chinese foreign aid
most chinese aid is provided bilaterally. only 15% is given as multilateral aid .
foreign governments don’t passively receive financial aid but rather actively attempt to manage their foreign aid donors. (ashraf shazly / afp via getty images )
at the onset, china’s aid policy was premised on equality between partners, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, respect for obligations and enhancing the self - reliance of chinese aid recipients. according to china’s 2011 white paper on foreign aid :
in addition, in the past decade, controversies stemming from china’s foreign aid, especially business contracts in less - developed countries and connections to china’s quest for natural resources, have solicited scrutiny and criticism from international observers. how to manage the reputational risks associated with commercial aspects of china’s foreign aid and improve its foreign aid to better serve china’s broader national interests is a key task identified by analysts within the chinese foreign policy community .
[ 3 ] “china’s foreign aid, ” xinhua news agency, april 21, 2011, urltoken .
over the past several years, an increasingly strong voice has risen in china calling for the reform of its foreign aid policies and systems. in response to this voice, the ministry of commerce (mofcom) initiated a campaign in 2014 to “comprehensively deepen the reform of china’s foreign aid system, ” which led to the release of new “ measures for administration of foreign aid ” in december. under this grand scheme, mofcom is scheduled to introduce mid - to long - term policy guidelines on chinese foreign aid in 2015. while the changes to china’s foreign aid may not be as drastic as some have hoped, they will nonetheless affect the direction and practice of china’s foreign aid as an important policy instrument .
they expressed fear that cutting foreign aid risks ceding u. s. influence in other regions and countries .
there is also an ongoing debate inside china about the goal and management of chinese aid to africa. for the foreign policy bureaucrats at the ministry of foreign affairs, foreign aid is essentially a political instrument for china to strengthen bilateral ties and facilitate the development of african countries. in their view, political considerations should be the most important criteria in aid decision - making. economic benefits associated with aid projects, such as profitability, resource extraction, or the acquisition service contracts for chinese vendors, should only be secondary .
this is an extract from a working paper titled “the political and economic dynamics of foreign aid: a case study of united states and chinese aid to sub - sahara africa”. [ kafayat amusa, nara monkam and nicola viegi ]
i was in fiji last week to get an update on chinese assistance to the country, as part of a larger project i' m doing mapping chinese aid activities in the pacific islands, to be launched in early 2015. navua hospital, built with chinese aid assistance, fiji. (author photo) fiji is becoming
lowy institute research associate dr philippa brant writes for foreign affairs about why china' s foreign aid won' t replace the west' s. the full article is available here
today the lowy institute’s melanesia program launches a major update to the institute’s flagship research mapping project on chinese aid in the pacific. * the map now contains a decade of chinese government aid activities in the pacific islands region, making it a valuable resource for
the chinese government is frequently criticised for not being transparent about its aid program. as i mentioned in my quick summary yesterday, there' s not a lot of specific data in the chinese aid white paper. but we can make a few comparisons — on geographical spread, type of aid, and income
the pacific region is making headlines across australia after pacific and international development minister concetta fierravanti - wells harshly criticised chinese aid in the region.' useless' is how fierravanti - wells has described chinese aid projects, leading countries to take on debt they can' t
mapping chinese aid in the pacific, an interactive map launched by the lowy institute today, is the first comprehensive survey of chinese - funded aid projects in the pacific islands region. lowy institute research associate dr philippa brant drew on over 500 sources including budgets, tender
china proclaims that the aid that it dispenses takes into account the beneficiary country’s economic growth and poverty alleviation goals. over the years, chinese aid projects in developing nations have also ushered in the flow of chinese investors through commercial contracts tied to state - funded projects .
my research on foreign aid diplomacy suggests that there is yet another reason we should care about the proposed cuts. here’s why: unpredictability and volatility in foreign aid undermines the ability of donor officials to lobby for changes in recipient countries .
the ministry of commerce (mofcom) is the principal institution for chinese aid, and houses the department of aid. it is in charge of distributing all zero - interest loans and grants. the ministry of foreign affairs coordinates with mofcom to decide aid allocations, and is the on - the - ground diplomatic point of contact for chinese firms and interests in africa. but the relationship between the two ministries is often tense, and, as experts have argued, conflicting interests between the multiple agencies sometimes hurts chinese aid policy .
dr. li ling teaches at chinese military economics academy, based in wuhan, china .
examining what drives chinese aid allocation to sub - saharan africa, empirical evidence suggests that china provides more foreign aid to oil - rich sub - saharan african countries than those that are not oil rich. almost half of the top ten recipients of chinese aid in the past ten years gave access to oil wells and granted first rights to prospect for oil in return. examples include angola and nigeria .
