonic state) the more general and less instinctive its learning is (and the peak in the animal world is in humans), and therefore investment in offspring is an additional learning mechanism that is added above evolutionary learning, which creates a new system layer built above the biology beneath it - from it, from the mouse, culture begins. Suckling is the root of cognitive learning for the next generation, and from here the countdown to humans began. That is, progress in evolution at the level of development is not finding this or that trick, for example some creative mutation. Such a view flattens everything and imagines learning as a network, where we suddenly found a new connection, or a new passage in the maze, or some new combination in DNA writing (bingo!). Progress at the level is progress that creates a floor above, that is, learning for which what was until now learning above the system becomes itself a system above which is the new learning. The previous learning becomes the new system, not because it goes down, but because something is built on top of it. Just as the reptile developed the reptilian brain, its great learning innovation, the mammal develops above it the mammalian brain, and the ape the ape brain, and so humans developed the human frontal brain, and above it the artificial brain is being developed today, as culture is becoming more and more functional organ - from library, to network, and to the thing after the network: distributed learning technology, all-human. Not that our brains will unite into one big brain, but that the connection of all of us will become one big brain, even if our brains remain separate, and this brain will also include artificial intelligences, and even the book, as it is the brain of culture. Therefore, evolutionary learning is accelerated, because once there is learning above learning then it also changes more and more quickly, like a derivative above the derivative, hence the exponential phenomenon that is the nature of learning, which is different from the phenomenon of explosion to infinity, and therefore there will be no singular point, but acceleration without limit. Therefore, at every point on this graph there is an illusion that we are moving faster than ever and that this is a special moment, although it is not special when you are exponential, that is, when you are actually developing according to a differential equation in which your acceleration is a direct function of your current speed. And therefore it seems that the distances between layers in time always become more and more dense until you - not because you are the crown of creation, but because you are part of learning that also learns how to learn. If so, why does learning benefit at all from extinction, that is, from the destruction of the previous system, and not simply build on top of it? Because in learning there are two stages, like sleep and wakefulness, or woman and man, or teacher and student, or evaluator and innovation. There is the stage of creation of the new method, and in it the existing system does not harm, but there is the stage of internalization and dissemination of the new method, and here the current system constitutes an obstacle. That is, the obstacle is at the level of the system, and not at the level of learning, and therefore it is more accurate to say that learning spreads in the system after the destruction, and becomes the method of the entire system thanks to this. The dual nature of learning, which stems from the fourth postulate, is what creates phenomena such as paradigm breaking. Just as there is a need to destroy the academic philosophical world in order for the Netanyahuite to be internalized, but at the current stage it is the mouse that lives among the dinosaurs.

Philosophy of Philosophy (Summary)

The disintegration of culture and loss of center are bad for philosophy, and they are the root of its loss in the current period, in which there is no longer philosophy and therefore we live in the concepts and philosophy of the previous period - language. But what is really the disadvantage in this? In every period, people's ways of thinking change, and philosophy does not invent them - but refines them, and summarizes them into philosophy. This is important both for the members of the previous generation, who understand the process they are going through and may be able to join it, and for the members of the current generation, for whom philosophy is cultural self-awareness (already today many speak and act in the name of learning, but it remains poorly formulated - here, the word formulated and the word word, as in language, when what we really wanted to say is "not well learned and not summarized", but we were afraid they wouldn't understand us and this precision, and it would look empty - learning, learning, learning - because the word learning has not yet been charged with enough learning meaning). But philosophy is also of great importance for future generations, and for the next period, because it allows summarizing a certain learning, in the next generation, and therefore advancing to the next philosophy, and for future generations it allows understanding the current generation at all. Periods that have no philosophy are mute periods. They are erased from intellectual history. And so are places. Cultures without philosophy are no longer studied, because they do not teach, because they did not prepare learning materials for the future. And so previous periods could see it too: for example, the language period could say that philosophy allows future periods to understand the language of the period, without which it is not understood at all, while the Kantian view will perceive that periods that do not understand the categories or perceptions of a previous period are not able to understand it at all, and so on back in the history of philosophy. That is, philosophy has an important part in the learning process - the summary. The concise formulation that indicates that learning has been done, and allows to go back and learn it anew. Philosophy is the notebook of history. And the lack of philosophy in our days delays learning, and creates less deep and principled formulations of it, and mainly formulations that belong to the previous period, and therefore seem philosophical - but are not. And this is the reason why philosophy cannot be imitative. If philosophy was some clarification of eternal truth (even Wittgenstein thought so, as much as he tried to be enlightened) then there would be no advantage in renewing philosophy and changing it between periods, and it would actually be a kind of disadvantage of it, in which each period rediscovers America, and declares it with ridiculous cheers of self-importance, that here here we have reached the last and final continent. In such a situation, there would be no value to past philosophies, except for their partial reflection in the current one (indeed, no one will be interested in medieval science, unlike literature. Why?). But we actually enjoy - learn! - a lot from past philosophies, and find tremendous value in them (what a contrast to Wittgenstein who "did not read" them), because they are documentation of the learning process of philosophy. They teach how to summarize. Yes, like any field philosophy teaches itself, its "how to do" it. Even if it (of course) does not teach the current philosophy, that is, does not teach what content is correct. Hence the tremendous value in its form, because it is the philosophical method. Hence philosophy is more similar to literature than science, and therefore the present does not cancel the past, because literature teaches the ways of narration, and hence in philosophy there is constant learning progress, unlike history where the story is not learning (at least in the way it is written today, out of fear of determinism - they give up on the directionality of historical learning and claim that history learns nothing, while this is the only thing it does. Development is progress is learning). What creates cultural golden ages, like Athens and the Renaissance, is not what creates evolutionary compensations like the Cambrian explosion, but rather extreme gardening and cultivation of a certain cultural ecological system, and making it the most important and interesting for a certain culture (because this is actually not an ecological system but a learning system, and this is exactly the transformation between just periods, in which there is an ecology of creators, and golden ages, in which there is their school). In culture, the dinosaurs are the great creators, and in evolution the great creators are the mice that remained after them. And the moment culture switched to a more primitive mechanism, indeed the creators became mice. The deep reason why complexity rises in evolution is the encapsulation of computation, namely the different genes, each on its own. And then genes accumulate, like building blocks, allowing more and more building possibilities, as they multiply. If the computation was not performed in separate modules there would be no ability to combine them. For example, if the entire genome was one long procedural code, it would be very vulnerable, and very resistant to learning, precisely because of its efficiency and information compression, or precisely because its learning and adaptation mechanisms were towards parameter optimization (as with Lamarck). Therefore, learning is not optimization. In Lamarckian evolution there were no jumps, and there was no benefit in Holocausts. And perhaps what really distinguishes life on Earth is not the formation of life, which is common in the universe, but the formation of the genome, and it is the great innovation (and perhaps: in the learning mechanism it has, which may also not exist in every genome). We could certainly imagine analogous and not digital life, that is, not according to a book but according to feedback loops in the cell, and certainly we would not have to imagine that all the information would be concentrated in one place, but perhaps in an information network. Maybe there were even such lives here, but they became extinct long ago against competitors with learning DNA. The randomness of the change created encapsulation, so that not every change would get stuck in the program, like in a computer. Therefore, life developed each time - no matter what Holocaust there was - to a greater level of complexity, even if precisely the most developed and complex lives were exterminated each time (because they are the most vulnerable, at the top of the system), and this strange phenomenon should be called the complexity paradox. The solution to it is in understanding the nature of learning. The complexity of the system is not the complexity of learning. Who is complex at the top of the system is not necessarily the next stage in learning, but the innovation. The construction of learning is construction in time, and not in a given space of a certain system. Therefore, the stone at the top of learning is innovation, and not the highest stone that is at the top of the ecological system. Perhaps the dinosaur is the most developed and adapted to its environment, but the mouse (which survived) is more developed than it, and we just need to wait for the dinosaur to die and the mouse to break out. In what is the mouse more developed than the most developed reptile? Why can't intelligence be precisely in a mollusk with hands, like the genius octopus, or a bipedal reptile with hands, like the dinosaur, and it is precisely in the latest development, namely the mammal? Well, what happens with the mammal is that it is the teacher, that is, it is the one that invests the most in offspring. As evolution progresses, investment in offspring progresses, and humans are the peak. But why should this trait be the determining one, and is it not biased towards the random winner, the mammal like us? And is learning not just a matter of degree (the dinosaur certainly nurtured its offspring no less than a bird)? At the fundamental philosophical level, before the asteroid destroyed the dinosaurs, what necessarily makes the mouse more developed than the most developed dinosaur? Is it more environmentally adapted? Precisely the exact opposite. The measure of development is not something at the system level, for example in "success in life", or in control of ecology (as is claimed today about humans, which rolls into the ridiculous wisdom that the microbiome in our intestines controls us and through us the world, or that wheat domesticated us), or alternatively in your status in the system in some high layer of it (for example as head of the food chain, or in the number of copies of you, or in the size of your biomass, or your car). The mouse is a marginal figure, Kafka of the dinosaurs. At the system level, the mouse is less developed and successful. Where is it more developed? At the learning level, which is hidden and therefore not seen at the moment, until the dinosaur leaves the stage and many new ecological niches open up for the mouse. And why is it precisely more developed, of all the other developments in the Cretaceous? Because investment in offspring is learning from a higher order, and here is the root of complexity and construction - not in the layers of the system but in the layers of learning. The new learning of the next generation, in which a parent teaches a child, is a higher method - above the previous one, and therefore even if the starting point is lower, the higher method will win in the end, because the higher derivative always wins in the graph continuation, even if it is not seen at the moment. The more immature the offspring is born in its brain (and more in an embryonic state) the more general and less instinctive its learning is (and the peak in the animal world is in humans), and therefore investment in offspring is an additional learning mechanism that is added above evolutionary learning, which creates a new system layer built above the biology beneath it - from it, from the mouse, culture begins. Suckling is the root of cognitive learning for the next generation, and from here the countdown to humans began. That is, progress in evolution at the level of development is not finding this or that trick, for example some creative mutation. Such a view flattens everything and imagines learning as a network, where we suddenly found a new connection, or a new passage in the maze, or some new combination in DNA writing (bingo!). Progress at the level is progress that creates a floor above, that is, learning for which what was until now learning above the system becomes itself a system above which is the new learning. The previous learning becomes the new system, not because it goes down, but because something is built on top of it. Just as the reptile developed the reptilian brain, its great learning innovation, the mammal develops above it the mammalian brain, and the ape the ape brain, and so humans developed the human frontal brain, and above it the artificial brain is being developed today, as culture is becoming more and more functional organ - from library, to network, and to the thing after the network: distributed learning technology, all-human. Not that our brains will unite into one big brain, but that the connection of all of us will become one big brain, even if our brains remain separate, and this brain will also include artificial intelligences, and even the book, as it is the brain of culture. Therefore, evolutionary learning is accelerated, because once there is learning above learning then it also changes more and more quickly, like a derivative above the derivative, hence the exponential phenomenon that is the nature of learning, which is different from the phenomenon of explosion to infinity, and therefore there will be no singular point, but acceleration without limit. Therefore, at every point on this graph there is an illusion that we are moving faster than ever and that this is a special moment, although it is not special when you are exponential, that is, when you are actually developing according to a differential equation in which your acceleration is a direct function of your current speed. And therefore it seems that the distances between layers in time always become more and more dense until you - not because you are the crown of creation, but because you are part of learning that also learns how to learn. If so, why does learning benefit at all from extinction, that is, from the destruction of the previous system, and not simply build on top of it? Because in learning there are two stages, like sleep and wakefulness, or woman and man, or teacher and student, or evaluator and innovation. There is the stage of creation of the new method, and in it the existing system does not harm, but there is the stage of internalization and dissemination of the new method, and here the current system constitutes an obstacle. That is, the obstacle is at the level of the system, and not at the level of learning, and therefore it is more accurate to say that learning spreads in the system after the destruction, and becomes the method of the entire system thanks to this. The dual nature of learning, which stems from the fourth postulate, is what creates phenomena such as paradigm breaking. Just as there is a need to destroy the academic philosophical world in order for the Netanyahuite to be internalized, but at the current stage it is the mouse that lives among the dinosaurs.

