libyan foreign bank
libyan foreign bank (a libyan joint stock company) was established under lwa no. 18 / 1972, and is subjected to law no. 1 / 2005 on banking, the commercial law and its amendments and related regulations .
libyan foreign bank would also focus on “strengthening” operations in chad, burkina faso, togo, algeria and tunisia and was looking to move into eastern and southern africa either with a partner or alone .
“al baraka has historical and strong relations with the libyan banks and the libyan market, especially the libyan foreign bank, which plays a leading role in libya, africa, asia, europe and america and owns main participations in 40 banking and financial institutions in all these countries…it is natural to look forward to working with the libyan foreign bank to integrate our large resources and potentials in all forms and fields of banking to achieve mutual benefit and to improve the integrated work models among the arab banking institutions, ” said adnan ahmed yousif .
any investment of more than 5 percent in an italian bank needs the approval of the bank of italy .
leading bahrain - based islamic banking group al - baraka banking group (abg) have signed a memorandum of understanding (mou) with the libyan foreign bank (lfb) to develop their banking relations across the board .
al baraka banking group, b. s. c (abg), the leading bahrain - based banking group, has signed a memorandum of understanding (mou) with the libyan foreign bank (lfb), the leading arab bank in africa, to collaborate in all banking areas .
the mou was signed by mr. adnan ahmed yousif, president & chief executive of abg and chairman of al baraka turk participation bank on behalf of al baraka banking group and mr. mohamed mohamed a. ben yousef, general manager of lfb on behalf of the libyan foreign bank .
, the united nations security council significantly relaxed its economic sanctions against libya by (i) declaring that the libyan national oil corporation and zueitina oil company were no longer subject to asset freezing and other requirements and (ii) exempting the central bank of libya, the libyan investment authority and other libyan entities from most sanctions measures .
mr. saddek omar elkaber, governor of the central bank of libya met with mr. marwan alabasi, governor of the central bank of tunisia on…
) holds 48 percent, to make the bank a hub for its european operations .
libya is struggling to reform a highly - centralised banking system, seen widely as an obstacle to private investment and growth. the central bank said in march it aimed to grant licences allowing foreign lenders to operate in libya next year .
summary of the speech of mr. saddek omar elkaber, governor of the central bank of libya on 5 - 6 - 2018 at the press conference held concerning the libyan economic dialogue in tunisia
on the occasion, mr. adnan ahmed yousif said, al baraka has historical and strong relations with the libyan banks and the libyan market, especially the libyan foreign bank, which plays a leading role in libya, africa, asia, europe and america and owns main participations in 40 banking and financial institutions in all these countries. al baraka banking group, which has a good presence in the libyan market through its representative office, has a strong presence around the world and has 703 branches through its banking units in 15 arab, asian and african countries. the group will soon open its banking unit in morocco and have well - planned programs to expand in africa and asia, based on long - standing islamic banking experience, deep knowledge of the markets in which its units are located, with a strong network of relationships, wide financial and human resources and a rich record of excellent financial performance. therefore, it is natural to look forward to working with the libyan foreign bank to integrate our large resources and potentials in all forms and fields of banking to achieve mutual benefit and to improve the integrated work models among the arab banking institutions .
the bank is a corporate body having independent financial status and its assets only consulting guarantee to its liabilities .
bait - elmal said lfb would look to tap into its home economy by providing project finance in foreign currency and had taken part in a deal to finance the purchase of oil tankers .
the signing ceremony was held at the headquarters of al baraka turk participation bank at the attendance of a number of officials in the two institutions led by mr. meliksah utku the general manager of al baraka turk participation bank .
©copyright 2018 al baraka banking group (licensed as an islamic wholesale bank by cbb), all rights reserved .
the mou was signed by president and chief executive of abg and chairman of al baraka turk participation bank, adnan ahmed yousif, and the general manager of lfb, mohamed mohamed ben yousef. meliksah utku, general manager of al - baraka türk participation bank also attended the signing which took place in istanbul at the headquarters of al - baraka turk participation bank .
in the framework of cooperation and collaborations between institutions, mr. saddek omar elkaber, governor of the central bank of libya…
lfb operates through its head office in tripoli – libya. the purpose of the bank is represented in overseas investments and banking activities and complementary and related financial activities. the bank practices the activity of opening accounts and accepting deposits from abroad and non - residents, in addition to banking and financial transactions with commercial local banks and any related banking activities licensed by central bank of libya .