african governments like ghana increasingly have access to financing from “nontraditional” donors like china. just last month, ghana signed a $ 10 billion memorandum of understanding with the chinese to develop the country’s bauxite industry. chinese financial assistance should not yet be seen as a replacement to traditional aid. chinese aid is concentrated in the productive sectors (infrastructure, agriculture and mining) and mainly goes to chinese companies. in contrast, traditional aid is more likely to go directly to recipient governments and supports social sectors like health and education .
robbie gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at foreign policy. @ robbiegramer
cari has combined and converted china’s officially published foreign aid data from the ministry of finance. all figures are reported in millions of us $ using annual exchanges rates and are available for download in excel format. we have included all budgetary categories under “foreign affairs”, since several categories that are considered “foreign aid” by oecd definitions are in independent categories .
there’s another big reason u. s. foreign aid is important: it helps the u. s. get what it wants .
in addition to securing africa’s natural resources, china’s capital flows into africa also create business opportunities for chinese service contractors, such as construction companies. according to chinese analysts, africa is china’s second - largest supplier of service contracts, and “when we provide africa assistance of rmb 1 billion, we will get service contracts worth usd 1 billion (rmb 6 billion) from africa. ” [ 18 ] in exchange for most chinese financial aid to africa, beijing requires that infrastructure construction and other contracts favor chinese service providers: 70 percent of them go to “approved, ” mostly state - owned, chinese companies, and the rest are open to local firms, many of which are also joint ventures with chinese groups. [ 19 ] in this sense, china’s financing to africa, including aid, creates business for chinese companies and employment opportunities for chinese laborers, a critical goal of beijing’s going out strategy .
according to 2011 white paper on china’s foreign aid, published by the state council of the prc, “financial resources provided by china for foreign aid mainly fall into three types: grants (aid gratis), interest - free loans and concessional loans. the first two come from china' s state finances, while concessional loans are provided by the export - import bank of china as designated by the chinese government [ … ] foreign aid expenditure is part of the state expenditure, under the unified management of the ministry of finance in its budgets and final accounts system. ” kitano & harada (2016) have inferred that the foreign aid figures “were based on committed amounts and that disbursed amounts were therefore still unpublished. ”
china has provided foreign assistance since the 1950s, and is now the largest developing country to provide aid outside of the development assistance committee (dac), a forum of the world’s major donor countries under the organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd). like its foreign policy more broadly, chinese foreign assistance has adhered to the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and emphasized the virtue of national self - reliance. at the same time, it has served a strategic purpose alongside other foreign policy priorities .
the chinese have helped build more than 300 dams in africa, like this one on the congo river .
there are three main organs controlling chinese aid: the ministry of commerce, the ministry of foreign affairs and china' s eximbank. the state council - china' s cabinet - has oversight, and approves the annual budget, grants and aid projects over a certain amount, as well as aid to politically sensitive countries. the ministry of finance is also responsible for giving aid to multilateral organizations, such as un agencies .
stay up to date on devex coverage of u. s. foreign policy under trump :
recipient governments do not just passively receive aid but rather actively attempt to manage their foreign aid donors. they pay attention to how predictable and consistent donors are with their aid dollars, preferring to work with donor agencies that keep their word and deliver what they promised .
due to the lack of transparency in china’s aid statistics, other efforts were undertaken to collect more information on china’s foreign aid, ranging from media - based, field - based, to extrapolating from official data. “estimating china’s foreign aid 2001 - 2013” (2016), by kitano & harada at jica research institute, provides an excellent overview of these efforts .
my conversations with government officials, however, suggest that some african governments see chinese aid as more credible than assistance from traditional western donors. this puts even more pressure on traditional donors to offer credible promises of aid to recipient governments .
there’s another big reason u. s. foreign aid is important: it helps the u. s. get what it wants. - the washington post
however, given the lengthy nature of china’s foreign aid reform and the vested interests associated with the current setup, few expect the top leadership to make any drastic moves in the near future. nevertheless, technical reforms, internal adjustments, and enhanced multilateral cooperation are indeed on the horizon for china’s foreign aid .
given the above considerations, president xi jinping’s 2015 announcement of a three - year $ 60bn aid package for africa presages still deeper chinese soft power forays into this strategically important continent, and arguably represents a wake - up call for the west that size is not the sole, nor even the main, criterion for effective foreign aid .
in a new book, “ the development dance: how donors and recipients negotiate the delivery of foreign aid, ” i argue that aid is about bargaining and diplomacy. contrary to popular conception, aid is not a unilateral gift. foreign aid requires, in president trump’s words, the “art of the deal. ” but diplomacy is not like the real estate business. to get the best deal, you need to be predictable .