The Relationship Between Construction, Rules, and Method

Modern science is the idea that everything is construction. Hence the aspiration for foundations, in order to start explaining from them how everything is built, from bottom to top, like the feed-forward in deep learning. And this is in contrast to the systemic approach, where there is feedback from top to bottom, meaning the construction is not unidirectional, but learning-based. Learning is construction from both directions, and therefore it happens in a system, not in a building. There is back-propagation. The problem with constructive science was revealed - and could only be revealed - when they finally reached the very top, to the entire universe, and then it suddenly doesn't look like a top floor, but it is revealed that the foundations themselves are very arbitrary, and are determined by their ability to create a universe. Instead of another floor, the universe is an ecology, that is, a system in which the top also determines the bottom. After all, if we had chosen the laws of cosmology as primary axioms, that is, starting from the highest systemic expression of the laws, we could have gradually derived from them the laws down to the bottom, and built an inverse science, in which the large domain in the system is the foundations, and the small is what is built from it. And the small laws at the bottom obey constraints that stem from the big laws at the top, because in any case we discover that there are many degrees of freedom between the layers of laws in the system, and all we did was to lower these degrees of freedom down to the foundations, for example to the basic constants of nature, instead of distributing them between all the layer intersections - and in the universe the layers are orders of magnitude, which parallel the layers in deep learning. What happens in science is that we have no laws that descend from top to bottom, and no feedback, and then we receive in the end some particularly bad systemic feedback, like the anthropic principle, exactly like some dopaminergic neurotransmitter that teaches the entire system at once, instead of a gradual learning feedback system, and therefore this explanation is not at all convincing, because it does not work in a learning manner. There is a failed attempt here to connect the highest to the lowest through the tail, that is, not through the body of the system, but directly, in that the constants in the universe are determined tautologically because otherwise there would be no universe (and not us). And all this in order to escape a learning explanation - within the system. The anthropic principle is the god of physics, that is, the concept that explains everything and therefore explains nothing, and cannot be refuted. If indeed the decree is one-to-one from elementary physics to cosmology, through all the layers, then to the same extent that we started with elementary physics and from it reached through countless layers to cosmology, we could have started from cosmology and descended in a one-to-one decree to elementary physics. And if there are degrees of freedom in the middle, why believe that they are all determined only in the lowest layer, and not dispersed in the friction of the different layers in the system. Systemic science does not seek to show direct feedback, that is, some way in which an upper layer influences the laws of the layer below it, as if the laws are written somewhere and the upper layer has access to writing the laws below it, and to playing with parameters until equilibrium. Rather, it aspires to a perception in which laws are created in interaction and with feedback from the upper layer, because they are emerging laws, not written, that is, patterns and not printed. Just as in an ecological system patterns are created from the interaction between predator and prey, for example. And then we will not be surprised that the universe works in a system, because it really is a system, and not a system that was designed, or created by chance, but because the universe is a learning system. Today in physics there is no such possibility that the above will influence the below, because it is anti-constructive and therefore anti-scientific. And therefore it is dragged to hypotheses like the anthropic principle which is similar to the idea that telepathy can affect cells and cure cancer, as opposed to describing biological mechanisms in which the brain affects the immune system, that is, to describe interactions between high and low levels that are not only those in which the low builds the high, but contain circuits - and not one big circuit that solves everything, like in the philosophical idea of God, which is poor precisely because it is not learning-based and therefore empty. This is in contrast to the Kabbalistic God who has infinite degrees and ontological layers, or the Halakhic God who has infinite legal layers, or the Hasidic with psychological layers, because the importance of Judaism was in turning God into learning-based. Just as science tries to do to the world - to turn it into learning-based - only it does not understand that learning is systemic and not just constructive, just as understanding is systemic and not just constructive, because it's not just basic concepts that build higher ones in the hierarchy, and even mathematics is not logical but ecological. The learning law is not built from lower laws, but emerges in interaction between layers in the system - there is the law, in friction, and not in some obscure tablets of the universe (where are the laws of nature written?). The law is in the connections between the layers of neurons, and in the connection between the orders of magnitude of the universe - there are the free parameters, which are tuned not only by determination from below but also by guidance from above. And this itself is the supreme providence - not that God intervenes in details or is found in details, but that God is found in the connection between details and rules. We have exaggerated Aristotle too much, and moved away from the Platonic intuition, that the general also has something to say about the particular and not just vice versa. And of course the conceptual fixation of atomistic and elementary science is also related to the individualistic psychological fixation of our times, which destroys even literature in the name of the individual (for literature is a system). The cultural disintegration we see is related to the view that construction is created only from bottom to top, and not vice versa. But life itself is a systemic phenomenon, in which the system is not just a collection of particulars - for example, a collection of cells or molecules. And therefore culture today is almost dead, and the feedback of criticism and evaluation has almost been destroyed. Not because there is no criticism, but because there is no system of criticism, for example criticism of criticism, in layers (for example in literary discussions), and therefore there is no learning system. The base of the pyramid has been greatly expanded, due to the countless "creators", and therefore its height has decreased greatly, because criticism is divided among more of them. And in the end, the volume of the pyramid is close to zero. That is, it is not enough to have interaction from top to bottom, but this interaction itself needs to be systemic, in layers, and bidirectional, in ecological circles. If the interaction from top to bottom is poor then the learning is poor, for example if there is only one big feedback loop. What creates a system are the infinite small interactions that build learning, not the one big one. Science is not just paradigm versus its replacements, or hypothesis versus refutation, but countless micro-paradigms and sub-replacements and countless mini-hypotheses and mini-refutations, and therefore also the understanding or learning of humans is not some big circle, cognitive or behaviorist for example, of an idea light bulb, penny dropping, or learning reinforcements in reward and punishment, but countless tiny reinforcements and weakening, like in a neural network, and not some huge concept that enters the head, or punishment from which one learns "once and for all". Learning through punishments or concepts does not work precisely because of this erroneous big picture of learning, as some learning cycle, once and for all. On the contrary, only constant learning, of ongoing interaction and feedback, shapes the river's path, not some one-time flood. Therefore it is not a waste to read the whole book to understand one concept, which can be defined in a few lines, or to convey one life lesson, which can be summarized in a two-sentence preaching. Because grasping the lesson conceptually, or understanding the words in which it was formulated, is completely different from learning it, that is, understanding it in the sense of internalizing it. Because then it needs to be within the system, while the big circle is largely external. Therefore, the TL;DR of Facebook means a culture of forgetting, because even if it's a brilliant idea you formulated or read in a Twitter tweet, and even if it technically entered your mind by reading it, in order to learn it you would need it to create a complex interaction between it and everything you've already learned, including mutual evaluations, and creating new patterns that emerge from them. Your thinking doesn't change from just something you read - but only from something you learned. And if it does occur from something you read, it's because you thought about it again and again until you learned it and therefore you also remember it, unlike almost everything you read. And therefore it's important to read less - and learn more. The problem with today's intellectuals is that they read a lot - and learn little. That's why they ask everyone triumphantly - what have you read, what, you haven't read? And their understanding of their reading is at a low level of knowing what was written there, and therefore they manage to remember so much of what they read. One who learns absorbs very little, but this absorption shapes him like water eroding stones, but if you ask what flowed in the water - the river won't know how to answer you. Precisely because so much water has passed, precisely because it is a river - it doesn't remember. The way is the long interaction between those who walk it and the terrain contours, hence its optimal wisdom. In physics they believe there are optimal systems by themselves, because it's a law of nature, without any interaction. Therefore physicists believe in miracles. So don't get angry if a lot is written, it's so that you learn a lot, not so that you know a lot. You don't need to remember, just learn. Any computer can remember, but to learn you need a brain. Therefore often true knowledge, learning-based knowledge, is not formulated. For example, the method of the system. And therefore it cannot be easily transferred. And the fact that many products and examples from learning are given is not for you to remember and know them, but because from them emerges what cannot be formulated: learning itself. And even if it could be formulated, it would give nothing in its formulation, unless it too was learned, that is, detailed. The rule needs details, not from a logical point of view, but from a learning point of view. Even mathematics is not content with axioms and rules of inference, but needs countless theorems and examples, and it is precisely they that formulate what the axioms fail to formulate - what is interesting about it. Wittgenstein was fixated on the rules of the game, but the rules of the game are not interesting - except to the extent that they create interesting games, because the games are interesting, and the rules are less important (you could play uninterestingly with the same rules, or play interestingly with other rules). Moreover, the rules of all games in the world were shaped from the interesting games played in them (and not - just the games played in them, because playing according to an arbitrary rule can and is expected to be boring), that is, the rules are a byproduct of the learning done in them (and not of the use made of them, a term designed to forget the dynamics, because patterns of use were created from learning, which is changing use). And therefore the importance of rules is less than if we were to imagine that the rules were there first, and then within them games were created, as mathematicians imagine axioms, although it is clear that axioms were created from interesting mathematics, and not in some miraculous way the other way around, that by chance from these axioms interesting mathematics was