deepen shah
deepen shah - urdu meaning and translation of deepen shah, translation, multiple word search (seperate words with space), english to urdu machine translation of deepen shah and more .
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awesome free customizable deepen shah templates for your websites & social media. it is dynamic, yet organized with new templates added regularly .
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the company does have a fairly strong pedigree with both founders nihal mehta and deepen shah coming from ipsh! , a mobile marketing agency acquired by omnicom group in 2005 .
deepen shah maintains a strong practice in the real estate sector, notably representing clients in purchases, sales, leasing and financing transactions. he also has experience in development matters .
deepen shah joined the firm in 1998. he is a corporate and commercial lawyer experienced in telecommunications, banking, aviation, mining, insurance, hospitality and horticulture, both in the private and public sectors. deepen is recognised as a leading lawyer by chambers global, iflr 1000 and legal 500 emea. notable recent transactions include: -
deepen primarily oversees the event management and corporate gifting business with additional client centric responsibilities that include marketing, logistics, business development and customer relationship management .
chief technology officer and co - founder deepen shah, whose company supplied one of the initial android market applications, ad - supported software to find out what' s going on at local bars, museums, and other venues .
born and raised at bangalore, deepen is an experienced business manager with strong public relations and marketing skills. deepen left a 5 year long illustrious career in the financial services industry having worked for two of the biggest names in the investment management business: fidelity international and dsp blackrock to start touchstone in 2009 .
mr. mehta, who co - founded the company with web developer deepen shah in 2007, declined to provide specific figures for the network’s user base, but said it was “in the six digits for active users on a monthly basis. ”
fanbridge: fanbridge was founded a little over year and a half ago by me (spencer richardson) and two other friends of mine, noah dinkin and deepen shah. the three of us met in business school (nyu stern) and decided that we wanted to try and start a business that focused on helping independent artists to unlock the power of their fans. a core philosophy at fanbridge is to embrace the fact that the music industry is rapidly evolving, and to try and create simple solutions that can adapt to this evolution, and in some cases even lead it. (ed. note: deepen shah has since departed fanbridge) .
bashir, shahzad. “shah isma‘il and the qizilbash: cannibalism in the religious history of early safavid iran. ”
mrs. shah sees a need for cultural ambassadors as the gaps between cultures and religions deepen. “music is an important tool, but it is also important who is singing, speaking or writing, ” she said. “if you got the right people, you can build bridges and translate the fears and problems of the other side. ”
deepen shah is a partner in the firm' s corporate / commercial department specializing in private equity, mergers & acquisitions, project finance, energy and real estate. deepen has a strong track record of guiding and advising clients, reputed for his depth of knowledge and responsiveness. he was appointed to the stake holder committee tasked with the review and preparation of regulations, forms and practice notes required under the recently enacted companies act. recently he acted for fidelity commercial bank in connection with the acquisition of 100% of its share capital by sbm africa holdings (mauritius) .
buzzd, a location - based city guide and social network for mobile phones, announced that it has completed series a funding, led by greycroft partners and monitor ventures. the money will be used for product development and distribution. monitor’s fern mandelbaum will join buzzd’s board of directors, along with company co - founders nihal mehta and deepen shah .
25. the shah is building on an already fast - growing economic base. since the mid - 1960s, iran’s
the underlying mythology in silicon valley is that almost every problem can be solved. having technology idols like jobs, bezos or musk, who have disrupted multiple industries only serves to deepen our collective resolve to find solutions to all problems .
is good, android applications are easier to write than iphone apps, and google makes its programmers available, shah said .
39. central to the shah’s ambitious plans for iran’s future is the expansion and modernization of the military establishment. believing that iran’s aspirations as a world power must be based on regional military strength, the shah is developing a military force stronger than that
deepen holds a bachelor’s degree in commerce from shri bhagawan mahaveer jain college, bangalore and a post graduate diploma in business administration from bangalore university. in his free time, he loves going out on long drives and is very passionate about music .
a. we see little prospect during the next few years for a serious challenge to the shah’s authoritarian control over iran’s internal affairs and programs. nevertheless, the shah’s monopoly of decision - making and his trend toward greater repression of opposition will incur certain political costs :
1. in iran today, the state and the shah are virtually one. the shah has succeeded in concentrating power and decision - making firmly in his own hands. in the process, he has removed or neutralized every official who might challenge him and has stifled the capacity of the political system to act without him. thus to understand the iranian political system one must understand the personality and character of the shah himself .