for both types of donors, recipient country governance is important. this conclusion is drawn from looking at the determinants of american and chinese foreign aid to 31 countries in sub - saharan africa. in the case of the us, both political rights and civil liberty are considerations in its aid allocation decisions to the region. for china, political rights are more important than civil liberty in influencing who receives aid .
since 2001 the need to boost chinese domestic economic growth has further driven china’s interest in sub - saharan africa’s natural resources .
some observers have also noted that most of the infrastructure projects funded with chinese official aid improve access to locations where chinese companies can produce agricultural products as well as undertake mining activities. if the philippines’ department of environment and natural resources sustains its clampdown on destructive mining operations, will china just discontinue aid for that sector or will it exert pressure to overturn the strict policy ?
china' s foreign aid program is now the sixth largest in the world. only the uk, us, germany, france and japan provided more last year .
emily tamkin is a staff writer at foreign policy covering ambassadorial and diplomatic affairs in washington. @ emilyctamkin
the economic sectors that get most attention in extending funding assistance and investment — particularly food production, mining and other resource extraction projects — which raises analysts’ questions whether the real beneficiaries are the poor countries receiving the chinese funding or the chinese economy itself .
hart and other aid executives told devex that such deep cuts would be short sighted and discount the role that development plays in creating global stability. the defense community has also emerged as a supporter of foreign aid, with a similar rationale .
prominent in the aid debate is the notion that western donor countries are more concerned about the degree of governance in recipient countries. their chinese counterparts are assumed to overlook the level and type of governance .
international development minister concetta fierravanti - wells' remarks about china' s aid to the pacific are part of a long tradition of concern in australia. yet while some chinese aid projects are less than perfect, as my colleague jonathan pryke notes, fierravanti - wells' sweeping
a political analyst at the university of new south wales in canberra, veasna var, wrote in an article published by the east asia forum days before the asean foreign ministers’ gathering that “excessive dependence on china [ financial aid ] has also placed cambodian foreign policy firmly under china’s influence. ”
“on the one hand, i have never heard as much bipartisan support for foreign aid in my entire career as i have heard in response to this budget, ” said hart .
in terms of the largest sub - saharan africa recipients of chinese aid, nigeria, ghana and sudan have been the top recipients in the past decade. the three countries combined received about $ 250 million in aid. the majority goes to energy infrastructure such as oil pipelines .
the document details how the trump administration’s plans to reduce direct foreign assistance would take place in fiscal year 2018 .
the proposed changes also contradict some previous republican positions, for example the shift toward esf funds, which are subject to less monitoring and regulation. republicans have traditionally favored greater aid transparency and were key backers of the recent foreign aid transparency and accountability act .
in recent years, china’s economic presence in africa has led to a heated debate, some of it well - informed and some of it not, about the nature of chinese involvement and its implications for the continent. the debate is partially motivated by the rapid growth of china’s economic presence in africa: for example, chinese investment in africa grew from usd 210 million in 2000 to 3. 17 billion in 2011. [ 1 ] aid is an important policy instrument for china among its various engagements with africa, and indeed africa has been a top recipient of chinese aid: by the end of 2009 it had received 45. 7 percent of the rmb 256. 29 billion cumulative foreign aid of china. [ 2 ] this aid to africa has raised many questions, such as its composition, its goal and nature .
dr philippa brant is a lowy institute research associate. china’s aid policy, like almost everything china does on the world stage, attracts close scrutiny and often criticism. the forthcoming release of china’s second white paper on foreign aid (likely within the next month) will
chinese foreign aid expenditure have increased steadily in the past decade, growing from us $ 631 million in 2003 to close to us $ 3 billion in 2015, with an average annual growth rate of 14% . the steepest growths were observed between 2005 and 2008, when annual growth rates range between 14% and 45% . a sluggish growth of less than 1% was observed in 2015, the lowest growth rate yet since 2003. after peaking in 2014 and 2015, chinese foreign aid expenditure decreased from close to 3 billion in 2015 to $ 2. 253 billion in 2016. the 24. 5% decrease arises from large fiscal carryover funds in previous years .
politicians in donor countries determine how much foreign aid a particular country gets. but donor agencies like usaid are responsible for delivering that aid. in exchange for aid dollars, donor officials ask recipients to make changes like implementing anti - corruption programs, establishing an independent electoral commission or overhauling the country’s primary education system. this requires donor officials to negotiate with recipient governments over how and under what conditions aid will be delivered .