created (which is not true at all, if we choose random axioms we will discover how difficult it is). Only physicists insist that by chance from these laws an interesting universe was created, because the laws were there first. Just as people don't understand that the commandments were created from customs (and not that the commandments were there first), and this is actually the source of the value of the commandments (and not because they were there a priori, in Leibowitz's style). The commandments were created from the laws that were created from the customs, and in fact in a complex interaction between the layers (which is the Talmud and Torah study), and so are the rules of all games and languages in the world, and hence the source of the beauty of language or game, and not from their beautiful square frame (that they take place within), all the beauty of which is the product of complex learning. The dog is not buried in the rules, but here in learning. Where does this beauty come from in the first place? From the fit. And where does the fit come from? From learning. The beauty we discover in laws, whether in nature, mathematics, game, or language, commandments, etc., stems from the learning that was done in shaping and emerging them. And then come the physicists or philosophers of language, and are so impressed by the beauty of the rules that they worship the rules, and forget where they came from. Where does the beauty come from? In that the peacock shaped the tail in a long learning interaction in many layers of courtship, survival, the developing taste of the peahen, the connection between this taste and genetic expressions in her and him and predators, innovations in proteins related to colors and patterns, pure formal ideas in the patterns themselves, which are themselves related to neurological patterns that perceive them, the development of handicap, and so on, in countless systemic interaction circles. And then someone comes and says that peacocks are subject to rigid rules set by the peahen (?), and these complex rules created the beautiful tail, as a byproduct of them. Or alternatively these rules are the grammar of a formal language between peacocks and peahens, which can be described but not explained (because the explanation is learning-based, right?). Descriptive Wittgensteinian rules, which try to evade the problem of the chicken and egg of rules in a tautological ammunition, are problematic precisely because of the emphasis on rules and linguistic framework, at the expense of learning, and exactly as what preceded the egg and chicken is learning, that is, evolution. Where does the value of the game and the value of the game rules come from, if they are determined serviceably or in some fashion or amusement or power struggle or institutions or any other nonsense invented by the last disciples of Wittgenstein, who have become fools, in their attempt to fill the learning gap with some tautology, which will give the dynamics behind the use. The value of the game stems from the development of the game, and from the amount of learning done in it (not all games are equal, there are stupid ones and genius ones), just as the value of the Torah and commandments stems from Torah study, and the value of axioms stems from the development of mathematics, and the value of ecology stems from the development of evolution, and so does the value of culture, or any other mental achievement - like a certain thinking (see philosophy) - created from learning. Only the value of the laws of physics does not stem from the development of the universe. And therefore they also do not develop, of course. And here too they hide behind the description, while they are explanatory par excellence. The explanatory vacuum always exists, and if the wise Wittgenstein denies it - the retarded Foucault will come to fill the void. Even if Wittgenstein pretends to be Aristotle, and claims that the rules of the game were created from game behaviors (and did not exist before it), in practice he precedes the rules of the game to the game (and reveals himself as Platonic in disguise), in that "the behaviors in the game" are shaped for him not from specific and capricious behavior but from the regular, normal one, that is, the one according to the rules. It's not about one-time use, but about use, as a multi-use tool. And hence what's interesting in the game is the general and the rules, and here Plato is back. And learning is what is interested in changing the rules of the game. Are methods rules, and the true source of rules is also rules called methods? Not really, because methods are the "obvious" of learning, which can sometimes be explicit but doesn't have to be, and in any case they don't have to be fixed - they are not the rules of the game of the game in rules. What exactly is the difference between methods and rules, are they actually the rules of learning? Rules are indeed created in practice from interaction between them and what happens according to them, but this interaction is not an essential part of them, and in fact contradicts their nature as rules. On the other hand, method is by nature something created as part of a learning system, and therefore this interaction between it and the learned is its essence, that is, it is itself subject to learning. Therefore the highest method is never formulated but only emerges, unlike rules which are by nature already emerged. The method of a system can be several possibilities, because there are several possibilities to generalize the learning that the system does to future learning, while the rule by nature already includes future possibilities, and dictates them (even if by chance it is not yet known, but the moment it is known it sets a limit, while learning has no limit, but possibilities, that is, not the limit is its nature). The emergence of the method is not as a description, which comes after the fact, but precisely as a driver of learning, that is, as a kind of guidance, which does not dictate (like a rule) but does guide. Is method a partial rule? This is a kind of sophistication, because a rule exists only if it limits something, and guidance can only give a push in a certain direction, and not prevent others. Although in practice it does of course create progress in a certain direction and not in another, but there is nothing compulsory about it, unlike a rule which always has compulsion. Rules are the boundary of the system, while methods are within it, so rules always create something from outside, while methods create something from inside. Does, for example, our thinking stem from rules, from rules of thinking? No, because even if there are such rules we are not able to grasp them, but only to progress in learning, and any such grasp of a rule we reach will itself be subject to learning. Does a neural network work according to learning rules, for example the biological rules of neuron action, like Hebb's rule, or the back-propagation algorithm? Yes, but these rules are not learning methods, just as our brain also works according to the laws of physics, but they are not our methods. The algorithm is not the learning method just as the rules of processor operation or operating system are not the software, or that mathematics is not the laws of the laws of physics. The method is internal to learning, and from the perspective of the deep learning network itself there is no meaning to back-propagation, just as there is no meaning to bit calculation or quantum mechanics, but to what it learns from its internal point of view. A method, therefore, cannot be completely general without any connection to any (learned, specific) content, just as there is no universal general learning algorithm, and if there is then it is meaningless to any learning. The method of a neural network learning an image is always somehow related to something visual it has already learned, and not to back-propagation, which may be a rule but not a method. Therefore when we say that the method is internal to learning it's not acceptance or New Age, but the internality here is precisely the lack of access to an external perception of your learning, for example to a rule that operates you. We do not know and cannot know about the laws of nature from within, that is, from ourselves, by introspection, but only by external experiment. Even if we understand quantum mechanics, or the Turing machine (and we are after all a Turing machine for that matter), we cannot grasp them as what operates our thinking, and even if neuroscience reveals such rules about ourselves, we will be able to grasp them artificially, as something we pay attention to, but we will not be able to grasp them in a learning way, because we will not be able to change them, and rules that are not subject to change are not part of learning. We will be able to know what algorithm operates us, but this knowledge itself will be knowledge from outside, and not part of the internal world of our system, and therefore we may be able to represent it, and even recite it, and even understand it as a fact of natural science, but we will not be able to understand and internalize it in a learning way, that is, as having learning meaning, as part of our method, and as something that changes our own learning (as opposed to its contents, because we will be able to learn it scientifically, but not learn differently not according to it). Just as familiarity with Newton's laws, to which our brain is also subject, or DNA rules, or the understanding that our brain is itself a computer, did not change anything in our way of thinking, and are not capable of changing anything in it (and the intention is to our way of thinking itself really, and not as a metaphor for intellectual perception which is a way of thinking about something). We are not able to think of ourselves as a computer, or as determinists, or as random, or as superposition, and even if it is true the matter is simply meaningless to us, and not because it has no linguistic meaning (which we understand very well), but because it has no learning meaning. These ideas are not nonsensical, and they may even be correct, but they are outside of learning. And we are inside learning, from within. Where there is dynamics there is learning and not rules, and all the sophistications like "rules of dynamics" only return the question one step back, because learning starts from dynamics and ends in rules, while rules of dynamics start from rules and end in dynamics. Therefore the idea of language rules is stupid just like rules of thinking or rules of philosophy. In philosophy it is clear that there are no rules, because each generation invents a philosophy that precisely does not obey the rules of its predecessors, and this is the essence of philosophy, and therefore it is correct to think of philosophy in terms of methods and not rules, and it nicely demonstrates the difference between what starts from method and ends in rule, and what starts from rule - and therefore will never end in method. And we see this in reality, in the difference between the people of rules, who are in every generation (even if the rules are different each time), and the people of methods. We all know who we would want as friends and partners, as opposed to the nudniks of rules. And where does the nudnikness come from in the first place? Because the very collision of rules with learning and therefore with reality is what turns them into nudniks. Therefore it is not anti-establishment and kicking against rules that is important, but adherence to learning. One who simply rebels for the sake of rebellion is one who simply acts according to a particularly stupid method, not to mention a simple and primitive negation rule. Greatness is not in who breaks the rules or throws off their yoke, but in who brings learning to the world that is what changes the rules. Just random terror is meaningless, and what changes history is always a new method, because a new method replicates itself, unlike a rule. A method is a living thing, while a rule is a dead thing. And this is actually the definition of life: learning. And not self-replication or self-preservation and homeostasis or reverse entropy or any other definition. Therefore let us not be surprised if we discover that the universe is in its entirety a living thing, a giant creature within which we are only parasites - the people inside the amoeba. After all, even in embryo growth there is a stage of exponential inflation - and the Big Bang was the fertilization. Therefore the encounter with another universe (inter-universal sex) is likely, and if we discover that the universe creates universes like itself - life is the reasonable hypothesis.