b. the shah is unlikely to change his course materially; hence strains within iranian society seem destined to grow as other sectors of life modernize and the pressure for political participation becomes more insistent. in the event of the shah’s early death, competition for power could lead to serious instability .
and so akbar was born as a lord of conjunction, a sovereign like timur and a messiah like jesus. his hindu queen who had born him sons was declared the “mary of the age. ” his sons were tutored by jesuit priests. his court scholars learned latin to deepen their understanding of christian scriptures .
while most media coverage around islam focuses on wars or terrorism, two female singers, falguni shah and emel aykanat, are using music to show a fuller picture .
in order to deepen my understanding of the development of optometry, i enrolled on a masters module on development management through the open university. coinciding with this, i was exposed to the world of research for the first time during a unesco - sponsored project training teachers and nurses to screen children’s vision in nicaragua, south america .
two child victims of a grenade attack in srinagar are undergoing treatment at the nanavati hospital with the help of superstar shah rukh khan who is bearing the entire cost of treatment .
, the shah believes he has taken out insurance in the form of economic and political ties and that he can deal effectively with the soviet union on his own under foreseeable circumstances .
63. the shah’s primary strategy to assure continuing military supply involves seeking to deepen ties with the us. he hopes by offering lucrative and tempting economic deals to make certain that washington would find it inexpedient to turn down his future requests. he is also actively wooing american educational institutions, at least partly in order to improve iran’s image in the us, and is participating in a series of joint commissions to concert efforts to develop iran in economics, social welfare, and culture. he has long provided important intelligence facilities for use against the
17. opposition to the shah and his regime is entrenched among intellectuals. writers, poets, and artists, who traditionally have played an important role in iranian political life, are contributing to the emergence of a class of alienated intellectuals. their demands for political participation and freedom of press and expression have no place in the white revolution. the shah’s style of government forecloses relaxation of police repression and an end to corruption desired by this opposition. educational excellence and administrative efficiency did fall within the shah’s program, but he has deplored the lack of effective action in these fields. student unrest is endemic. there seems almost no chance that the shah’s regime, however successful in material terms, will be able to satisfy these elements. their desire to share political power is more troublesome for the shah than the nationalist demands of reformers of the mossadeq era who have been satisfied merely to participate in the process of economic development .
41. these forces can do much of what the shah considers necessary. they are already more than capable of maintaining internal security and of defending iran’s territory against any hostile neighbor but the
j. while us - iranian relations would come into question if the shah should leave the scene, much of the relationship has become institutionalized to the point where it transcends the shah. power would rest at least initially on a military - bureaucratic coalition, but they would come under increasing pressure and we cannot now foresee the nature of the regime which will ultimately succeed the shah. but even a more extreme regime probably would not immediately seek to restructure the present relationship in drastic ways given the iranians’ view of their interests and the importance of the us connection .
14. the most wholehearted backers of the shah are those few thousand who profit personally from close association with the court; they would also suffer most if the system were eliminated. besides the inner circle of the shah’s principal assistants, this group includes bureaucrats, cronies, hangers - on, and business and professional men whose importance arises from their access to the court advisers .
zubair, the elder cousin of the children told the magazine, ”amina keeps asking me if i have spoken with shah rukh and when is he going to take her to meet his daughter .
23. the violent removal of the shah would immediately threaten the system. the shah is paying increasing attention to his personal safety. while this makes him more isolated and remote, it heightens the chances that his security forces would detect and forestall an assassination which was part of a comprehensive plot to seize control of the government. on the other hand, the shah’s forces still could not be sure of [ page 355 ] preventing acts by an individual or a handful of plotters willing to sacrifice their lives. if assassins should succeed, the death of the shah would profoundly shake government officials and the public in general. under these conditions the senior generals might feel all the more impelled to band together to act swiftly to preserve the system to which they owe so much. but in time they would probably come under increasing pressure from more nationalistic and more radical elements in the middle and lower ranks. thus the monarchy would face an uncertain future whatever the manner of the present shah’s passing .
48. the shah’s preoccupation with keeping ahead of regional rivals raises the question of his intent to develop nuclear weapons. iran is a party to the nuclear non - proliferation treaty and has also proposed a
21. the shah’s death by accident or natural causes would be less traumatic for the iranian system than his assassination. there are probably enough persons with a stake in the established order to ensure continuation of the monarchy, at least in the short run. although popular, farah as regent for shah reza would have difficulty in maintaining political stability because of the variety of politicians and military officers jockeying for dominance .