although the benefits of chinese aid in sub - saharan africa are clear in health and infrastructure projects, including the provision of medicine, the training of health workers as well as the construction of transport infrastructure, there are some drawbacks to the aid. while china provides aid for different projects over a wide spectrum, for the most part it is focused on a few specific sectors. as a result pertinent issues that enable domestic resource generation in the region are not necessarily addressed. this suggests that there is a need to re - assess the type of chinese aid sub - saharan countries accept and to make sure that the aid ties in with these countries’ development agendas .
it should be noted that, although china’s foreign aid reform is primarily a domestic campaign, recipients, especially african countries could play an important role in shaping the discourse. to fully utilize china’s foreign aid resources and potential, african countries should not stay passively as mere recipients, but actively voice their needs and concerns. only through interactive and collaborative efforts could china’s aid to africa be shepherded for the maximum benefits for the recipient countries. if there is one voice that china’s aid community cannot afford ignore, it is that of africa itself .
it looks like u. s. president donald trump' s plan to reduce the foreign aid budget will come at a cost to his administration' s other aims in south and central asia .
compared to top dac donor countries, the scale of china’s foreign assistance is still relatively small. according to some estimates and oecd international development statistics, china’s gross foreign aid in 2001 was extremely limited, amounting to only about 1. 8 percent of the total contribution by dac donors. however, since launching its “go global” strategy in 2005, china has deepened its financial engagement with the world, and its foreign aid totals have grown at an average rate of 21. 8 percent annually. in 2013, china contributed about 3. 9 percent to total global development assistance, which is 6. 6 percent of the total contribution by dac countries and over 26 percent of total u. s. foreign aid .
trump’s plan to cut foreign aid spending has been anticipated for months. the president rarely broached the topic on the campaign trail, but a series of outline documents — some of them released intentionally, others leaked to the press and think tanks — gave a clear indication that the white house had its sights set on cutting foreign aid. the administration’s stance has left the development community facing something of a paradox .
china’s role as an aid donor has been met with wariness, both from aid experts and recipients. confusion over the nature of china’s aid arises because the country uses multiple ministries and agencies to give money, has different strategic priorities than traditional western donors, and does not release detailed reports about how much aid it provides .
this week' s quick comment interview is with the lowy institute' s dr philippa brant, who is behind the lowy institute' s latest (and very popular) infographic on chinese aid to the pacific. philippa discusses how she put the data together (china doesn' t have a comprehensive accounting of its own aid
china’s ministry of finance has been publishing their annual central government budgets and expenditures since 2003. relevant budget categories have evolved over the years, though what the budget category of “foreign aid” encompasses has remained fairly unchanged .
this may be a reflection of the fact that china has been a recipient nation of aid .
influenced mainly by their own experience of development and by the requests of recipient countries, the chinese aid and economic cooperation programmes emphasized infrastructure, production and university scholarships at a time when traditional donors downplayed these ,
wrote bräutigam .
despite strong opposition to some of the proposed cuts by members of congress, military leaders and business leaders, administration officials seem to have made few changes to the foreign aid budget from the “skinny” budget and earlier leaks .
most of these aid forms have existed since china became an international donor. the country gives money through three mechanisms: interest - free loans; grants; and preferential interest loans or tied loans, according to xue lei, a research fellow of shanghai' s institutes for international studies .
most of the foreign aid is provided in the form of project aid ,
he told irin .
the restructuring also saw the creation of three policy banks. these were china’s development bank, china export - import bank and china agricultural development bank. they were all state owned and enabled the government to provide targeted finance. the new policy opened the door to an economic and trade strategy. it enabled chinese investments in manufacturing and agriculture, and growth in chinese assembly factories. it also created increased demand for chinese exports and allowed china’s incursion into the exploration and investment in minerals and forest resources in africa .
the foreign aid arena in africa has traditionally been dominated by the organisation of economic co - operation and development (oecd) countries. however, over the past three decades non - traditional donors such as china, have emerged .
despite chinese leaders’ claim that china’s assistance to africa is totally selfless and altruistic, the reality is far more complex. [ 9 ] china’s policy toward africa is pragmatic, and aid has been a useful policy instrument since the early days of people’s republic of china .
in the 1960s africa provided china with an opportunity to increase its political and diplomatic reach. chinese interest in the continent came about in part as a result of political tensions between china and the soviet union as well as increased american and japanese competition in asia. in addition to political motives, africa presented china with economic opportunities. while the initial motive for chinese aid was to strengthen diplomatic ties, the resource motive became an important factor .