Learning without measure, untitled (too complex even for a general topic)

What you already know becomes your prior assumptions (and your blind spots) - and what you have already learned becomes your biases in further learning (and your preconceptions). But you could not continue to learn at all without them, because you could not learn without what you have already learned. Kant essentially discovered that learning cannot bite its own tail, and reach its beginning, because then it becomes circular (we can never escape our preconceptions). What you have learned becomes an assumption not because it is justified - but because it is not justified, and therefore cannot be reversed. Everything you have learned to do becomes a prior assumption, because only in what you have learned to do can you use to create a future hypothesis, and not in anything that grows directly from the thing being learned itself. The inability to learn from the thing itself is the depth of Kant's discovery. The algorithm does not understand anything from what it operates on, just as the learner does not receive any knowledge from what is learned, as if there is some magic that transfers information into it from some external object, but the learning itself is the creation of knowledge through the action of learning on what is learned. One cannot learn from something, only about it, meaning with its help. How does what is learned help learning? By being its object, and not by being its subject, or something that acts on the learner. The object is not a subject, and never speaks with the learning subject, meaning communicates with it and transfers information to it. It does not tell the learner anything, because nothing can be said - only learned. There is no communication in the world at all, it is only an illusion created by learning. We do not speak - you learn from me and I learn from you. Similar to the claim that there is no sexual relationship. Things cannot be transferred because what is learned is not an object, but a way of action. One does not learn material, and not just learn to do, but learn a new way to do something. Even the action itself is not the object of learning and it is not about behaviorism, meaning only learning of an action, for example in imitation. Imitation is an illusion as if something can be learned from the action itself, as if the action is an object that can be transferred. Imitation is actually created from innovation in the learner's way of action, whose learning acts on the action of the one teaching him. But the action itself does not pass between them. Because after all, any action can be imitated in many different ways. Learning is always a way, meaning not fully defined by what already was, which can only serve as a hint for it. One can only be helped by instruction, but something cannot be instructed, meaning teach a specific thing, no matter what method of instruction the teacher chooses (the student can learn something completely different from it). There is no method for instruction, because its purpose is learning, and learning has no method. If it is an algorithm it is not about learning, and therefore a computer can learn, but there is no algorithm that learns, meaning there is no method that learns. Therefore not only for learning but also for instruction there is only a way, and there are no instructions for it. What is instructions is not instruction, but it is only to show, and not in the sense of proving but in the sense of outlining, pointing, marking where to, meaning showing a way. This tautology indeed does not explain, meaning show to the end, but as tautologies do (and hence their value!) it may be a logical void but not empty in terms of learning, because like a circle chasing its tail it establishes what is outside it, meaning something that does show to the end, and is not circular but has a beginning. If so, what is imitation? If it is a method it is not about learning, and if it is about learning it is not a method. But there can certainly be a learning method, meaning a methodology, and this is because it is not about a method, but about a learning method, meaning a method that is itself not only learning but also learned, meaning that as part of its methodicalness it is not only methodical but also learning, because it lives within learning. It itself is an object of learning, and learning is not its object, otherwise it is a learning algorithm, and not a methodology. Learning methodicalness is different from action methodicalness just as learning is different from action. In a good language, learning would not be a verb, but would have its own grammatical form, as a separate grammatical category that is not subject, predicate or object. Learning relates to the verb as the verb relates to the object, meaning it is the verb of the verb, the verb acting on the verb (verb of the verb), but it is not an adverb, and not its noun, but the way of action of the verb's way. If so, how does learning work (perhaps better than "learning acts", as our language is not suitable)? Is it some mystical way, or some elusive magic, or a fine distinction? No, it actually works in the simplest and most prosaic way: through a hint. Only that it is so difficult for us to understand what a hint is, and philosophy is so opposed to something incomplete, like a hint or helping, that it is almost contrary to our logic, because our logic has been trained (against its nature) to love necessity, logic, strong causality, whose connections can be examined in both directions, meaning to go backwards, and check the proof. But such logical proof has never worked. In fact, there is no philosophical argument in the world that is logically valid, and that is not full of holes like a sieve. One can go through all the philosophy books, and as a stupid student prove one by one that nothing claimed there really follows from its premises, and that all the arguments are shaky. Does this make philosophy worthless - or perhaps its value stems precisely from this? Because it has never proved anything (and if so - it would be mathematics), but only hinted and helped and led our thoughts in a certain way, and hence the value of all philosophy: as a way, and not as a method. As learning, and not as proof or algorithm. As thought and not as calculation. Therefore philosophy helps us, because if it proved to us it could not help us at all, just as mathematics does not help us, and no premise in it not only "helps" to prove the theorem, but either proves or does not prove it, but does not hint at it. What does hint in mathematics? The way in which mathematics is actually learned, meaning the way mathematicians act, and not mathematics. The partiality of the hint - is what philosophy was unable to digest, in its constant attempt to pretend to be mathematics, and in its invention of "reason" and "logic" themselves, as a kind of anti-learning illusion and idealization. And why did all this happen? Because of the arrogance of philosophy, while learning requires humility. Therefore learning did not suit philosophy, and was left to science. And therefore science succeeded and philosophy failed. Not because of being logical and rational and based and proven, but because of being learning. Therefore there is no scientific method but scientific methodology. And therefore in philosophy we lack philosophical methodology. And therefore today we have reached in philosophy a loss of way, and this is precisely because of the attempt of analytic philosophy to be scientific and logical, and because of continental philosophy's renunciation of learning from the other direction, and its desire to be mysticism, in order to replace religion. Therefore it does not teach anything, and in fact it can no longer be learned, and not even taught, but only to be gurus, meaning cult leaders, meaning leaders of a failed and bad religion. And all this because of the decline of the status of the teacher, which is a modest status and is not interested in sweeping followers after it, but students. The greatest compliment to a philosopher is that he is a teacher, and not a great leader or distinguished academic (after all, and this is the problem of analytic philosophy, academia is now perceived as dealing with science, and not with teaching, and therefore everything pretends to the image of science). Who is currently interested in learning is the organizational world, and therefore it is the most advanced philosophically, and therefore often the philosophy of the organization is more advanced than the philosophy of man. In the organization it is clear that learning is not just another of the organization's actions, and that there is no learning department like there is a marketing or production department. In the organization it is clear that learning is not something that management does, meaning some process that works from top to bottom, like the head manages the body, and not from bottom to top, meaning something that employees do disconnected from management. It is clear that the entire organization participates in learning, although learning is not the action of the organization, but its action is always its regular action: for example, achieving profits. It is clear that learning is also not the introduction of any knowledge that the organization encounters in some way, although adding knowledge can be one of the ways of learning, but it certainly does not define it, and is not even the main one of the ways, because in order to really learn you need something much deeper than adding knowledge, or even adding any activity. It is also clear that there is no general method, that an organization can adopt, and that will be its learning, and that no such algorithm can work, and that therefore organizations always fail - there is no ideal, or optimal, learning, not because we are not smart enough, but because this process is not subject to such metrics. And it is clear that organizational learning can always be in several directions from the same data (and therefore there is successful learning but not correct learning), and the idea that one can always (was, it is always in hindsight of course) choose the right direction thinks that learning is an algorithm, and hence the illusion of wisdom after the fact, and the ease of criticizing the organization compared to learning the organization, which fails almost by definition, if this is the definition. And after all this, it is clear that organizations learn. That it is not some magic or wonder, but a very real process, that happens almost necessarily, unless the organization is already dead, and just continues to live as a machine. The organization does not encounter something external that tells it to do this and that, differently from what it has done so far, ever. Nothing in the world speaks to the organization, or transfers material to it, or instructs it. But the organization constantly encounters hints that tell it and help it to change activity and learn from them, and one can certainly help an organization learn, and it can have a learning methodology, and different learning methods (not a general method), that create within it an internal process of learning (it is always inside, and if the manager suddenly decides then it is an instruction from outside, even if the manager is inside the company, after all in such a situation where learning is not organic to the organization the coercing manager becomes external to it, like a rapist husband, who suddenly becomes an attacker outside his marriage, attacking it). Therefore it is not possible to build an organization so that it is guaranteed to learn, meaning an ideal adaptive organization, because there is no method that will force an organization to learn. And the thing that drives the organization's learning is the elusive thing called the organization's way, which is something in its spirit and culture. In fact, the very existence of the spiritual level, not only in the organization but also in man, or in society, or say in literature, stems only from this undefined thing that outlines learning, or, inseparably, learning outlines it, meaning that its outlining is expressed in learning. This is the reason that man has spirit in our days and a computer does not, and not some cognitive or computational ability, or some mystical precedence or some other conscious quality or metaphysical reason, but precisely something unexpressed that comes out as a kind of summary, as a kind of way with its own logic, meaning internal logic, from all the steps of learning. Some kind of meta-learning, with internal coherence, above regular everyday learning. Therefore the summary is always a higher level, above, on what is learned, because the way as a whole shows a clearer direction than any of its parts, and thus it is refined and receives a more internal and less accidental essence, with less noise and more signal and meaning. Therefore learning as a whole is higher than the sum of all its parts, because this sum, meaning this sum, like in stock market dispersion, precisely shows its general direction, and thus gives it more meaning, like a big narrative that includes countless small narratives. And hence history also has a spirit, although it is not the spirit that drives it, and therefore it is not that some wonderful correlation is created between a spirit fixed in advance and what actually happened, but that if one delves deep enough (meaning looks enough from above and enough wide and enough along the time axis, as a shape with a large volume) all actions are understood by us as a certain spirit, and not just as a weathervane, because history indeed progresses in the end, like the stock market and the economy, and its countless parts do not cancel each other out so that we are left only with white noise. And why is this indeed so? Because in history, as in the economy, a powerful process of learning is applied, and not some random process, for example drifting and fashions. And learning by its very nature has a summary, and not just moves, but a move. Otherwise it would be just change. Meaning the very learning view of the process is what creates the spirit, which is (and hence its name) the general direction to which the ship is driven, and not just drifted or fluctuated in waves, and therefore it also creates the superiority of the spirit over the waves and drift. We identify the spirit of the organization, or