in the presence of mr. saddek omar elkaber, governor of the central bank of libya, departments of the cbl held a…
secretary mnuchin leads u. s. delegation to g - 20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting in buenos aires, argentina
most recently, the bank concluded its third brainstorming session which took place on march 11th and 12th in tunis attended by libyan economists, public administration, and private sector representatives. the initiative comes as an effort from the world bank in supporting the government of national accord in particular on an economic recovery and social stability prioritization and sequencing. the objective of the libya dialogue and planning exercise will be to bring libyans from different horizons together for a discussions to forge a locally defined and libyan owned vision and plan for recovery and development in the country .
the bank is committed to supporting libya’s transition and economic recovery through technical assistance and analytical services, as well as trust fund and grant financing. the bank has been implementing a program of post - conflict technical assistance (ta) with the authorities and development partners, and carrying out analysis since reengaging in october 2011. post - conflict recovery priorities were defined jointly with the libyan authorities and are underpinned by analysis prepared with the united nations, the european union and the world bank group as part of a “watching brief” launched during the 2011 conflict .
mr. saddek omar elkaber, governor of the central bank of libya meets with mr. ahmed doghan the turkish ambassador to libya at…
mr. saddek omar elkaber, governor of the central bank of libya met with mr. ronald shtorm, ambassador of austria to libya and…
the mou aims to establish a close cooperation framework through which the two parties can activate joint initiatives and banking activities, as well as prepare technical cooperation programs in the future. it also includes the exchange of knowledge by al baraka banking group, which will benefit the libyan foreign bank in the field of islamic banking, enhance cooperation in correspondent banking and commercial finance operations between the two banks as preferred trading partners, and further cooperation in liquidity management, investments, exchanging information and ideas and making use of the network of resources available to each party .
a meeting was held at the central bank of libya on friday night 6 - 6 - 2018, with the attendance of mr. saddek omar…
( lfb) is a commercial bank that provides a wide range of banking services for clients in libya and internationally. the central bank of libya owns 100% of lfb. the bank provides short - term loans, medium - term loans, long - term loans, and syndicated loans, credits cover, documentary credits, letters of guarantee, and overdraft services, demand and term deposits. lfb also provides banking transactions and services .
ansar al - sharia ran training camps for foreign fighters, including a significant number of tunisians, travelling to syria, iraq and mali. individuals associated with ansar al - sharia participated in the september 2012 attacks on the us diplomatic mission in benghazi .
set up in 1972, the bank is an offshore institution licensed to operate internationally and does not provide banking services in its home north african market .
on august 31, 2011, canada lifted its unilateral sanctions imposed against libya under the special economic measures act. these contained a number of requirements and prohibitions concerning activities involving the government of libya and its departments, institutions and agencies, including the central bank of libya. a summary of these and other canadian sanctions measures imposed against libya on february 27, 2011 can be found here. although canada’s unilateral sanctions against libya no longer apply, until now, measures imposed under canada’s united nations act remained in force, including restrictions on dealings with the central bank of libya, the libyan national oil corporation, and the libyan investment authority as well as entities owned or controlled by them .
with the prospects of a possible government of national accord, the world bank group is increasing its partnership with other donor agencies to help gathering relevant libyan stakeholders to discuss change and reform and seeking some sort of consensus on how should we reengage and support the restoration of key institutions as well as coordinated international offer of support to the new libyan government. despite the current political crisis, the world bank has not stopped its technical assistance to libya. the on - going work has been selective in content and counterparts, focusing on building the capacity of the public administration counterparts with whom strong working relations had been established before the political crisis materialized. in particular in the areas of public financial management, governance, internal control, islamic banking, energy, private sector development and decentralization. this program is being funded by world bank and trust fund resources .
on september 23, 2011, canada amended its libyan sanctions regime to implement recent steps taken by the united nations security council significantly relaxing measures imposed against libya. canadian companies should be reviewing these changes to ensure that their compliance programs are fully up - to - date and any resumption of activity involving libya or libyan entities is fully compliant with economic sanctions measures that remain in force .
it has held a 0. 56 percent stake in unicredit since 1997 and bought another 3. 67 percent together with the libyan investment authority, the oil - exporter’s sovereign wealth fund, in october .