since the beginning of china’s reform and opening up, especially after 2000, africa has become an increasingly important economic partner for china. africa enjoys rich natural resources and market potential, and urgently needs infrastructure and development finance to stimulate economic growth. chinese development finance, combined with the aid, aims at not only benefiting the local recipient countries, but also china itself. for example, china’s “tied aid” for infrastructure usually favors chinese companies (especially state - owned enterprises), while its loans are in many cases backed by african natural resources .
moreover, at a time of massive chinese assistance flooding the region, savings achieved through scrounging comparatively small levels of assistance will leave washington with a shrunken profile and a shallower footprint .
china’s aid strategy contradicts the western approach, but is arguably more effective in achieving development goals .
concessional loans, provided by china eximbank, now make up nearly half of the total aid .
earlier this year trump also announced he was withholding $ 32. 5 million in funding earmarked for the u. n. population fund, the lead united nations agency on family planning and maternal health. trump made that decision on the grounds that the agency helps to support a chinese government family planning program that forces people to get abortions and sterilizations — a determination that both the agency and many advocates for foreign aid vigorously dispute .
the west’s concern is that china’s $ 9bn overseas aid (and investment) operates as a form of 21st century neocolonialist imperialism, exploiting poorer states’ energy and commodity sectors. however, this is contested by a growing body of empirical evidence that suggests chinese aid is allocated irrespective of whether recipient nations are resource - rich, or not, acting to dispel fears that china delivers only “rogue aid” (opaque, political, and exploitative) to “rogue states” (authoritarian and corrupt) .
in a chapter in an edited book, philippa brant examines the dynamics of china’s provision of foreign aid and its quest for natural resources in the south pacific region, with comparative references to other regions. she argues that although major commercial resource contracts do
during the cold war, foreign aid an important political tool that china used to gain africa’s diplomatic recognition and to compete with the united states and the soviet union for africa’s support. between 1963 and 1964, zhou enlai visited 10 african countries and announced the well - known “eight principles of foreign economic and technological assistance. ” [ 10 ] these aid principles were designed to compete simultaneously with the “imperialists” (the united states) and the “revisionists” (the soviet union) for africa’s approval and support .
about 61 percent of chinese concessional loans to africa are used for infrastructure construction, and 16 percent are for industrial development. the three areas that receive the largest allocations of chinese concessional loans are transport and storage; energy generation and supply; and industry, mining, and construction. a small portion of the remaining allocations go to health, general budget support, and education .
once a government signs a memorandum of understanding, the chinese firm proceeds to work on a feasibility study. the chinese can be “on the ground in a week” doing the feasibility study, which is itself is “not comprehensive” but merely an analysis of the cost — a stark contrast with the long time western companies or even the world bank spend on feasibility studies, hruby noted .
to the white house and congress cautioning against cuts to foreign aid and diplomacy. the letter cited the state department and usaid’s role in maintaining global stability by confronting extremist groups like the islamic state, curbing refugee flows, and combating infectious diseases like ebola .
there are also changes in the way china looks at the links between aid, development and business .
nonetheless, aid experts still expect the final budget passed by congress to lower spending levels on assistance .
president donald trump’s 2018 fiscal year budget proposal would shift funds from the united states agency for international development to the state department, hinting at potential changes in how development is carried out and shedding light on which parts of foreign aid could take the biggest hit .
elizabeth c. economy is c. v. starr senior fellow and director for asia studies at the council on foreign relations. follow her on twitter @ lizeconomy .
studies made in recent years on the experience of developing countries that have received chinese official development assistance and capital investment showed gains made in such sectors as infrastructure, agriculture, energy and mining. some of the aid money also goes to technical cooperation, human resource development, medical assistance, and debt relief .
in addition, over 23 other government ministries and commissions play some role in providing foreign aid. for example, the ministry of education has been responsible for scholarships provided to african students to study in china, and the ministry of health runs and funds overseas medical programmes .
“what i see happening in this budget is elimination and draconian cuts to aspects of the foreign aid program critical for getting results, ” said george ingram, a senior fellow at the brookings institution. “you are removing the account and mechanisms that produce the greatest accountability. ”
chinese aid in infrastructure outweighs that of other donors. it accounts for over 30% of total value of infrastructure projects in africa. sub - saharan africa’s education and health sectors have also benefited significantly. but the amount committed to these two sectors lags behind others such as transport and energy. this is possibly due to the fact that a significant amount of western aid is focused on these two sectors (see table 1) .
china’s aid policy in africa underwent major reforms between 1994 and 1995. these were effected in three main ways :
the president’s budget is a proposal to congress and is likely to change considerably before coming into effect. the initial top line cuts have been met with criticism from republicans and democrats in the house and senate. observers and advocates believe that foreign aid and usaid have support on capitol hill .