the spirit of history, even if it is difficult for us (necessarily) to define them, as they are the most general learning, and as learning is not a method. Is this a Kantian perceptual claim, that the learning view is what creates the learning? No, because the learning view stems from our very learning, or the organization's learning. It is not that we have such a perception but that we have learning, and it also creates the perception. The fact that we have no choice but to perceive this way does not stem from the basicness of perception, preceding learning, but the opposite. And this is also not a claim about human nature, but about the nature of learning. Is the spirit an illusion stemming from learning? Is everything actually random and it just seems to us this way - that there is learning and direction? This question itself gives precedence to perception, and in particular over learning, but from learning itself there is no meaning to illusion, because there is no meaning to such an untrue perception, because there is no meaning to non-learning perception. If learning precedes perception, then not the existence of the spirit is a priori and precedes experience, but that nothing exists before learning, and therefore aprioriness itself is post-learning, and also the idea of precedence itself, which is also learned, meaning it is not possible at all to learn something (in the past we would say: to talk about something) "before" learning. In language we would say: it is meaningless, senseless, meaningless. In learning we say: it is unlearnable. This may sound circular, but if it really is so, it could not sound otherwise. The foundation will always be circular, otherwise it would need to stand on something. There is no possibility to refer to something outside learning, except through simulation, because we are inside. And therefore this thing itself we are not able to learn. What are we able to do? Despair. To despair of learning the unlearnable, this may be completely logical, but precisely learning is a deep urge to learn what it is not capable of. It really chases after its own tail, and tries to catch it, and precisely its failure is what proves that it is not capable of doing anything but learning. There are no jumps, only steps. And therefore it will never be able to see itself from behind, no matter how much it turns, and this will only make it dizzy. But this rotation itself will teach you that there is no point of the beginning of the way, to which you could return, or from which everything started. There is no before learning not because learning is standing at the zero point, and sitting there and preceding everything (for example a priori), but because there is no such point at all. At the end of all philosophy (in the sense of ultimately) the human mind always gets caught in circularity. Why did this happen? Precisely because of learning. If we were a logic machine, or a computer, this would not happen, and we would reach primary concepts, or primary definitions, in the case of language (have we not succeeded in precisely defining computer language, from bits and up? Is this not a language?). And is this a property of the human mind specifically? Also an organization that tries to get to the root of its learning will eventually get caught in circularity. Because ultimately you always reach your own methodology. And this assumption of yours is not problematic, because everything eventually becomes an assumption, when moving to the next stage. The really problematic thing is not to progress, out of a desire to base the assumption. The aspiration for lack of bias (which is also seen in politically correct) is an anti-learning aspiration. There is no universality - an organization is always particular, and only a Turing machine can be universal, and then it does nothing. If man had thought of himself as a large organization many philosophical problems would have been avoided, because then he would have internalized that he has an inside, meaning that he has an inside as a system, and not as an onion (subconscious, soul, instincts, hormones, neurons, etc.). I am a system. This is what he should say to himself every morning in front of the mirror: I am a system. I am an organization. And therefore it is better that I be a learning system or a learning organization. It is not that I learn the world using fixed categories, or within language, and in fact the ability to change categories and invent language is one of the deepest and most effective learning abilities. And therefore philosophers (and organizations!) invent terms. But the interaction of an organization with the world, from which learning stems, can be a completely non-linguistic friction, for example a war of two barbaric tribes that do not speak at all, or do not speak the same language and have no shared culture, exactly like the evolutionary learning of an organism from the world is not dependent on some language shared by it and the world (but can certainly be helped by its own language as a system, for example in changing its DNA). The teacher, usually the external world, does not have to speak to you or communicate with you to teach you. You can ask what it is saying to you, but it is better to ask what it is teaching you, because the view that it is saying introduces will and intention to it, which is not always correct in terms of learning. The market does not speak to the investor. The investor speaks to himself, and if there is learning it is done in the language between him and himself, like DNA learns from the world, not because it describes the world, or contains knowledge about the world, but because it contains self-knowledge. The tiger's wonderful running is not knowledge about the laws of physics, or even about its own muscles, but knowledge about a way of action. And if it was an algorithm then the tiger would be a machine. The great malfunction of the industrial age, which also led to disasters like the Holocaust and communism, is looking at the organization as a machine (today: as a computer). It is much better to think of a system as a network, because a network is at least (a primitive example) of a system, and it is clear that it has a systemic inside, unlike a machine. The disadvantage of a network is that learning is not an integral part of its definition, and it can be looked at like a language, as some communication platform. Meaning as a language system instead of a learning system. Therefore the best metaphor, meaning the one that helps learning the most, is the organization. And then it is clear that precisely what an organization already knows how to do are its assumptions and biases in coming to learn from reality. And it is also clear that it is absurd to try to get rid of these prior assumptions and biases, and become an organization that knows nothing. Your knowledge limits you - and precisely therefore it is knowledge. And not nonsense. The nonsense of the New Age really does not limit, and therefore is not knowledge. Anything goes. What a good organization needs to do is use its biases and assumptions to adapt itself to new reality, and not try to get rid of them and arrive as a blank slate, because the blank slate is not the ideal learner, but just an empty hard disk, an information container that cannot know anything. What does a learning organization do when it encounters its assumptions or language that do not fit reality? It does not get rid of them, but for example seeks to build from its language, or with the help of its language, a new term that will fit. It tries to find a deeper assumption of its own that does fit reality, or builds with the help of its assumptions (sometimes by negation!) new assumptions that help it function in reality. And changing assumptions is less about getting rid of old assumptions and more about adding new assumptions. In fact, an organization can be quite conservative in its knowledge, for example keeping its entire past in its DNA, or like the Talmud, or like literature that just accumulates, and precisely because of this it will find richness to deal with new reality. And whoever tells themselves that this is just preserved knowledge and not assumptions or biases, does not understand what knowledge is, because everything you remember affects your view of the future. Therefore, the very importance of cultural wealth (like genetic wealth) is increasing the system's ability to learn. When a system is complex it learns better than a simple system, which is why our brain is so complex, and our biology too. The fear of artificial intelligence is that it will not be complex, meaning it will be an algorithm, and then intelligence and learning will disconnect, and everything will be accumulation of knowledge. The utopia of philosophers is the dystopia of reality. Why? Because a perfect thing never includes learning. Learning cannot happen in a simple machine because it requires a complex system. The problem with a large organization is the tendency to build it as a machine, meaning as a bureaucracy, and therefore large organizations have earned a reputation for not learning. But a large organization learns, like Judaism or literature, learns much better than a small learning organization, like philosophy. Just as culture learns better than the individual. How can one build an organization that learns well? There are many ways to learn, but a recommended way would be one where each level in the hierarchy evaluates those below it and is evaluated by those above it, and each layer in the hierarchy competes for the evaluation of the layer above it. In such an organization there is no mechanical structure, meaning the top layer does not operate the one below it, and does not give it instructions, but only evaluates it, and uses it to receive the evaluation of the layer above it. The evaluation can be expressed monetarily, but not only, and it's preferable that it be open in order to encourage competition and prevent corruption. The guidance of the entire organization is through evaluations, not instructions, except at most one instruction. Each layer is the teacher of the layer below it and the student of the one above it. Thus the organization is open to innovations and innovators from below, and rewards the path up to them from above. There is no learning method without problems - there are no free lunches, but why is this a good way? Because it has many independent learning components and much complexity and redundancy, and because what each layer learned builds the learning of the layer above it, without the building process being planned from above, and also without it growing only from bottom to top, but in interaction between them, meaning between innovation and evaluation. Many natural systems learn this way, and social systems too, and perhaps the brain learns this way too. So even if an ideal learning system cannot be characterized, it is still possible to outline, from learning experience, a path for a learning organization. In such an organization there are many feedback loops, and few one-way instructions. And its learning does not depend on any specific factor, for example its head, because it is all its own head, and therefore because learning is distributed and there are no bottlenecks, it is systemic learning, and less need for a charismatic genius to make a revolution, which is dangerous for an organization, whether this genius happens to arrive or happens not to arrive. Instead of charisma and leadership, they rely on effective evaluation, and instead of someone with a huge innovative motive, they encourage innovation in everyone, through competition. There are those who think that the academic organization is not hierarchical, because everyone evaluates everyone (today: according to number of citations), but this is not true because in every field there are layers with more prestige, like established researchers, or senior figures in the field, who evaluate lower layers, and young researchers. Meaning: The hierarchy between the layers does not have to be formal and rigid, but it's enough that it is created from the learning itself, like the hierarchy of popularity in a social network, but the most important thing is that it be competitive. Why is competition so important? Because there are many ways to learn, since hints are always partial and evaluations too provide only partial guidance, so one needs to learn in many directions in parallel, and then choose between them. One needs to search and then converge. A system never learns only in one direction, otherwise it is simply executing an algorithm that progresses in a certain direction. Learning is always a broad front, and therefore there is never a single specific datum that forces progress in a certain direction, like in a chain of proof step by step, but a whole set of things that point to a general direction. Philosophy therefore never relies on this or that argument, which caused it to choose a certain direction, but it is a kind of whole network of arguments, and in fact a whole system, and good philosophy is a whole organization of thought - and learning. In my thinking too I am constantly trying to evaluate it, and thus direct it, and so the reader too is constantly engaged in evaluating every word, of course if he is a learning reader and not a memorizing reader. Therefore my thinking is built layer upon layer, evaluations upon evaluations, and therefore it progresses. If it did not move on a horizontal front but in a line forward, then it would not be interesting and not thinking, but calculating, like a Turing machine. The ability to advance an argument stems from the conduct of a commander who conquers territory, and not of a commando unit that breaks through and returns as it came, but does not change the situation on the ground. Also a person who moves into an unknown area does not discover a continent, but a route, and only a broad movement, in the dimension of area and not of line, is the discovery of the unknown, because knowledge is a systemic thing. After all, there were those who traveled to America before Columbus, and what made him the discoverer is the movement of the Spanish after him, and if they had not continued his discovery would have been forgotten, until someone else would discover and turn the anecdote into a method. Therefore literature that tells a specific story is unimportant, and importance stems from