although several budgets have been presented by the tripoli administration and the hor (tobruk, eastern administration), the central bank of libya (cbl) did not acknowledge any budget as being the legal, legitimate libyan budget for fy2015. in effect, neither the budget submitted by rival parliaments in tripoli and in the eastern city of tobruk have been recognized. the central bank of libya (cbl) has only disbursed funds regarding wages and salaries (chapter 1); student scholarships abroad; oil / gas sector development; electricity (chapter 3); and, essential subsides items (chapter 4) .
the world bank group works in every major area of development. we provide a wide array of financial products and technical assistance, and we help countries share and apply innovative knowledge and solutions to the challenges they face .
neither turkey nor qatar have the same level influence on the government of national salvation and its allies that egypt and the uae have on the tobruk side. turkish companies have, according to the un panel of experts, delivered weapons to one side (the defunct libya dawn coalition) and qatar has maintained links with one libyan politician and former jihadist – abdelhakim belhadj – since 2011. yet none of the major libyan actors respond to input from ankara or doha the way that tobruk aligns itself with cairo’s policies .
isis also had a smaller presence on the outskirts of sabratha, a coastal town in western libya, until a combination of us airstrikes and attacks by local forces – including former jihadists from that first generation – managed to uproot the militants earlier this year. in benghazi, those fighting haftar’s operation dignity include libyan and foreign members of isis. although sirte was the group’s ostensible base, isis sleeper cells operate in tripoli and other cities and towns in libya. while the pentagon estimated there were over 6, 000 isis fighters in libya prior to the bam operation, the un and many libyans believed that the actual number was much lower .
lfb started exercising its activity in the year 1972 with a paid up capital of 20 million libyan dinars (equivalent to 67. 4 million usd). at the beginning of the year 2006 the paid up capital of lfb has increased to 1 billion usd .
a number of other militias in tripoli and its hinterland, some of which have links to figures from the now defunct libyan islamic fighting group (lifg), have been sceptical of the unity government from the outset and have clashed with kara and tajouri’s forces .
the tobruk centre of power has also established its own central bank and its own noc which are not recognised on international markets and which were supposed to merge with their tripoli counterparts. the merger has, so far, not happened .
with 189 member countries, staff from more 170 countries, and offices in over 130 locations, the world bank group is a unique global partnership: five institutions working for sustainable solutions that reduce poverty and build shared prosperity in developing countries .
the brsc’s ranks were fed by youth radicalised by haftar’s scattergun campaign, which sought not only to eradicate islamists of all stripes, including the muslim brotherhood, but also took on an ethnic character at times, targeting families of western libyan – and particularly misratan – origin in the city .
many of these fighters fled sirte before bam forces entered the city. they then travelled in three directions: south - west towards sebha, west towards sabratha and south - east towards the border with sudan. most foreign intelligence estimates hold that the group now has upwards of 600 fighters, mostly scattered across libya’s south - west and central regions, with notable concentrations around bani walid and the area south of sirte, including the jufra hinterland .
the third centre of power is made up of the authorities based in tobruk and bayda, which were also supposed to work under the lpa. the house of representatives (hor) in tobruk would become the legitimate legislative authority under the lpa but it has so far failed to pass a valid constitutional amendment to enshrine itself as an authoritative institution. instead the hor endorsed the rival government of abdullah al - thinni which operates from the eastern libyan city of bayda. the tobruk and bayda authorities have been aligned with the egypt - aligned, self - described anti - islamist general khalifa haftar, who leads the libyan national army (lna) .
canadian companies seeking to engage or to re - engage in business with libya or involving libyan - owned or controlled entities should tread carefully. it will be important to closely review the remaining sanctions in canada, the united states and the european union to ensure companies continue to maintain effective due diligence and full compliance with applicable requirements .
the international finance corporation (ifc), the world bank’s private sector arm, is keen to support the private sector in libya through its investment and advisory services. in the short term, creating access to finance for small and medium enterprises, and especially leasing, is an immediate area which ifc will start working on. on the advisory side, the ifc is working to raise awareness and provide capacity building for the financial sector as well as private participation in infrastructure development, possibly through promoting public private partnerships. the ifc and the world bank are coordinating support to strengthen the financial and private sectors .
al baraka banking group (b. s. c) is licensed as an islamic wholesale bank by the central bank of bahrain, listed on bahrain bourse and nasdaq dubai stock exchanges. it is a leading international islamic banking group providing its unique services in countries with a population totaling around one billion. it is jointly rated bbb + (long term) / a3 (short term) on the international scale and a + (bh) (long term) / a2 (bh) (short term) on the national by islamic international rating agency & dagong global credit rating company limited, and by standard & poor' s at bb + (long term) / b (short term) .