according to natsios, the former usaid administrator, secretary of state henry kissinger similarly diverted funds during the cold war. natsios pointed to the consultations that current secretary of state rex tillerson has had with kissinger and believes that the elder statesman may be influencing the administration’s attitude toward foreign aid restructuring .
my research tells us that uncertainty in foreign aid negotiations undermines the ability of usaid to lobby for things including democratic overhauls, increased transparency and economic policy that are in the u. s. national interest. this should matter to a president interested in making deals that benefit the american people. to get the best possible deal for our aid dollars, the assistance needs to be given in a predictable way .
in many contemporary accounts of western aid and capacity - building in africa, there would not be a close connection between aid and trade ,
king writes in his book. china by contrast, sees a very important link between private business and aid. indeed, this is a core element of china' s official view to development .
konyndyk told devex that such a shift could see u. s. programs lose key aid expertise, developed at usaid over the past half century. “when we see state really driving foreign assistance spending, it generally is not as effective, rigorous, or results - driven, ” he said .
this is according to a new paper from the jica research institute estimating china' s foreign aid program from 2001 to 2013. their calculations put china' s total official development assistance (oda) at us $ 7. 1 billion in 2013. (china' s aid budget is growing rapidly, so this fits with the us $ 6. 4 billion figure reported in china daily in april 2013. )
the trump administration proposes a 30. 8 percent cut to the overall foreign aid budget, according to a state department budget document obtained by devex on monday. that top line figure was already apparent in the administration’s so - called “skinny” budget released last month, but the latest document offers great detail .
“despite chinese leaders’ claim that china’s assistance to africa is totally selfless and altruistic, the reality is far more complex, ” said public - policy think tank brookings institution nonresident fellow yun sun in a 2014 analysis paper. africa has been a big recipient of chinese financing, with a sovereign risk officer at the export - import bank of china projecting that by 2025 china will have provided africa with us $ 1 trillion in direct investment, soft loans and commercial loans .
“chinese aid provides an opportunity for cambodia to dodge the efforts of the international community, in particular the united states, to get cambodia on the right track for democracy, good governance and human rights, since cambodia can ultimately turn to china when it disagrees with these initiatives, ” explained var, a phd student in the unsw program in political and international studies .
some of the experts who spoke at the forum pointed to alleged misconceptions about china’s aid and investment flows to africa. for instance, aid recipient countries were said to also include commodity - poor nations and not just nations with rich mineral and agricultural production .
in southeast asia, the influence of china’s financial aid on the recipient country’s government policy stance is best reflected in the position taken by cambodia when in july 2016 it blocked an asean foreign ministers’ move to include in a joint statement a reference to the united nations - backed ruling that rejected beijing’s claim to the south china sea .
bolstering the economic support fund while gutting development assistance has raised fears in the development world that the trump administration is more interested in using foreign assistance to achieve short - term political objectives than his predecessors .
enation or invigoration to remind the chinese people of past glories in an attempt to bind them to modern china. xi has, however, surpassed his predecessors in the sheer scale of his efforts to achieve the goal of national revival. he has put in motion a massive infrastructure plan, the belt and road initiative, which is designed to revive the ancient silk road and the maritime spice routes that flourished as early as the han dynasty, thus reinforcing the claim of chinese centrality. he has also
a long wait: lonmin miners - involved in a bloody clash with police with killed 34 people - are arguing for a greater share of wealth that has steadily flowed into foreign economies, most recently china .
given the steep bipartisan opposition to slashing foreign assistance, congress likely will not consent to the entire proposed reduction. republican sen. lindsey graham went as far as to declare trump’s budget “dead on arrival. ”
philippa brant is a lowy institute research associate. earlier this week a massive database of chinese development finance activities in africa (warning: big pdf) was launched by aiddata and the center for global development. this endeavour involved a team of researchers and has
africa enjoys rich natural resources and market potential, and urgently needs infrastructure and development finance to stimulate economic growth, sun noted. much of the chinese financing that had gone to africa, she said, is “associated with securing the continent’s natural resources. ”
a partner in the international law firm dentons, thomas laryea, confirmed that chinese “facilitators” are constantly monitoring countries for potential projects that their companies can undertake. this activity, laryea said, has given rise to “a cadre of professional facilitators” on such deals .