20. as a master political strategist, the shah will probably seek new ways to head off growing discontent. he may announce new welfare programs to bring tangible benefits to the masses. he may attempt fur
43. the new weapons for this force will cost at least $ 25 billion over the next five years. one of the considerations motivating the rapid buildup is the shah’s desire to avoid future price rises by purchases at today’s lower cost. thanks to the current high oil prices, iran has the funds to purchase the military equipment the shah desires and to set up the factories necessary for the military industry he now envisages .
, the shah’s brother - in - law and air force chief, would probably be a main prop for the succession, but his relationship with other military officers is not known. while over the years the shah has exerted great care to weed out disloyal elements in the upper ranks of the military establishment, we do not know how the military commanders would act once he is off the scene. among the politicians, prime minister
8. cliquishness, personal insecurity, and inertia dominate the iranian bureaucracy. while the shah recognizes that these traits have hampered the implementation of his policies, the administrative transformation mandated by the white revolution has foundered on the shah’s own reluctance to reward individuals who display initiative, efficiency, and judgment. the first requirement of iranian administrators is loyalty; the higher one climbs up the bureaucratic ladder, the greater the salience of this factor. consequently the higher levels of the bureaucracy have come to be stocked with technocrats and administrators who choose bureaucratic survival over accomplishment. corruption is [ page 351 ] endemic but is no worse than in other countries in the region. bureaucratic inefficiency will delay some of the shah’s programs and to that extent will frustrate the expectations of both the shah and the people. we do not expect significant improvements and the government will face increasing administrative challenges .
15. a far larger group—administrators, middle - class professionals and probably even the bulk of the urban lower class—go along with the shah not so much out of conviction but because they have profited from the system and do not see an alternative. unenthusiastic about the shah as a person, many perhaps even unenthusiastic about the monarchy as an institution, most of this group would probably switch loyalties easily as long as they perceived no threat to their personal interests. this lack of enthusiasm leads to considerable passivity, and the services of many upper - class, experienced administrators are denied either by their own choice or by what the shah considers their political unreliability .
66. oil policy forms an area where collisions between the shah and the us are all but inevitable. the shah has already proved quite adamant in refusing to cooperate to secure oil price reductions. his interest in receiving the maximum return for oil is so intense that he is likely to continue to take the lead in urging continual increases in oil prices in order to maintain at least the present relative advantage of iranian purchasing power. though he will seek to keep the image of reasonableness and moderation as a bargainer in petroleum matters, the shah will thus be likely to run afoul of us interests in oil questions as he seeks to maximize his income .
dr ali told people magazine that he knew he could ask the doctors to treat the children for free but there would be plenty of other expenses. “so, i just spoke to shah rukh, ” he said .
for jahangir painted alongside christ, see koch, “influence of the jesuit missions, ” 10–12. a painting depicting shah jahan as part of the christian trinity (see figure 1) is discussed in a. azfar moin ,
67. the shah’s regional policies also carry risk of conflicting with us interests. this is particularly true of the gulf, where the specter of iranian military power increasingly will alarm iran’s neighbors. thus far, the shah has been relatively judicious in his actions. he has been particularly aware of arab sensitivities in providing troops to assist the sultan of oman, and we would expect him to continue to act with restraint. but the shah has little respect for the capability of the leaders of neighboring arab states. as he boosts his gulf forces and finishes construction of naval facilities over the next few years, the opportunities for falling into more overt rivalry with saudi arabia will grow .
in the light hovers a dove, the holy ghost, and above the clouds is god the father. in place of the son, though, is shah jahan, rendered in perfect profile, the very form of sovereignty .
35. iran’s investment and development strategy will also pose problems for the us. iran is apparently determined to engage in some development whose viability would depend on preferential access to the foreign markets the shah has been seeking. iranian exports to third countries under such conditions might affect competing us exports in the late 1970s or early 1980s; increased iranian production for domestic consumption will certainly affect certain us exports to iran itself in the longer run. the shah’s strong interest in us government participation or involvement in his commercial relations may raise problems for the us. the shah sees the us government as a guarantor for the performance of the us private sector and could hold washington responsible should us industry not meet his expectations .
i. the shah’s strategy in dealing with the us is likely to continue to be based on efforts to expand economic ties with the us to offset strains developing from his growing political independence. he provides important intelligence facilities for use against the
fanbridge: though the underlying processes that run fanbridge are incredibly complex (you' d have to talk to deepen to really get a feel for that), the musician interface / experience is specifically designed to be as easy to use as possible. we want to save bands time and make their lives easier, not require them to take the time to learn a new system. our philosophy in this regard is that the user interface should require zero learning curve .