the fact that we perceive it as telling a big and broad story. The stories of the patriarchs without the people that came from them are grandmother's tales and family gossip, which is always lost. Therefore philosophy that wants to be didactic cannot be a certain sequence of arguments, as (ostensibly) Wittgenstein tried in his first book, until he understood in his second book that he needs to create a field, and not a thread. Therefore a philosophy book needs to be fat, and so does a novel, and so do the holy scriptures, because they are not doctrine or a summary document in points of the word of God, like the list of commandments, meaning an algorithm. The detail is important because the system is made up of details, and not of rules, and whoever thinks there are only rules does not understand what a system is. Therefore the world is so complicated and life is so complicated, not by chance, and not by mistake that needs to be solved, or stripped down and arranged, as certain philosophies think. Everything is complicated because this is a learning system. To a computer nothing is complicated, and in fact everything is terrifyingly simple. It's amazing how superficial the logical operation is, and the interpretation of the command in the programming language. What's frightening is that there's nothing there. Therefore one should fear much more the too simple than the too complicated. And if we appreciate some simple explanation, meaning some learning move that leads to simplicity, it is not because it turns the system into a simple one, but because it creates a new field of complication, built on something simple. For example: The simple explanation explains something complicated, or creates a new type of questions that did not exist before it, and opens a door in what seemed like a self-evident and uninteresting wall, behind which there is a whole complicated world. This is the beauty of the beautiful definition in mathematics - not because it solves everything, but because behind it there is monstrous complexity that we did not imagine until it showed us the entrance, and thus it creates interest because it allows us to learn more. Learning is indeed a kind of process that knows no satiety, unlike calculation which as it progresses its number of possibilities decreases - learning constantly increases the space of possibilities, and adding a simple innovation in learning adds another dimension to it, meaning it acts as a force multiplier. And on the other hand, a not simple innovation is one that is just another complication in one of the existing dimensions, and therefore it is less good learning-wise, because it adds less complexity to the system, in addition and not in multiplication. This is the more of the same, of the non-deep learner, meaning the one who does not add another dimension. But to add a dimension it is not enough to have one vector perpendicular to the others, but you really need to add after it the whole dimension, meaning to progress on a very wide front, and to show (for example in our case) learning in language, and learning in epistemology, and learning in aesthetics, etc., and only at the end of learning can it really be considered another dimension in philosophy, and not just another idea, like language and epistemology were considered (and rightly so) to be more dimensions. Once, perhaps, when people read texts in manuscripts, like in the Talmud, it was enough to write the idea, without detailing it fractally, in order to add another dimension. Because there was respect for the text and people would not just read it but delve into it, learn it, internalize it, expand it (for example: interpret it), meaning they themselves would do the work of expansion, and therefore the important texts were concise. The Spanish would come after Columbus. Today, when the text is worth nothing because it is not learned but is knowledge, then all the work of expansion needs to be done within it. It needs to be the entire invasion of European culture to America, because no one will come after it. There are no evaluation mechanisms that will discover it, and if there are evaluation mechanisms then they are not qualitative and the competition is a race to the bottom. Not only do you need to be your own interpreter, you need to be the entire system, a whole learning organization. After all, the system is from the word evaluation. Therefore in order to be a philosopher today - you need to be the entire philosophy. In order to be a writer - you need to be an entire literature. In order to be an intellectual - you need to be the elite in its entirety. And here we come to the difficult problem, which really sabotages learning in our days: not the lack of ability to innovate, but self-evaluation.

Philosophy, Method and Learning (The General Topic Becomes the Last Topic)

In addition to the fact that what you already know creates your space of blindness - because learning is built on it and therefore covers what is underneath it, meaning the assumptions on which it itself is built, meaning other possibilities to build, and all this is expressed in biases to use your current knowledge and tools and not examine others - there is a deeper blindness, which is not black but transparent. In black blindness you know there is something there, but do not see it, and therefore you are aware of your blindness itself, and therefore you can examine your knowledge and change it relatively easily, and if you discovered you made a mistake in knowledge - you will correct it quickly. But beneath what you know, in a depth that you can never reach to its bottom, and therefore it has no bottom in fact, lie different layers of your method, to which you can only ever be partially aware, and therefore in its depth it is always transparent to you (the question of whether it has some basic layer is beyond your grasp, in principle, and therefore meaningless learning-wise, and the answer to it is not only beyond the capabilities of your brain, but beyond everything that operates it, meaning not only beyond the limits of your existence but beyond the limits of the universe, because this is a question that is even below the laws of nature, and therefore in its depth the method is more basic than physics and even mathematics, because they too have methods). The depth of the question of method, meaning the question of the method of the method of the method of etc., is expressed not only in bias towards your current method, like that bias towards previous knowledge that becomes an assumption for you, but in the impossibility of even imagining another method, if one goes deep enough, meaning the impossibility of understanding your method to the end at all. A deep understanding of something in learning is always the ability to learn differently, meaning it becomes just a possibility, that one can build from it in another direction, on the same assumptions, but eventually if one goes deep enough in the building, one reaches assumptions and layers that you cannot imagine alternatives to, and therefore you do not really understand them, and finally you are not aware of them at all, due to their depth and basicness. Artistic understanding is for example the ability to write differently, and therefore it becomes a tool, for example if you understood the method of the writer, not only can you write like him, but the next stage is the ability to write differently from him, by consciously operating his method (which he was not aware of), meaning to the end (not innocently), and after squeezing this possibility to the end, the next stage in deepening understanding is the ability to see the arbitrary in the method, what can be done differently from it, meaning the deeper you go you see more possibilities, and alternatives to more and more basic layers in the phenomenon you are learning. A deep mathematician is not one who understands best in depth why two plus two is four and not otherwise, but one who can imagine other number systems, and finally even alternatives to the concept of number, and finally even an alternative to the concept of concept, and finally even an alternative to alternative, and so on, until it can no longer be formulated, and the thing becomes transparent to us, and therefore incomprehensible, and therefore self-evident, because it is below the lowest method we managed to dig and reach in the archaeological layers, or in the evolutionary tree of learning, and therefore there are already creatures there that we are no longer able to imagine. Although we will easily imagine a mammal with two tails, for example. Because there we are very much in control of the ability of combination and composition and construction, and therefore we understand this very well. Therefore precisely the more tools you have and more knowledge you base yourself on and are committed to, the more free you are, artistically for example, or conceptually, and not the opposite (as liberals would think, who feel that tradition binds them, for example artistically or conceptually). This paradox stems from learning, because you cannot think a free thought at all, but freedom is the ability to learn and make combinations in previous knowledge. You have no access to some freedom mechanism - but you are operated in a learning mechanism (and therefore learning is conservative, in current political terms, and precisely therefore it is innovative to an incomparable degree from liberalism, or from one who is freed from all tradition and culture, and thus turns himself into a barbarian and shallow. There is a boor who does not know, but one who is not capable of learning is the current type of boor, which is a different type, and the appropriate name for him is donkey, because he is not necessarily stupid or lacking knowledge. But a donkey does not learn). Philosophy is the attempt to dig into the depth of the method layer - each time to one more layer, and to take control of it and show the different possibilities in it, the paths not taken, and therefore philosophy can progress at all - downwards. Therefore every philosophy is deeper than its predecessor (as opposed to more correct than it, not because none is correct, but because both are correct, only one is more basic, and this is entirely like the progress in physics or mathematics, and even - in literature and aesthetics). And so everything ultimately stands on the solid ground of the self-evident. But unlike other philosophies that opposed the self-evident, and saw it as arbitrary, and a malfunction, and a problem that needs to be overcome (or desirable, or would be desirable, even if not entirely possible, as they admitted in the end, in the process of retreat of the pretension of philosophy), learning sees it as something positive, that only it enables learning. Even Kant feels a miss that he cannot directly grasp the world, and feels that there is a barrier, which simply cannot be overcome. All philosophers want the ground of certainty, but refuse to stand on it. For them one needs to find what is beneath the ground and what supports it, so that it will stand philosophically. But the philosophy of learning understands that you cannot learn at all without biases, prior knowledge, unsubstantiated assumptions, and a method that you cannot be aware of to the end, and it does not derive from this that one should try slowly to overcome the biases etc., and find a more open and breached method to every wind, but it derives from this that one should precisely rely on them. This situation where we stand on something unfounded is positive, and not just necessary, in the sense of an unfortunate necessity. If physics is based for example on mathematics as its self-evident, then this was a tremendous advancement in physics, which is what enabled the scientific revolution, than when physics was based on something lower, like common sense, or was not based on anything. So too in art - if you base yourself on the achievements of the past you will reach much higher than if you are ignorant. The basic deepening in technology (for example basic research) creates only higher technology - and does not return us to the Stone Age. If so, does learning oppose philosophy, meaning digging down into the depth of the method? Does it see it as a subversive enterprise, against learning? Exactly the opposite. If you dig in order to pull the rug out, and show that it is arbitrary and therefore worthless, because you see arbitrariness as a negative and anti-philosophical element, and try to take out the foundations from there, then you are really trying to bring down the entire tower. But this is not how philosophy really works, contrary to what it told itself, within history, and this is not how the act of discovery of the basic layers really works, and the presentation of alternatives to them. In fact, it only raises the tower, and adds to it from below another layer, meaning expands it and creates alternatives for it, and thus the building actually grows, exactly like if we had added more interesting species millions of years ago evolution would only have created for us even more species today. That is why science and art have expanded so much. But if you are a modern artist, who deals only with the basis of art, for example with the language of art, and remains in this layer, and tries only to talk about the language itself without saying anything, or without understanding that precisely the layers above the language itself are the important ones in order to say something of value, then you are really pulling the rug out from under the entire world of art and remain shallow like a carpet, which indeed happened to art - and not to science. Both expanded - but only science grew taller, and art actually became as low as grass height, and lost meaning - from too much preoccupation with language and meaning itself. The philosopher was always one who wanted to be a modern artist, but in the end science came out of him, because the world did not use philosophy to destroy but to build. In fact, the understanding of this method of philosophy is what distinguishes the philosophy of learning from its predecessors. After all, what does the linguistic idiot always say, who just yesterday read Wittgenstein at university as if we are a hundred years behind and thinks these are hot rolls from the oven and not moldy bread? What are you talking about learning, after all you yourself write in