[ 19 ] jamil, anderlini, “china insists on ‘tied aid’ to africa, ” financial times, june 25, 2007, urltoken .
on november 15, 2012, the day he became general secretary of the chinese communist party, xi jinping stood onstage at the great hall of the people, in beijing, to reflect back on his country’s 5, 000 years of history. after citing china’s “indelible contribution” to world civilization, xi called for “the great revival of the chinese nation. ” and he acknowledged that others had “failed one time after another” to realize that goal. implicit in xi’s remarks was a promise: unlike his predecessors, he would not fall short .
for the first time, we have a well - informed estimate that includes bilateral aid, multilateral aid, concessional loans, and aid that sits outside the main budget (like scholarships administered by the ministry of education). as china - africa expert deborah brautigam has said,' lead author naohiro kitano and his colleague yukinori harada have done a superb job. the methodology is carefully worked out and fully explicated.'
that’s why drastic cuts in aid will hurt the u. s. ’s ability to keep its promises to countries like ghana. retracting aid promises will discourage recipients from upholding their side of the bargain. it will also undermine the u. s. ’s credibility in future negotiations .
the trump administration’s proposed federal budget includes a 28 percent cut ($ 26. 6 billion) in spending for the state department and the united states agency for international development (usaid). according to trump’s budget director, the may budget proposal prioritizes “hard” vs. “soft” power, increasing military spending and preserving current foreign aid levels for just one country — israel .
for developing economies like the philippines, development aid and investment flows from china are an attractive proposition that could energize a range of productive sectors .
china’s aid in sub - saharan africa is varied and can be found in almost all sectors from telecommunication to health. the largest amount of aid funding goes towards the transport, storage, energy and communications sectors. a significant share, about 70% , is geared towards infrastructure development .
some of the cuts appear directed at countries that had been regarded as strategically important. for instance, foreign assistance to ukraine, which is used to encourage political and economic reform, is facing a 68. 8 percent cut .
aid experts reacted to the budget document with alarm. the proposal would take “aid back to the worst days of the 1950s” by ignoring the development lessons of the past half century, said john norris, the executive director of the sustainable security and peacebuilding initiative at the center for american progress .
one expert, aubrey hruby, a co - founder of the africa expert network, noted that chinese companies usually deploy representatives to a developing country and look for potential infrastructure projects. they arrange high - level meetings with government ministers or the president of the country to pitch the idea .
foreign - policy and national security experts on both sides of the aisle have argued that the cuts pose concrete risks to u. s. security interests. in february, a group of 121 retired generals and admirals sent an open letter
on one level the reductions did not come as a surprise. trump had already made clear in his
skinny budget
proposal, released in march, that he wanted to lower spending on foreign assistance by more than a third .
in all four countries, there are aid units within the ministry of finance whose sole job is to dialogue with donors, manage aid funds and represent the government’s interests with donors. in rwanda, this government unit produces annual reports on the performance of individual donors — an attempt to shame agencies into upholding their commitments .
what does china’s new white paper on aid need to say? dr philippa brant china policy institute blog, university of nottingham 26 march 2014 please click here for online text .
some countries would see dramatic increases in parts of their aid budgets and cuts in others. sometimes cuts will offset with new funds, sometimes they don’t. countries including the central african republic, niger, sierra leone, laos, thailand, poland, brazil, cuba and nicaragua would see all their aid for the u. s. government disappear .
“it is a politicized foreign assistance budget, ” said scott morris, a senior fellow at the center for global development. morris added that the choice to treat cuts to humanitarian assistance and global health programs as an opportunity to make a political statement represents a “departure” from recent decades .
adva saldinger is an associate editor at devex, where she covers the intersection of business and international development, as well as u. s. foreign aid policy. from partnerships to trade and social entrepreneurship to impact investing, adva explores the role the private sector and private capital play in development. a journalist with more than 10 years of experience, she has worked at several newspapers in the u. s. and lived in both ghana and south africa .
the proposal would slash development assistance funds, which are managed by usaid and intended to boost development outcomes. in some cases, the budget would redirect spending through the economic support fund, which is run through the state department and intended to meet u. s. foreign policy objectives .
these efforts were enhanced during the cultural revolution under the influence of a radical revolutionary ideology, motivating china to provide large amounts of foreign aid to africa despite its own domestic economic difficulties. [ 11 ] one famous example was the tanzania - zambia railway built between 1970 and 1975, for which china provided a zero - interest loan of rmb 980 million. by the mid - 1980s, china’s generous assistance had opened the door to diplomatic recognition with 44 african countries. [ 12 ]
sadly, the cuts to the global health account do not come as a surprise. the global health initiative was a signature foreign assistance priority of the obama administration—in fact, it was called a “presidential initiative”—and the cuts are in keeping with president trump’s desire to undo many of the obama administration’s undertakings .