12. only rough assessments are possible on the extent of support for the shah. opposition sentiments are taboo in public and expressed in private only with great discretion. the bulk of the population, [ page 352 ] mostly peasants, has been traditionally apolitical; it generally has supported the monarchy as an institution, although not necessarily any specific monarch. the peasants have gained in absolute terms from the reforms, but there is no indication that their higher standard of living has been translated into support for the shah .
69. underlying these problems is the dependency of the close us - iranian relationship on the attitudes and perceptions of one man—the shah. this offers the possibility of an erratic course for personal reasons. more important, it raises questions about us - iranian relations if he should leave the scene. there is some reason to believe that over the past two decades much of the relationship has become institutionalized to the point where it transcends the shah. whether or not the shah’s succession arrangements succeed, power will rest at least initially on a coalition of key military officers and establishment bureaucrats. but this coalition would be likely to come under increasing pressure from diverse elements in society, however, and we cannot now foresee the nature of the regime which will ultimately succeed the shah. if a more extreme nationalist regime took charge, it might loosen present close political ties to the west, but probably would not immediately seek to restructure the present relationship in dramatic ways, given the iranians’ view of their interests and the importance of the us connection .
, appears to have little potential for mobilizing grassroots support for the regime. the shah rejected the previous notion of a loyal opposition as a vehicle for expressing a variety of opinions and thereby has reduced the ability of the system to accommodate differing points of view .
. elections, parliamentary debate, and shifts of personnel were inconsequential to the actual course of developments. the existence of the loyal opposition, the mardom party, however, provided an appearance of political competition which permitted a number of iranians to rationalize their participation in the shah’s system .
to manage and control political activity from behind the scenes. in so doing, the shah is counting on the flexible and resilient nature of the iranian social system which has traditionally allowed the ambitious to become influential as long as they played by the rules established by the ruler. but the operation of this system breeds widespread personal insecurity and cynicism which discourage voluntary cooperation and national commitment. as a result, some capable iranians will increasingly be left on the sidelines, benefiting materially from the development process, but assuming no responsibility for the success of the shah’s program .
when nihal mehta launched buzzd with co - founder deepen shah, he believed in the power of the check - in and essentially created an city guide that aggregated check - ins from foursquare, gowalla, and others. but because of the competitive landscape in the location - based network space, buzzd never really took off. so mehta went back to the drawing board, with the hope of creating a service that would combine the element of the check - in he found intriguing with buzzd and advertising and marketing elements (mehta’s first startup mobile marketing service ipsh! was sold to omnicom years ago). the result, which he calls “a culmination of everything he’s done, ” of this is local response, a new web - based tool that allows local businesses to respond to the “check - in” on social media sites with marketing campaigns to promote transactions .
we have direct access to a lot of the developers who work with platform
at hackathons and other events, shah said. that means programmers can build relationships, unlike with apple :
they threw the sdk out there in hopes developers would latch on to the apple brand name .
and would probably cooperate in facilitating us political initiatives in middle eastern diplomacy. while over the short term, us and iranian interests are likely to be largely compatible, we can no longer rely on the shah to accommodate us interests in the increasing number of areas where his interests diverge from ours .
52. the shah sees the persian gulf as studded with inept backward regimes susceptible to radical subversion. to deal with this danger, he is proposing a regional collective security arrangement. while the shah hopes that saudi or other arab elements will prevent or suppress radical movements on the arabian peninsula, he will be prepared swiftly to deploy iranian forces across the gulf to forestall a radical upset. he would prefer to act in concert with the conservative arab states, or at least on invitation of a beleaguered regime—as in oman—but would not wait for arab agreement if he considered iran’s interests at stake. the shah recognizes arab suspicions and anti - persian sentiment and will seek where possible to avoid an unnecessary confrontation. however, with the 1971 seizure of the tunbs and abu musa islands as a background, iran is likely to take further unilateral action in the gulf if it perceives a protential threat to its regional hegemony .