the cost of the political conflict has taken a severe toll on the libyan economy, which has remained in recession for the third consecutive year in 2015. political strife, weak security conditions, and blockaded oil infrastructures continue to constrain the supply side of the economy. production of crude oil fell to around 0. 4 million barrels per day (bpd) or the fourth of potential. the non - hydrocarbon output remained weak due to disruptions in the supply chains of both domestic and foreign inputs, as well as lack of financing. in this context, gdp is estimated to have declined by 10 percent and per capita income has fallen to less than us $ 4, 500 compared to almost us $ 13, 000 in 2012. inflation strongly accelerated last year driven by high food prices. lack of funding to finance imports, especially subsidized food, generated chronic shortages in basic commodities and expansion of black markets activities. this situation was exacerbated by households attempting to stockpile food. inflation averaged 9. 2 percent in 2015, mainly driven by a 13. 7 percent rise in food prices. prices of flour and bread quintupled .
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we start by providing an overview of financial systems in the african continent. we then consider the regions of arab north africa, west africa, east and central africa, and southern africa in more detail. the paper covers, among other things, central banks, deposit - taking banks, non - bank institutions, such as the stock markets, fixed income markets, insurance markets, and microfinance institutions .
two other institutions are based in tripoli and play a major role in libya’s politics. the central bank of libya, which is where oil money is paid and government money is disbursed. though pledging loyalty to the pc, it has had an uneasy relationship with it. the national oil corporation (noc) is also formally loyal to the pc but has had relatively good working relations with haftar’s lna after its seizure of eastern oil ports .
also called tandhim ad - dawla (the organisation of the state) by libyans, isis controlled the central mediterranean coast of libya around the city of sirte until a misratan - led operation to uproot it began in may. isis has carried out attacks in all major libyan cities, including the capital tripoli. isis has also had a presence in other parts of libya, including benghazi, where it was largely defeated by heftar’s lna. its affiliates have mostly been driven out from the towns of derna and sabratha by anti - haftar forces .
local returnees from syria helped form libya’s first isis affiliate in the eastern town of derna in 2014. many had fought as part of isis’s al - battar unit in northern syria before returning home to replicate the model with help from senior non - libyan isis figures. the leadership of isis in libya has always been dominated by foreigners. its leader earlier this year was abd al - qadir al - najdi, whose name suggests saudi origins. he replaced an iraqi whom the us claims it killed in an airstrike in eastern libya in 2015 .
companies that accept and manage deposits from individuals, firms, and governments and channel the funds into lending activities. offshore banks carry out their activities such that they are located in countries (or designated areas within countries) that provide financial and legal advantages not available in the country of residence of the depositors. advantages include bank secrecy, less restrict and transportive legal regulation, low or no taxation, protection against local political or financial instability, or other advantages. includes conventional and islamic banks .
no other arab country plays as powerful a role in libya as egypt. testament to egypt’s involvement in the region is the regular travel libyan leaders make to cairo. the relationship between tobruk and egypt is not just defined by significant arms deliveries but also by a shared political project: eradicating political islam and enhancing the autonomy of eastern libya. for egypt, according to some authors, having cyrenaica – the eastern region of libya – under the role of a leader that is friendly to egypt (haftar for instance) would create a buffer zone with isis and a territorial hinterland for any opposition to the regime in cairo .
although sharing some of the same goals as egypt, the uae has a more nuanced position on the situation in libya. reportedly, it has been more supportive of un negotiations and ultimately less engaged on libya since its intervention in yemen. nevertheless, emirati weapons are still delivered to both haftar and the militias of the city - state of zintan, according to a report from a un panel of experts. moreover, the uae’s political influence should not be underestimated. aref al - nayed, who was libyan ambassador to abu dhabi until he resigned in october, was key to the uae’s role in libya and was even touted as potential prime minister at one point .
at the moment libya has three centres of power. the first is the presidency council (pc), which has been based in tripoli since 30 march 2016. the pc is headed by fayez al - sarraj – a former member of the tobruk parliament, where he represented a tripoli constituency – and it was born out of the signing of the un - brokered libyan political agreement (lpa) in december 2015. according to this agreement, the pc presides over the government of national accord (gna), also based in tripoli. the gna should be endorsed by the tobruk - based house of representatives (hor) ac - cording to the agreement, but on two occasions the hor has voted down the list of ministers .