the administration’s march budget proposal vowed to slash aid to developing countries by over one - third, but contained few details. according to a detailed 15 - page state department budget document obtained by
more broadly advocates worry that by putting such an unprecedented cut on the table trump will at least chip away at the longstanding bipartisan consensus that global health aid should be funded at current levels .
the president’s budget request proposes to eliminate title ii food aid, relying instead on the international disaster assistance account it deems to be more efficient, and yet which it also proposes to cut .
by 1976 chinese resource interest was apparent in numerous sub - saharan african countries. examples include the construction of the tan zam railroad in zambia in part to facilitate china’s access to copper. there was also the construction of roads in countries like ethiopia to assist the movement of cotton exports to china. china’s view of the resource possibilities in sub - saharan africa continues today .
“the draconian and unprecedented nature of the cuts that are being proposed to foreign assistance … really does threaten our ability to pursue and achieve our national security interests, ” said michèle flournoy, chief executive officer of the center for a new american security and a former undersecretary of defense in the obama administration .
for more than a decade, u. s. engagement in global development efforts has stood as a rare exception to washington’s constant partisan warfare, with both democrats and republicans tending to agree that relatively small investments in developing countries benefit u. s. national security and project american values. the trump administration’s proposal to slash foreign aid spending by a third marks a distinct turn toward a more politically charged environment for these programs than has been seen in a long time, many in the development community agreed .
on tuesday, the administration defended its proposal to slash foreign affairs spending as part of an effort to enhance efficiency, and focus on only the most effective programs. the officials suggested that current humanitarian needs can be met in part with funds already appropriated in the 2017 omnibus budget bill that passed last month .
michael igoe is a senior reporter with devex, based in washington, d. c. he covers u. s. foreign aid, global health, climate change, and development finance. prior to joining devex, michael researched water management and climate change adaptation in post - soviet central asia, where he also wrote for eurasianet. michael earned his bachelor' s degree from bowdoin college, where he majored in russian, and his master’s degree from the university of montana, where he studied international conservation and development .
aid to kazakhstan and turkmenistan will end, full stop. kazakhstan, an upper middle - income country according to world bank data, was receiving limited u. s. aid, on the order of $ 6 million. turkmenistan, also an upper middle - income country with an authoritarian leader—a place the guardian recently called the world’s second - most isolated state after north korea—will see the closure of its miniscule $ 3. 9 million aid package. assistance to the kyrgyz republic, tajikistan, and uzbekistan will continue—but under the esf account, and with smaller budgets shrunk by about half. assistance to uzbekistan will increase slightly .
still, the proposal sends an ominous message on global development as legislators dive into the first of several contentious budget negotiations in the coming months. this week, congress will try to hammer out a budget for the rest of 2017 before funding runs out at the end of the week. this could include foreign aid cuts, and analysts are watching it as a signal of what might follow. debate on the 2018 budget is expected to pick up at the end of may or early june, when trump’s full budget proposal is expected .
scholars have defended the importance of aid in fostering economic growth and democratization. faith leaders, retired military and even republican members of congress have criticized the proposal as undermining diplomatic efforts that are important for national security .
given the lack of transparency in china' s aid program, much is still (educated) guesswork. this new paper won' t be perfect. but it is the best we' ve seen to date .
the budget document also points to a shift in aid philosophy and perhaps in the way the government delivers assistance. the allocations of cuts have fueled rumors that the administration would like to merge usaid into the state department .
china on july 15, 2016 announced the grant of us $ 600 million in aid to support cambodia infrastructure, education and health projects. “china, a key ally of cambodia in the region and the southeast asian nation’s largest donor, in return expects support in international forums, including in discussions over the future of the south china sea, ” the us - funded voice of america khmer said in reporting the signing of the aid agreement .
it’s worth thinking about the tradeoffs here in ceasing and shrinking these relatively small programs in central asia. as nisha desai biswal—who served as assistant administrator for asia at the u. s. agency for international development before becoming assistant secretary of state for south and central asia during the obama administration—puts it, “limited foreign assistance is playing a crucial role. ”
foreign aid from china is development assistance provided by the chinese government to other countries in the form of infrastructure projects given as gifts ; concessional loans to fund projects ; disaster relief ; student scholarships ; and other forms of assistance . 
foreign aid from china is development assistance provided by the chinese government to other countries in the form of infrastructure projects given as gifts; concessional loans to fund projects; disaster relief; student scholarships; and other forms of assistance.
foreign aid from china is development assistance provided by the chinese government to other countries in the form of infrastructure projects given as gifts; concessional loans to fund projects; disaster relief; student scholarships; and other forms of assistance.