language, and isn't this sentence itself said in language and not read in language and even thought in language, meaning isn't language the basis of everything, and in particular of the phenomenon of learning? Doesn't one need to analyze learning linguistically in order to understand it? (As indeed Wittgenstein did, partially, but one can continue this linguistic investigation!). This is the defensive response of one who is inside a paradigm and not willing to leave it - and therefore not able. Meaning he uses the method of pulling the rug out from under your feet, that rhetorical trick that philosophers have used since time immemorial to show the necessity and power of their profession and their questions, and thus attacked the innocent, meaning those who are not aware of that carpet on which they stand, because it is actually not a carpet but ground, because they are not aware of the method that operates them (as no person is able to be aware of the method to the end - in all of us there is always innocence, even in philosophers!). This method is a basic philosophical method, which stands beneath philosophy, and it assumes as self-evident that the carpet is problematic, because it covers, meaning that the ground is a carpet. As if what is covered is more important and true, and stands at a higher ontological level (epistemology, the supposedly enlightened and more advanced than Greek primitive ontology, always concealed its own shaky ontological assumptions, and how it itself is actually ontology). This is exactly the same method by which the Freudian embarrasses his interlocutor with the claim that his opposition to him stems itself from some sexual deviation, and with what joy and sense of self-courage he exposes some particularly unusual perversion, and his interlocutor indeed feels cheated but does not know how to put his finger (oh, what a Freudian slip) on the point. He feels that something is eluding him, although it is correct, but the philosopher or the exposing psychologist comes out with a confident expression, feels victorious, and of course rightly so, and therefore the other feels unjustly defeated. And why does the exposer defeat the exposed? Because the exposed does not know how to discover and expose the fraud of the exposer (which the exposer himself of course is not aware of), because he does not know how to point to the primitive method that the exposer operates on him, since he encounters it for the first time - and it works on him. But after philosophy used its method too many times it is exposed and becomes conscious, and then one can point to the method. This is how the method worked - as they say in the news when exposing a corruption scandal. Awareness of the method, and the method beneath it, is the depth of the exposure. Therefore, when learning exposed this method of philosophy - to take some basic thing (there are many possibilities! We have progressed a lot and there were many previous stages in learning) and then pull it out, and claim that everything therefore stands on it, and that everything is in doubt and needs to start from scratch (meaning not from scratch, but from the lowest place the philosopher reached, and therefore he imagines that he is ground zero) - and then the other side that of course stands on it (everything stands on it!) is forced to raise its awareness to this layer, and deal with it - and the philosopher has already won, because one can never really pull out a previous basic stage and start again from there, because it is too radical for learning, but one can undermine it, exactly like a terrorist cannot defeat the state but only undermine its security (and especially its self-confidence, for example in its righteousness). But the victory of philosophy is illusory, because raising awareness only leads to enrichment with more possibilities related to this layer, and not to a radical change resulting from its removal from intellectual history. Therefore, the answer to Wittgenstein's student is correct, everything is in language, but it's a matter of choice. We are already aware of the method, and therefore aware that one can choose some plane from reality, and claim that it is the most basic of all, and all stand on it (and ultimately, in the continuation of the move towards postmodernism, that the choices made regarding it are arbitrary and unfounded). But this choice itself - that is, not the choices made on this plane, but the choice of the plane itself from countless such possible planes - already seems arbitrary to us, because we understand this philosophical method, and see its own arbitrariness. Therefore, we propose to choose another plane, beneath language - learning. Just as you claim that this text is made of words and that language is more basic than learning, we claim that to the same extent this claim itself stems from learning (you learned Wittgenstein, didn't you?), and that learning is beneath the text and beneath language and thinking in a much more basic sense. So which is really more basic? It's a matter of choice. Indeed, you could choose to see language as more basic than everything, just as you could choose any previous philosophical paradigm that has already been exhausted (for example: perception, or reason, or being itself), but you could choose some basic plane that hasn't existed before, for example learning, and claim so. But isn't it more interesting from your perspective to examine a new possibility? (From a learning perspective - clearly yes). After all, we could have chosen a plane that is not basic, for example the tail, and claim that the tail is the relevant basic plane for the world (or the cat), and then we would have created a kind of ridiculous philosophical parody, showing the arbitrariness of philosophy (in fact, Nietzsche did exactly that with sleep). If so, philosophy is the attempt to find a more basic plane that is also deeper, and there is competition between philosophers (Searle might claim that the plane more basic than language is institutions, and philosophers of mind will claim that the mind is more basic, and even the philosophy of learning itself dealt with two such competing planes, the legal plane and the plane of thought, where learning is the meeting between them just as Kant is the meeting between empiricism and rationalism), and time is ultimately the judge of who was the deepest of all. That is, the continuation of learning is what judges between the possibilities, from the moment the method has come to our awareness, and we understand our combinatorial abilities. Therefore, we are not only cynical, but serious in proposing learning as the next plane, on which it is worthwhile to continue building. It cannot be justified, but we see the advancement of technology towards learning, for example in machine learning, and the advancement of science towards learning, for example in neuro, and believe that in the future learning will also become the basis of culture and art, meaning that just as language became the basis of the 20th century, learning will become the basis of the 21st century, and will play a similar role in it, and it will be possible to talk about the learning turn in a similar way to the linguistic turn. That is, we do not want to pull the rug out from under language, but to add a floor to it and claim that it is based on learning. And why? Because we already understand this method of philosophy, and it is no longer transparent. But it is clear that beneath us there is a method that is transparent to us, and it will be the next stage in philosophy, which will certainly not define it as a method, because learning will no longer be floor 0 but floor 1. The archaeological excavation does not bring down the city but on the contrary shows how much the city has developed and grown, as long as there is no pretension to reach the first layer and the beginning of time. How was the tower created in the first place? The moment you learn something enough, it becomes so understood that later you forget that you learned it at all, and it becomes part of your method, that is, it turns from understood to self-evident and ceases to be understood. That is, there is a process here where regular learning gradually forgets its foundations, and you are least aware of your methodological foundations, and thus learning itself was actually hidden and forgotten during intellectual history, despite its basicness and primacy. And philosophical learning is learning that works in the opposite direction to regular learning. Not against it - but comes to its aid when it gets stuck, with the possibility of going back, or at least bypassing backwards (because you can't really go back like rewinding a movie). Hence the importance of philosophy. The great help of philosophy is against the inability to imagine - what can be different at all. Therefore, even in the most plowed fields - and especially in them - we are always waiting for (and this indeed always happens, and never stops) precisely very basic discoveries, and each generation in research thinks that it is the one that has reached the bottom. But there is no bottom - there is an abyss. Therefore, when a system reaches a problem that does not stem from lack of knowledge or false information, but from a basic, methodological gap, it is much harder for it to recover, and this undermines it from the foundation, what is called a basic surprise (see Webster). If a disabled child is born to you, unlike the situation where your parents passed away at an old age, it shakes you to the core. If the house (i.e. the temple) is destroyed, unlike losing a war, it is a fundamental undermining of the system. And this is also the difference between the Holocaust and another pogrom (for all the researchers trying to show what the difference is between the Holocaust and other murders, including genocide). And here philosophy comes to your aid, with its ability to assist learning through changing the method, and not just through more learning. Learning is upwards and forgets the method below, but sometimes you need to deepen and dive into the method, and change something basic, and this is the opposite direction from regular learning, which may be able to develop the method gradually, but not imagine a different method. And of course, such a dive always has a finite depth (unlike philosophy's pretension to infinite, i.e. absolute depth). There is a method for the method that is no longer accessible to us. We claim that we have exposed another depth in the method of philosophy, and not that we have exposed all the depth that is there. And we claim that there is value in this because philosophy has reached a dead end, to scribbling, and to lack of value, through repeated and repeated and repeated use to the point of nausea of the same used method (of the use of language, for example), that is, the method has already reached awareness but no alternative has been presented to it and therefore it is in its decadent and corrupt stage. But does the very change in the method, created after the crisis (and usually the catastrophe), show that a flaw has fallen in it? Yes, but it fell in it not because of what it is, in principle, not because it itself is not okay, and there is a method that in itself is better than it. The method fell for a learning reason, and not for a philosophical reason, that is, because it happened, in practice, that it encountered a challenge that it failed to crack, or to strike. The test is empirical and not a priori. In fact, a method that has not changed for a long time is usually precisely because it is a very successful method, which is not worth replacing, and not necessarily because it is a fossilized method. The gap between a layer of method that needs to remain in unconsciousness, and it is not worth imagining a substitute for it at all because it will be bad or worthless and will not lead to anything, and a method that has lost its relevance, is not on the philosophical level, but on the systemic level, for example in a surprise like Yom Kippur. The method is not worth replacing just because it is there, and it is not worth digging into one of its foundations for no reason, and there is no profit in undermining for the sake of undermining (as they think in contemporary art), but only for the sake of better learning success. No one replaces any part of the method in physics because of fashion, but because this replacement can explain a physical mystery or contradiction, which the previous method failed to learn. The method in literature should be replaced because the current method no longer succeeds in creating masterpieces, and the method in art because the current method is a factory for producing garbage, being an infinite recycling, without creative treatment of its raw materials (which are the great narratives, for example in painting: the great myths, or history). And not every part of the method is worthy of replacement, or can even be replaced. The great wisdom is therefore to choose what to change in the method, and therefore it is so difficult. And therefore it happens rarely, because most changes in the method will only worsen the situation, like most mutations in DNA. After all, the uniqueness of any field stems from its method, and if we get rid of everything special in it and choose a more general method, the field will disappear, and we will not be able to learn more but less, since specialization in a method is also higher efficiency, just as knowledge promotes learning ability. The general method in the computer is brute force, for example in search, and it is much worse, precisely because it is much more general, than any learning algorithm, despite the limitations of any such algorithm. Therefore, algorithm development is a difficult field, but it is clear that it is different from the operation of the algorithm itself (and opposite to it in the same sense that philosophy is opposite to learning). And it is also clear that knowledge, just like data, is indeed a bias but it is not worth getting rid of it, but relying on it in the continuation of learning. The very pointing to the algorithm that drives the program, and bringing it to awareness, is not supposed to undermine it, or its validity, but only its actual performance, and therefore pointing to this algorithm can help to think about it itself as something that was built, and therefore allow to think about alternatives to it