developments over the past year have made elements associated with the former gaddafi regime more confident than at any point since his ousting in 2011. saif al - islam gaddafi, the son of the former libyan dictator, was reported “freed” in june 2017 after being held for six years by a militia in zintan. speculation that he seeks to make a comeback – though in what way is not clear – continues amid growing consensus that former regime elements should be included in any sustainable political settlement. the former regime camp is far from united or cohesive, however, and includes prominent figures like saif al - islam, tribal elements, and armed groups including the one that sabotaged the great man made river project in late 2017, disrupting the water supply in tripoli and its environs .
while khalifa haftar is recognised as general commander of the armed forces by the hor in eastern libya, his self - styled libyan national army (lna) is a mix of military units and tribal or regional - based armed groups, and is not recognised as a proper army by all military personnel across the east or west of libya. a number of senior military figures refused to join haftar’s operation dignity against islamists when it launched in may 2014. some of these have since joined forces with his adversaries, whether cooperating with militias that comprised the now defunct anti - haftar libya dawn coalition in western libya, or joining with local jihadist - led groups to drive isis out from the eastern town of derna. haftar’s opponents claim his irregular forces include sudanese mercenaries, particularly from the darfuri rebel group jem .
protracted political standoff, coupled with lower international oil prices and generous subsidies have weakened public finances and external position. budget revenues from the hydrocarbon sector have fallen to only a fifth of their pre - revolution levels, while spending has remained high. the share of the public wage bill in gdp is astronomic (around 60 percent), mainly reflecting a plethoric public sector. meanwhile, investments have been insufficient for sustaining adequate public provision for health, education, electricity, water and sanitation services. however, savings have been realized on subsidies thanks to tougher control of the supply chains of subsidized products and lower import prices. overall, the budget deficit rose from 43 percent of gdp in 2014 to more than 75 percent of gdp in 2015. being highly dependent on hydrocarbon exports and food imports, libya’s balance of payments suffered in 2015. representing 97 percent of total exports, oil receipts are estimated to have declined to less than 15 percent of their 2012 level. meanwhile, consumption driven imports remained high. as a result, the current account swung from balance in 2013 to a deficit estimated at around 76 percent of gdp in 2015. to finance these deficits, net foreign reserves are rapidly being depleted .
figure 1 below provides a snapshot of 2012 - 2015 libyan national budget. during the 2010 - 2013 period, the executed budget did not typically exceed the overall amount authorized by parliament, but its composition substantially differed from that of the approved budget. the overall rate of budget execution was around 80 percent in 2010 and 2012 and was about 93 percent in 2013. there has been no approved (official) budget over the past two years (2014 - 2015). in fy2012, development budget spending accounted for slightly more than 52% of all government spending, with wages and salaries comprising 24% . however, over the past several years, development spending has virtually collapsed, comprising an estimated 15% of total government spending in fy2015, down from a budgeted 52% of total budget spending in fy2012 .
immediate challenges are to manage fiscal spending pressures while restoring and improving basic public services. a longer term goal is to help develop the framework and institutions for a more diversified market - based economy, broadening the economic base beyond the oil and gas sector. although the bank’s post - conflict engagement was initially expected to accompany only libya’s short term economic recovery efforts, the transition program will lay the foundation for longer term goals. this includes creating a more vibrant and competitive economy with a level playing field for the private sector to create sustainable jobs and wealth. it also includes transforming the management of oil revenues to ensure they are used in the best interests of the country and to the benefit of all citizens equally. this will also ensure that citizens have a role in defining and voicing their communities’ best interests .
libya’s jihadist network can be divided along generational lines, starting with those who emerged in the 1980s. many from that older generation fought against soviet - backed forces in afghanistan. these veterans later created a number of groups in opposition to muammar gaddafi, the largest of which was the libyan islamic fighting group (lifg) which is now defunct. several former lifg figures, including its final leader, abdelhakim belhadj, played key roles in the 2011 uprising and went on to participate in the country’s democratic transition, forming political parties, running in elections, and serving as deputy ministers in government as in the case of khaled sherif at the ministry of defence. this did not sit well with the second and third generation of jihadists – among the former were those who fought in iraq after 2003, among the latter were those who fought in syria after 2011 – who lean towards more radical ideologies and reject democracy as un - islamic. the libyans that have joined isis tend to come from the second and third generations .