5. in this situation, the shah will not give up his exclusive responsibility for all major and many minor decisions. if anything, this method of operation is likely to become more pronounced. particularly since his celebration of the 2, 500th anniversary of the persian monarchy, his sense of infallibility has become more apparent and he has become more isolated from opposing views. several recent major decisions appear to have been taken by the shah with little consultation even with his coterie: for example, the creation of a new single - party system, and the agreement with iraq at the expense of the kurds. the shah seems likely to make more decisions without reference to his advisers. while his judgment has proved generally sound thus far, and is likely to continue so, nonetheless, his monopoly of the decision - making process inhibits the development of institutional mechanisms and imposes an even greater burden on his energies and wisdom .
over at least the next few years. many of the projects on the drawing board probably will be deferred or implemented at a slower pace. military expansion, however, will be largely unaffected by the economic slowdown; the shah plans purchases abroad averaging about $ 5 billion annually over the next five years .
in sum, the safavids in their first century were neither a doctrinally shi’i group, nor an anomalous sect on the margins of islam. rather, they were very much a product of their time insofar as they believed that ali had been reborn on earth in the form of their king, shah isma’il .
44. to reduce iran’s total dependence on foreign suppliers for the sophisticated weapons systems he desires, the shah wants to coproduce late - model weaponry in iran under license, mostly in conjunction with us firms. coproduction will not significantly lower the cost of these weapons, and is likely to increase it somewhat. the shah, however, believes it will give iran a more dependable source of supply. much of this gain is illusory, however; components for the more sophisticated items will still have to be imported, though it may be easier to purchase parts on the world market than to procure the entire weapons systems .
other rulers as well as ministers of the muzaffarids were also referred to and praised by hafez in his po - etry. they include the two nephews of shah šojāʿ: the brothers shah yaḥyā (789 - 95 / 1387 - 93; ḡani, i, pp. 371 - 75) and shah manṣur (790 - 95 / 1388 - 93). the latter, according to ḡani, held a special place in hafez’s affections (ḡani, i, pp. 400 - 411). he referred to him in several ghazals and dedicated a famous qaṣida to him, which in some editions is classified as a ghazal (jawzā saḥar nehād ḥamāyel barābar - am, ḵ. ii, qas á. , pp. 1039 - 41; ḡani, i, pp. 403 - 4). here again, in sharp contrast to the qaṣida for shah šojāʾ, the whole panegyric is in the form of a dialogue with the beloved and the end rhyme terminates in the first person singular. there are also occasional references, and panegyrics, to other rulers of local dynasties of the time, most notably the jalayerids (qazvini, 1944, pp. 9 - 10; moʿin, i, pp. 235 - 74) .
f. iran will be prepared to deploy forces unilaterally in order to forestall a radical upset in the gulf. there are also prospects for greater [ page 348 ] cooperation with saudi arabia’s prince fahd and, following iraq’s recent regional overtures, for a reduction in iraqi - iranian hostility. iran’s relations with south asia will remain limited over the short term; the shah is likely to limit his financial backing for pakistani arms purchases. in the middle east, the shah will probably continue to expand his relations with egypt, and it is becoming less likely that iran would supply israel with oil in the event of resumed hostilities .
2. since his earliest years, the shah has been imbued with a sense of specialness. this has been translated into his mission to modernize his country economically and militarily so that he and iran can play a major role in world affairs and dominate the persian gulf. proud of his image as a royal revolutionary, he has been directing the “white revolution” for over a decade to transform iran into a modern state. to the shah social justice means primarily closely - supervised economic development to raise the living standards of the masses. he regards iran’s growing prosperity as an essential antidote to pressure for far - reaching political transformation .
58. the shah wants iran to be a leading—if not the dominant—power in the indian ocean. seeing india as a major potential rival in this region, he has recently stepped up efforts to improve relations with india in order to reduce the likelihood of friction. iran is seeking raw materials from india and will probably supply a major portion of india’s fuel requirements at manageable prices at least for the next few years. the shah has also begun cultivating conservative, pro - western governments such as australia, new zealand, indonesia, singapore, and south africa, but in low key to avoid irritating the nonaligned states. over the longer term, the shah will work for the elimination of both soviet and us military presence in the indian ocean. while he will tacitly approve a us naval presence as long as the soviets keep naval vessels on station there, we cannot depend on him to provide access to iranian facilities to support fleet units .