that will help in special cases or in areas where it fails. And what happens to a field that has lost its method - we can see in the field of aesthetics. Let's ask ourselves how it happened and when it happened that cities became much uglier than nature? Has it always been like this? Well, every city in the ancient world was much more beautiful than cities today, and so in the Middle Ages, and until the 19th century, and in fact was no less beautiful than nature. If so, what happened? Is it because of industrial construction? But there are (few) cities that remained beautiful, and industrial construction could have been done beautifully, if it was important to people, as it was important to them in the past. After all, we have not become poorer, but on the contrary, much richer and more capable, and can create more beautiful things with less investment, relative to the past. And in the past, wealth actually contributed to aesthetics. Did the mass alone of the number of people in the city create the ugliness? But Rome was a city of over a million inhabitants. Are people less concerned with the external aesthetics of the building? Yes, it is not important to them at all, and it is clear that there was a cultural change here, but it itself requires explanation. After all, this is an unprecedented phenomenon in history, of exceptional ugliness that has taken over the immediate environment of almost all the inhabitants of the world. Was there a phenomenon of chicken and egg, and of a destructive feedback loop of descent to the lowest standard? Of course, but there is no explanation in this but only description, and description alone could have happened in any period (yes, Wittgenstein, and you actually cared about aesthetics). What happened is that cities lost their method, and became absolute cacophony, and then both neglect and indifference to aesthetics (when only money is a consideration) created a process of deterioration in the aesthetic ability of the entire population, from the rich to the poor, and all this stemmed from the propaganda against the method, and the desire to erase it and the very idea of learning, in the name of freedom. If all previous knowledge becomes a limitation (and therefore: it must be broken through), and every method is arbitrary (and therefore: worthless), then the learning dimension of aesthetics (also in art) disappears, and therefore the style disappears completely, for example of how to make a city, which was local. And so in almost every city in the world, in parallel. And therefore a Bauhaus city like Tel Aviv became a monster of ugliness (which is of course considered functional, because someone decided that aesthetics is not functional, and hid the ontological assumptions beneath it). And therefore architects, leaders, and even the residents themselves - lost their shame. Who would have been willing to live in such ugliness, in the past? After all, we are not talking about abject poverty (and why should the poor not care about aesthetics, like everyone else? Are they not more ashamed, as they were more ashamed than everyone else once, and therefore especially insisted on external appearance?). The idea of the language of art is what destroyed aesthetics, because aesthetics is a learned thing, and if it is not taught - it disappears. And it indeed disappeared. Is the method of any city (in the sense of a city until the 20th century) arbitrary? Certainly. Is this method without aesthetic value? On the contrary, it is precisely the arbitrariness that creates the uniqueness of the city and its special character which is beauty. It is precisely the limitations, that not every building goes, but for example that we do Bauhaus, that are the beauty. Thus free verse poetry destroyed poetry and turned it into something that interests no one. Just as the shape of your building does not interest anyone, and an ugly building is no longer a scandal, but a norm. A norm of lack of norms. This is certainly a simpler and more basic method, but therefore it is precisely poorer. And therefore art no longer has style. Is a genre breakthrough (which is often said as a compliment) an advancement in art, or is it the destruction of the genre, unless there is a deep methodological need precisely in this breakthrough - precisely? That is, if it does not stem from recognition of arbitrariness, but from a certain necessity, which stems from a certain method. Because of the linguistic destruction, precisely the natural innovation of learning is perceived today as conservatism, because the very innovation within a certain tradition - within a certain system - and not the arbitrary innovation outside the system (and therefore worthless and without continuity and disconnected from any learning) is already perceived as terrible conservatism (why is conservatism terrible? Can one say something in a truly free language, or is every language conservative in order to have any meaning at all, and learning is what allows it to renew itself?). How did philosophy become anti-learning? The opposite directionality of philosophy caused it to become opposed to the direction of learning, and eventually to become automatically opposed. After all, the essence of learning is its unidirectionality, and every philosophy invests enormous effort in striving against the direction of the system, and against the current, towards the method that is the source of the current, and from which the flow comes out. Physically, the meaning of the speed of light is precisely this unidirectionality, and it is that no one can block the disturbance or information that came out of himself, by chasing after the light that came out of him and catching up with it and exceeding the speed of light and then blocking or changing it. His influence on the universe is unidirectional, and he cannot retroactively change and cancel it - this is the deep meaning of the speed of light, and hence there is time, because there is no possibility to act retroactively. What was was. Therefore, the universe always becomes more and more connected, because more and more things are influenced by more and more things, and with the help of this network of influences becomes one reality, which everyone agrees on (and cannot be changed after the fact). Therefore, the unidirectionality of learning is rooted in physical roots themselves, and in the arrow of time itself, and therefore writing is also unidirectional, in a line, and we did not adopt for example a script in which several words can come out of each word in several directions, although theoretically such a script could also work. Philosophy is an attempt to read against the direction of writing. A low level of understanding of literary creation is reading what happened in it, and a much higher level, which is the reading of the writer in another writer, is reading backwards - reading the method of writing the book. What brought the writer to write it (what is the initial and even personal motivation, what he tried to do, what is the essence of his method and doctrine), what means and techniques he used, what he could have done differently - better - and why he chose to do so and not otherwise and how this contributed, what literary current or literary development he is developing, what he learned from the history of literature before him and what he teaches for the future - all these and more are backward readings of the text, to the mechanisms and methods that created it, that is, reading that sees the text not as information but as evidence of a method, one product of an algorithm, or a variety of algorithms, whose operation could have created other works as well (and perhaps created such, by the same writer, his imitators and sources of inspiration). But the product (necessarily!) teaches us about the algorithm that created it, and therefore from extensive reading we can learn to write, which is precisely the purpose of philosophy. To extract the method from the learning that was done. To go back from the light to the source. And this is what enables originality, and hence its connection to creativity and new writing. Knowledge of the method is the mother of innovation, and deep innovation, as opposed to just innovation, is innovation that originates not in learning but in method. In his backward reading, the philosopher reads the world like an alternative creator of the universe, or an alternative designer of culture, or an alternative navigator of history, and therefore he aspires to the divine point of view, in which the world is a creation, and tries to discover the method of God (philosophy of religion), the method of the world (ontology) and the method of man (epistemology). Therefore, philosophy goes against the direction of physics, against the direction of mathematics, against the direction of evolution, against the direction of technology, against the direction of culture, etc., and therefore philosophers do need to learn all the sciences, and there is influence of scientific knowledge on philosophy and vice versa (it is not independent, on the contrary, it cannot be independent of any field whatsoever, because it goes against the direction of learning in all of them towards a more general method as much as possible, and therefore it must walk in their paths - only backwards, and this does not necessarily mean in time, but in building learning). Philosophers must learn and know everything everything as general knowledge, nothing should be foreign to them, because philosophy is the last field that still goes against the increasingly narrow specialization. Only in this way will philosophers be able to imagine another universe, another man, other sciences, and another culture. Backward reading enables otherwise. And then imagination will receive its proper place as a central philosophical method, because today one of the problems of learning is simply lack of imagination, and people are not even able to imagine another philosophy (or other literature, or other art, not to mention other sciences), to such an extent they are fixed, after seventy years of petrification of philosophy. If philosophy continues in its petrification, we will reach the Middle Ages, which are characterized by the inability to imagine an alternative to the ruling philosophy. The low learning skills of this period are what turned it into the Middle Ages, and not some decline in GDP. And therefore it seems that philosophy skipped over them from the Greeks, because learning is not interested in the amount of time that has passed, but in the amount of learning that has been done (therefore usually youth is longer than adulthood which is much longer than it). The more we get stuck in the same method, the more it will become ontology in our eyes, and then learning will build mountains above it (as happened in the Middle Ages) that will lose all interest in the future and the future will lose all interest in them (see Scholasticism), because learning will not maintain a living connection to the basic innovation, but will become a kind of repetitive algorithm. Other periods will not connect to what is not connected to the basic method, and to its potential for change, and current learning will progress too deeply into the search tree, and forget to return from time to time backwards to search breadth, and interest in other possibilities. In literature we have become fixed on the novel, in art on the myth of the artist, in aesthetics on the avant-garde (how ridiculous when the matter itself has petrified), in poetry on lyrics and free verse, in political theory on democracy, in economics on capitalism, and so on. And the inability to imagine an alternative is the inability to learn the next stage of these structures, and to build the continuation. The purpose of imagination is not to pull the rug out and destroy everything in a revolution (like the Marxist opposition to capitalism) but precisely to continue and develop capitalism and democracy themselves to their next stage, by improving the methodology of the state (political theory), or, in the case of art for example, improving aesthetics (learning texts have their own aesthetics, and like literature that played with language, there can be learning or teaching literature). Therefore, going back in the tree aims precisely at advancing forward more in searching the tree, and thus even periods of destruction in evolution only advance it, because sometimes dealing with foundations (the philosophical engagement) is in contrast to dealing with the development of tree branches (learning itself). And therefore good learning is a balance between developing learning and developing the method. And philosophy is important to create the backward pull in the dialectic between them, and its bankruptcy will lead to excess progress in narrow specialization and narrow-mindedness, which is what characterizes the intellectual of our time, namely the narrow-minded academic, see the analytical philosopher, whose only interest is consistency, because creativity is far from him and he does not understand at all its ways of operation as a method, and is not able to grasp different and parallel learning moves that exhaust a space of possibilities, because from his point of view they are contradictory, because he fantasizes that the method of philosophy is logic, exactly like the Scholastics. Therefore, he is not interested at all in the history of philosophy, because this would have shown him a completely different method, and his pathetic and childish desire to "catch" the great thinkers on logical fallacies would have been exposed as a relevance gap, and as an inability to even relate to the question of method. But if any learning does not develop the method, eventually it itself is destroyed, because it is not able to cope with a new basic challenge, which would have required methodical innovation, and this destruction of learning itself enables the development of the method - which learning blocked. This is the most primitive method of changing the method, but if learning gets stuck, this is what happens. The method will always win in the end, so its submission by learning that is already too invested in a certain direction is a Pyrrhic victory, which will come back as a boomerang. But who will get this far? No one. No one will get this far. Not in learning and not in reading. And I don't know who I'm writing this for.

Culture and Literature