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al baraka offers retail, corporate, treasury and investment banking services, strictly in accordance with the principles of the islamic shari' a. the authorized capital of al baraka is us $ 1. 5 billion, while total equity is at about us $ 2 billion. the group has a wide geographical presence in the form of subsidiary banking units and representative offices in fifteen countries, which in turn provide their services through over 700 branches. al baraka currently has a strong presence in turkey, jordan, egypt, algeria, tunisia, sudan, bahrain, pakistan, south africa, lebanon, syria, iraq and saudi arabia, including two representative offices in indonesia and libya .
mr. ahmed mohamed ben barka (chairman), mohamed m. benyousef (md )
that al emad complex, tower 2 p. o. box 2542, tripoli
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on 29 / 12 / 2009 the extraordinary general assembly meeting of shareholders of lfb decided to increase its capital to 2 billion usd as per decision no. 1 for the year 2009 .
furthermore, the extraordinary general assembly meeting of shareholders of lfb decided in its meeting dated 21 / 02 / 2010 to increase its capital with another 1 billion usd as per decision no. 2 for the year 2010 and with this increase the paid up capital of lfb amounts to 3 billion usd with an authorized capital of 8. 7 billion usd divided into 87 million shares at a value of 100 usd per share .
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“the mou aims to establish a close cooperation framework through which the two parties can activate joint initiatives and banking activities, as well as prepare technical cooperation programs in the future, ” abg has said .
the mou will include the exchange of information, which in the case of the lfb should benefit it in the field of islamic banking. it is also hoped it will enhance cooperation in correspondent banking and commercial finance operations between the two who have identified each other as “preferred trading partners. ” additionally, the mou will work towards further cooperation in liquidity management, investment and taking advantage of the network of resources available to each party .
firms that carry out proprietary investments (i. e. their own funds) in private, government, and publicly listed companies. the investment companies include holding companies, investment groups, and other firms .
companies that primarily invest in companies that operate in various sectors. the investment companies include conventional and islamic private equity, holding, and venture capital firms .
companies that provide financial services and products that facilitate the creation, liquidation, or change in ownership of money and other financial assets. includes credit - related services, investment - related services, oversight services, investment banking, all other banking, insurance, central banks and monetary authorities, and stock exchanges .
companies that collect funds through accepting deposits and channel the funds into lending activities. the companies also provide services that facilitate the lending of funds such as mortgage and loan brokerage services, clearinghouse and reserve services, check cashing services, and other banking operations such as providing atms. includes conventional and islamic commercial, specialized, offshore, and online banks .
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the btl network in tunisia is now made up of 15 agencies employing 250 executives and agents .
libya, home to africa’s largest oil reserves, has seen revenue grow as it emerges from decades of western sanctions, and the government is looking abroad for profitable investments .
“our capital is $ 1 billion, we hope to get it up to $ 10 billion, that’s our plan... hopefully in the next two to three years, ” chairman mohamed bait - elmal said, adding that the lender would get the additional funds from shareholders .
“we are going to have a new strategy because of the changes in the world, ” bait - elmal told reporters on the sidelines of a banking conference in dubai. “we would like to have participation in london, usa, paris, rome. ”
western firms have turned increasingly to arab oil exporters and their sovereign wealth funds for cash as the financial crisis freezes credit markets and hits their market values .
“we will buy hsbc’s shares... they will go down to 19 percent and we will be buy the rest, ” bait - elmal said, adding it would also buy shares from other shareholders to take its stake above 70 percent. “we hope to have it by end of the year. ”
lfb, which already has subsidiaries in france and spain, will also inject more capital into rome - based banca ubae, in which it holds a 49. 9 percent stake, according to its website .
in libya there are very few truly national actors. the vast majority are local players, some of whom are relevant at the national level while representing the interests of their region, or in most cases, their city. many important actors, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances .
since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in tripoli and in tobruk, with the latter having been recognised by the international community before the creation of the presidency council (pc) – the body that acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces – in december 2015. several types of actor scramble for power in today’s libya: armed groups; “city - states”, particularly in western and southern libya; and tribes, which are particularly relevant in eastern and southern libya .