, he has taken out insurance in the form of economic and political ties with the soviet union and does not feel himself directly threatened from that quarter. massive oil revenues give him confidence that he will be able to secure whatever military and industrial equipment he considers necessary. against this backdrop, the shah will seek :
4. the shah is a man in a hurry. he is only 55 years old and is in good health. but he appears to fear that unless he impels iran much further along the path of modernization, his successor will be unable to sustain the momentum. his urgency is also stimulated by the conviction that iran must develop before its oil runs out or the value of its oil is undercut by alternative sources of energy. the forced - draft nature of all his projects suggests that he has a deadline in mind. the shah probably wishes, by staying ahead of demands for changes, to move fast enough that when his son comes of age six years hence iran will be at the point of self - sustaining development. this concern may be evidenced in the shah’s remark last year that while the crown prince could do much good as king in the future if he were willing, “we are fixing things so he can do no harm. ”
10. the replacement of this structure by a single party last march represents no change in the basic machinery of political decision - making. the creation of the iranian national resurgence party shows that the shah has lost interest in the facade of competitive politics. the new party, run by the old group of politicians headed by
. indeed, they have a clear edge in military capabilities over all states in the region and could seize and hold any of the smaller ones on the arab littoral of the gulf. but aware of the problems encountered by his expeditionary forces in oman, the shah recognizes that in practice their performance leaves something to be desired .
like mrs. shah, ms. aykanat believes that music is one of the best ways to fight prejudices. “if i write a song as a muslim woman, which the people like, i think it is much more complicated for people to hate a culture or a group, if they already know someone they like. ”
g. us - iranian relations are likely to become more difficult in coming years. the shah is seeking to remove both the us and soviet military presence from the persian gulf and the indian ocean and to establish his own regional collective security arrangements in the gulf; while he will tacitly approve of us naval operations in these waters as long as the
49. the shah would like to move toward a position where he could eventually produce nuclear weapons on short notice if he believed it necessary. nevertheless, in view of the difficulties in developing the facilities needed to produce such weapons, he does not seem likely to decide to launch a nuclear weapons program in the near future. we can expect, therefore, that iran over the next decade will make a major effort to acquire facilities and develop the know - how and technology to manufacture nuclear weapons, but without taking a firm decision to undertake actual production. the shah would hope that by avoiding a definite program to produce nuclear weapons he would forestall problems with the us over his nuclear intentions .
61. relations with china have been relatively inactive since iran’s recognition of peking in 1971. both countries share a strong interest in blocking the spread of soviet influence in the middle east and south asia. china has endorsed iran’s military buildup and, apparently at the shah’s behest, terminated its support for the dhofar rebellion. for its part, iran sees china as useful to balance its relations with the soviet union and the us. while we do not envisage a rapid strengthening of sino - iranian relations over the near term, we would expect a growing [ page 365 ] mutuality of interests and a continuation of exchanges of high - level visits including, perhaps, a trip to peking by the shah .
50. basing his foreign policy on a historical perspective, the shah is acutely conscious of the contrast between past persian glory and present iranian reality. he sees iran confronted by an untrustworthy soviet union, while he sees the remote bastions of western power in a state of disarray and decay. although he would count on us support in a confrontation with the
percent below last year’s 6 million barrels per day. although small increases are possible during 1976–77, the longer term outlook is for lower production. accordingly, oil prices take on increasing importance in the shah’s future revenue plans. he will continue to work for higher oil prices, both making bilateral deals and acting through his leading position in the organization of petroleum exporting countries (
“if there is anything that brings together people and not divide them, it is music, ” said mrs. shah, who goes by the name falu. “when people of different backgrounds become united by valuing the same ideas, i think it is very easy to fight anything. radicalism and racism can be fought with a message of peace through beautiful music and inspiring lyrics. ”
68. even the shah’s desires for economic development raise issues that will be troublesome to resolve. for example, his ambition to purchase from the us a large - scale net of nuclear generating plants to supply iran’s future power requirements poses potential problems. for reasons of national pride and to keep his options open, the shah is reluctant to agree to us demands for safeguards for these reactors more stringent than those imposed by iaea; this reluctance is unlikely to abate. as in other matters, he will seek to hold the executive branch re [ page 367 ] sponsible for bringing the congress along behind this deal with iran. in this situation his nuclear program may become a continuing thorn in us - iranian relations as he presses hard to get these plants on his own terms .