the second centre of power is the rival, but ever weakening government of national salvation headed by prime minister khalifa ghwell – resting on the authority of a rump of the general national congress (gnc), the resurrected parliament originally elected in 2012. the government of national salvation was also based in tripoli, although it no longer controls any relevant institutions. in october 2016, ghwell tried to reassert himself but failed to gain wider support and his forces were kicked out from tripoli in the spring of 2017. the vast majority of the members of the gnc (also known as the “tripoli parliament”) have been moved across to the state council, a consultative body created under the lpa which convenes in tripoli and is headed by abdul rahman swehli, a misratan politician (and hor member) who had previously been threatened with eu individual sanctions .
initially, the pc comprised nine members. two of them started boycotting its meetings early on, while others became inactive over time so that now only two figures re - main active on a daily basis within the council: pc president sarraj and his deputy, ahmed maiteeq .
prime minister al - sarraj is not a strong figure on his own, but some of the other eight members that originally madke up his pc have close links to powerful stakeholders .
his deputy, ahmed maiteeq, who served a short stint as prime minister of libya before being hit by a court ruling, comes from the powerful city - state of misrata, which is the biggest backer of the gna from both a political and military standpoint, though some elements in the city remain opposed to it. misrata’s militias were a crucial component in the downfall of gaddafi and are still one of the two most relevant military forces in the country, having taken the lead in the fight against the islamic state group (isis) in sirte in 2016 .
another important deputy is ali faraj al - qatrani, who is aligned with general haftar, who in turn heads the lna – the other large military force. al - qatrani has boycotted meetings of the pc almost from start on the grounds that it is not inclusive enough, and has publicly called for military rule under the lna .
another member of the presidency council, omar ahmed al - aswad, who comes from the town - state of zintan in western libya, has also previously boycotted the meetings of the pc. zintan played an important role in the fall of gaddafi - controlled tripoli in 2011 and the head of its military council, osama jweili, was appointed commander of the gna’s western region military zone in june 2017 .
others include abdessalam kajman, who aligned with the justice and construction party of which the muslim brotherhood is the largest component while another deputy musa al - kuni was selected to represent southern libya but later resigned .
finally, mohammed ammari represents the pro - gna faction within the gnc and fathi al - majburi, who was once an ally of the facilities guards (pfg) commander ibrahim jadhran until he was dislodged from key eastern oil ports by the lna .
the speaker of the general national congress nouri abusahmain and the prime minister of the “government of national salvation”, khalifa ghwell, come from the cities of zwara and misrata respectively. their military support base is the steadfastness front (jabhat al - samud) of salah badi. initially they represented the libya dawn coalition which included islamists, the city - state of misrata, and several other western cities (including parts of the amazigh minority). both ghwell and abusah - main have been hostile to the pc and have been subjected to sanctions by the eu because of this. their support base has shrunk considerably and, at the moment, it is unclear whether they are capable of re - establishing a presence in tripoli .
the relationship between haftar and the speaker of the tobruk parliament, aguila saleh issa, has ebbed and flowed since 2015. over the past year, it has become in - creasingly strained. haftar oversees his forces from his headquarters in marj (in eastern libya) and has exerted pressure on both the bayda government and the hor in tobruk. in july 2017, haftar declared that his forces had “liberated” benghazi from both the islamist - dominated benghazi revolutionary shura council and isis, but fighting continues in pockets of the city. haftar’s camp has faced several challenges from within and without, not least from erstwhile ally faraj ghaim, who was appointed deputy interior minister of the government of national accord in 2017 .
nevertheless, over time egypt has put out at least two statements that contradict this position. on the one hand, diplomats and the mfa have given assurances of their support to the un - led political process; on the other, the security apparatus has supported haftar, even when it was clear that he was on a collision course with un - backed unity efforts .
the two maghrebian countries, while having a high level of interest in what happens in libya, have not built a network of proxies in the country like other arab or regional powers. both countries have been vocal supporters of reconciliation and a political solution while closely coordinating with each other to contain the spillover from isis’ presence in libya .
the terms “army” and “militia” mean different things to different libyans and this is one of the consequences of the political power struggle that has roiled libya since 2014 .
haftar’s lna has different degrees of control in the area of central and eastern libya that stretches from ben jawad to the border with egypt. in this part of the country, lna’s colonel nadhuri is the military governor and he has replaced elected officials with military figures to head most municipalities across the east .