13. the major source of strength for the shah has been his military and security forces. the shah takes particular care to keep his officer corps content, mostly through the provision of extensive perquisites such as salaries and housing. however, the increasingly high level of education required by the modernizing of the iranian military forces may affect the political reliability of the officer corps. present commanders, like their civilian counterparts, are selected primarily on the basis of loyalty to the regime. those at the top of the military establishment today are not particularly competent. as better educated officers, who are more likely to have imbibed some of the intellectual dissent of their civilian peers, come into middle - grade positions, it will become more difficult for the top - ranking generals to maintain their present tight control .
e. the shah is likely to grow increasingly assertive in his foreign policies. he would risk confrontation with the arabs, the west, or even the soviet union in order to assert persian primacy in the gulf or to maintain what he considers a sufficiently high level of oil revenues. although he will remain suspicious of soviet intentions and will continue to rely on the us as the ultimate deterrent to the
some equipment if pakistan were threatened by its neighbors, iran would probably not become involved in hostilities in support of islamabad except perhaps in the event of unprovoked indian attack. as for turkey, the shah’s sympathies for its efforts to circumvent the us arms embargo are strong, and he might permit some “leakage” of spares to ankara, but would be circumspect in order to avoid risking relations with the us .
42. the shah hopes by acquiring additional quantities of the latest - model weaponry to overcome present deficiencies and keep far ahead of iraq’s continuing military modernization. he plans to expand his armed forces by another 50, 000 men to nearly 400, 000 by 1978. much of this growth is in conventional ground forces, where the scheduled acquisition of over 400 additional helicopters designated for trooplift and attack roles will give the shah a major offensive capability. he will bolster iranian naval power by purchasing the most modern destroyers, additional hovercraft, submarines, and anti - submarine aircraft; he appears to be preparing eventually to add some type of aircraft carrier to the fleet. by 1980 the iranian air force should have nearly 24 fighter - bomber squadrons of over 400 late - model aircraft, including 80 f–14s with associated phoenix missiles .
45. iran has the financial resources to carry out its ambitious military modernization program without cutting severely into development projects. nevertheless, the expansion and upgrading of the armed forces, by increasing the pressure on the limited pool of skilled manpower, may inhibit growth in the developmental sector. the competition for manpower poses a difficult problem of priorities for the shah, who is deeply committed to both economic development and military modernization .
( detail from folio). the late shah jahan album. painted by bichitr, c. 1650. opaque watercolor and gold on paper mounted on paperboard, 36. 9 x 25. 3 cm. source: © arthur m. sackler gallery, smithsonian institution, washington, d. c. : purchase—smithsonian unrestricted trust funds, smithsonian collections acquisition program, and dr. arthur m. sackler, s1986. 403
ḵᵛāja qewām - al - din moḥammad ṣāḥeb - ʿayār (d. 764 / 1363), shah šojāʿ’s first vizier, who was later savagely executed by him, is another notable to whom hafez dedicated several poems (ḡani, i, pp. 200 - 202), including a long qaṣida (ḵ, ii, qas á. , pp. 1031 - 34) and a chronogram registering his death (ḵ, ii, qeṭ. 16). and finally, the last and one of the longest serving viziers and counselors of shah šojāʿ, ḵᵛāja jalāl - al - din turānšāh, was a favorite patron of hafez (ḡani, i, pp. 218, 268 - 77). according to ḡani (p. 273), the poems dedicated to him are marked by their mystical overtones, suggesting an interest in sufism by the patron .
ther political rearrangements to infuse greater vigor into the iranian national resurgence party. but the main lines of his policy seem already laid down and will not accommodate major political changes. hence, strains within iranian society seem destined to grow as other sectors of life modernize and the pressure for political participation becomes more insistent. nonetheless, we see little prospect during the next few years for a serious challenge to the shah’s total control over iran’s internal affairs .
and by regular high - level political exchange, he believes he has provided strong incentives for soviet cooperation and has thus reduced the soviet threat to manageable proportions for the foreseeable future. indeed, the shah is now confident of his position. he has already forced the soviets to accept large increases in the price of gas and introduced surface - to - air missiles into areas of iraq over which soviet - piloted aircraft were operating. in short, he still considers the us as an ultimate deterrent to the soviets but he no longer feels that a us military presence is currently necessary in the region to protect iran and he believes that he can deal effectively with the soviet union on his own. moscow, for its part, is unlikely to take action in the gulf area which would risk its good relations with iran, and probably sees little alternative but to tolerate the shah’s increasing assertiveness .
alliance with turkey and pakistan as a useful adjunct to his regional policy. he is concerned about the possibility that pakistan and afghanistan might come to blows over their volatile tribal populations, a conflict he fears would spill over into iran’s tribes as well. he is also mistrustful of the course of indian relations with pakistan. despite his concern, the shah is likely to weigh carefully and limit his financial backing for pakistani arms purchases. while he might provide
the assistant chief of staff, intelligence, department of the air force, believes that this estimate overstates the extent and significance of dissent in iran and prejudges the shah’s capacity to effect successful reforms. problems associated with the modernization program in iran are not necessarily unequivocal danger signs for the regime. the country’s economic boom continues to attract many iranian students back from foreign universities and, while they have indeed absorbed the experience of living in non - monarchical societies, the promise of material reward has proven sufficient to deflect the great majority from political opposition. nevertheless, the shah remains cognizant of the need for diffusing political power and responsibility, but he believes that this process must be gradual and need not necessarily reflect western standards or forms of government. whether he can be successful in ensuring the smooth transition from a modernizing autocracy to a bourgeois - nationalist constitutional monarchy must therefore remain an open question. [ footnote in the original. ]
resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the middle east. but india’s nuclear testing program is probably giving the shah second thoughts about iran’s renunciation of nuclear weapons. moreover, his proposed nuclear power program would give him some of the essential elements needed to develop the weapons. the facilities needed for the domestic production of fissionable material, however, would require extensive foreign assistance. the time required to build and operate these facilities would depend on the
27. the shah’s program for rapid development is creating strains within the economy. by far the greatest problem is a shortage of skilled and semi - skilled workers. the shortage is presently about 700, 000 and rising. introduction of foreign labor, largely from east asia, can fill only a small part of the gap. large numbers would greatly add to housing and food supply problems. the 20, 000 or so that have arrived are causing resentment among iranians .
11. if, as we believe likely, the new party fails to deal with dissent and to provide greater outlets for the demand for political participation, strains within iranian society will increase. the shah is unlikely to act on his declaration that all who do not join the new party should face jail or expulsion from the country. more likely, he will use party membership as just one of the many criteria for allowing participation in the system. he will continue to rely on
7. the most important political clique in iran is the coterie of individuals surrounding the shah. this group consists of a dozen old classmates, trusted advisers, loyal military and civilian officials, and relatives. a key figure is empress farah, the mother of and designated regent for 14 - year - old crown prince reza. although the other members of the inner circle remain deferential to the monarch and isolated from the rest of iranian society, the empress, his own private network of informants and consultants, and
d. by the end of this decade, iran will have acquired a formidable military arsenal capable of projecting significant ground and air forces into the arabian peninsula and south asia and a blue water navy capable of routine operations in the indian ocean. iranian combat effectiveness, however, will remain limited by lack of training and the ability to maintain sophisticated equipment. foreign support, particularly from american technicians, will remain essential to iran’s military establishment for many years. the shah is not likely to seek nuclear weapons in the near future, but he will probably attempt to acquire the necessary technology .
3. the shah has no intention of sharing political power. he views iranian politicians as by nature fractious and uncooperative and prefers to work through a small coterie of loyal and tested assistants. his willingness to tolerate limited party competition stemmed from the desire to appease critics in the west and among western - influenced elements of the population. but he has long been mistrustful of the parliamentary process. in his view, representative government is at best a distant goal suited for a successor, although he feels defensive about the anachronistic appearance of absolute monarchy in the last quarter of the 20th century .
51. he would accept confrontation with the arabs, the us, or even the soviet union if necessary to assert persian primacy in the gulf or to maintain what he considers a sufficiently high level of oil revenues; in other matters and areas he is likely to be more cautious. the shah’s past behavior has reflected a relatively realistic appreciation of iran’s capabilities and of the interplay between regional and international power. but as he grows older and more convinced of the soundness of his own judgment and as iran’s military strength increases, he is likely to take greater risks to achieve his ambitions .
hiten shah, co - founder of two b2b saas companies, crazy egg and kissmetrics was at tradecraft this week and it was incredible hosting him. he is a ball of energy, ideas and advice and an incredible paradox of abilities: someone who is capable of both thinking deeply but acting fast, casual in his demeanour but ferocious in his execution, interested in everyone despite being the most interesting person in the room. i admire his voracious appetite for learning and a key # learninghack that i walked away with is listening to books on audible at 2x speed to amp up my learning velocity.
deepen shah ( born march 4 , 1984 ) is an american web developer and businessman known as the creator of buzzd , and eztxtmsg ( acquired by omnicom 's bbdo ad agency in 2006 . 
deepen shah (born march 4, 1984) is an american web developer and businessman known as the creator of buzzd, and eztxtmsg (acquired by omnicom's bbdo ad agency in 2006.
deepen shah (born march 4, 1984) is an american web developer and businessman known as the creator of buzzd, and eztxtmsg (acquired by omnicom's bbdo ad agency in 2006.