drawing its strength from a web of tribal alliances, haftar’s lna has expanded its presence across the area of central and eastern libya that stretches from ben jawad to the border with egypt, with the exception of the town of derna which has been besieged by lna - aligned forces for over a year. the lna appointed its colonel abdulrazaq nadhuri as military governor of eastern libya and he has replaced elected officials with military figures to head most municipalities across the east .
the libya dawn militia alliance that formed partly in response to haftar’s operation dignity in summer 2014, and which drove then dignity - allied militias from the western town of zintan from tripoli, no longer exists. the coalition was made up of both islamist and non - islamist militias, armed groups from tripoli and the port city of mis - rata, and fighters from other parts of western libya, including from the amazigh mi - nority. it had fractured long before the un - brokered deal aimed at establishing a unity government was signed in late 2015, with tensions growing between misratan factions and tripoli - based groups in particular .
at present, tripoli’s armed groups can be broadly categorised in terms of whether or not they support the unity government led by sarraj. most are either explicitly supportive of, or ambivalent towards, the unity government. one of the most important figures supporting the government is abdel rauf kara, leader of the special deterrent force (or rada) which is based in the maitiga complex, also home to tripoli’s only operating airport. kara’s salafist - leaning forces – which number around 1, 500 – once sought to present themselves as a type of police force for the city, targeting alcohol and drug sellers in particular. now they focus their efforts on tackling isis cells and sympathisers in the capital. armed groups from the suq al - jumaa area of tripoli, including the nawasi brigade, are also key to securing the unity government .
another powerful figure in tripoli is haithem tajouri, who heads the city’s largest militia. tajouri, whose tripoli revolutionaries brigade (trb) has threatened and intimidated officials since 2012, is not a particularly political figure. his priority is protecting the considerable interests he has accrued in the capital .
long - standing tensions between associates of sheikh sadeq al - gheriani, who was appointed mufti in 2011, and adherents of a particular strand of salafism inspired by a saudi sheikh called rabee al - madkhali, have increased in recent years. colloquially known as madkhalis, they detest the muslim brotherhood and all forms of political islam. as a result, many madkhalis joined haftar’s operation dignity in eastern libya. their critics suspect they may be a trojan horse for saudi influence in libya. kara’s rada force contains a large number of madkhalis, as do a number of other militias in tripoli. the disappearance and presumed killing in 2016 of nader al - omrani, a member of al - gheriani’s dar al - ifta, was blamed on madkhalis, who have made clear their doctrinal disagreements with al - gheriani and his circle. in mid - 2017, armed groups aligned with al - gheriani and figures from the former lifg lost territory and influence in the capital. several key personalities from this milieu are now based outside libya .
the prosperous port city of misrata is home to libya’s largest and most powerful militias. local rivalries feed the power - play between the city’s constellation of armed groups. several prominent political and business figures in misrata support the unity government, which includes misratan businessman ahmed maiteeq, as deputy prime minister. this has helped secure the backing of a number of the main armed groups from the city, including the two biggest – the halbous and the mahjoub brigades. a wildcard in misrata is salah badi, a controversial former parliamentarian and militia leader who was a key figure in the libya dawn alliance in 2014 and who opposes the un - backed unity government. tensions have also grown between the city’s mili - tary council and its municipal council, with the former attempting to unseat the latter.
libyan foreign bank ( lfb ) was established in 1972 in tripoli , libya as libyan arab foreign bank ; it was renamed libyan foreign bank in 2005 . it was libya 's first offshore banking institution licensed to operate internationally . the central bank of libya owns 100 % of lfb . the head office is located in libya 's capital tripoli . since 2010 , the bank owns 84 % of british arab commercial bank , and 68 % of banca ubae ( est. 1972 ) in rome . 
libyan foreign bank (lfb) was established in 1972 in tripoli, libya as libyan arab foreign bank; it was renamed libyan foreign bank in 2005. it was libya's first offshore banking institution licensed to operate internationally. the central bank of libya owns 100% of lfb. the head office is located in libya's capital tripoli. since 2010, the bank owns 84% of british arab commercial bank, and 68% of banca ubae (est. 1972) in rome.
libyan foreign bank (lfb) was established in 1972 in tripoli, libya as libyan arab foreign bank; it was renamed libyan foreign bank in 2005. it was libya's first offshore banking institution licensed to operate internationally. the central bank of libya owns 100% of lfb. the head office is located in libya's capital tripoli. since 2010, the bank owns 84% of british arab commercial bank, and 68% of banca ubae (est. 1972) in rome.