bomb damage assessment
the official insisted on anonymity as he discussed the pentagon' s preliminary bomb damage assessment .
bomb damage, forensic assessment .
world of forensic science. . retrieved july 09, 2018 from urltoken urltoken
recapitulation of bomb damage assessment for the period 31 jan - 24 feb 1966 | cia foia (foia. cia. gov )
we also talk about radically reducing the logistics demands of our deployed forces through increases in reliability, and frankly, better use of our precision capability, and a good look at bomb damage assessment and / or battle damage assessment .
bomb damage, forensic assessment .
encyclopedia of espionage, intelligence, and security. . retrieved july 09, 2018 from urltoken urltoken
bomb damage, forensic assessment .
world of forensic science. . encyclopedia. com. (july 9, 2018). urltoken
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bomb damage, forensic assessment .
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we have detectable damage on 38 to 40% of the radars, and we still have some (data) coming in
, said on official, discussing the pentagon' s preliminary bomb damage assessment .
fires and explosions are closely related phenomena in physical and chemical terms. appropriately, bomb - damage assessment is an aspect of forensic science closely related to arson investigation .
unwavering adherence to an established intelligence process, regardless of the demands of the situation, hampered bomb damage assessment and rendered intelligence support of the overall effort less than optimal .
this collection consists of three images of hiroshima and three images of nagasaki taken by william jones during the low altitude atomic bomb damage assessment photography of hiroshima and nagasaki in january 1946 .
see also accelerant; architecture and structural analysis; bomb detection devices; bomb (explosion) investigations; explosives .
laser remote sensing techniques are an established and mature scientific method used extensively in civilian research such as environmental monitoring and atmospheric research. this paper discusses specific problems inherent with established technologies applied to reconnaissance, surveillance and bomb damage assessment, and proposes specific applications for laser remote sensing methods, which resolve the ambiguities which may result from the use of established reconnaissance, surveillance and bomb damage assessment sensors .
bomb damage assessment (bda) has historically been a task of considerable difficulty because the wide range of munitions utilised, target types attacked and modes of attack used have precluded the application of any single reliable method .
suitably implemented, laser remote sensing methods could be profitably applied to reconnaissance and bomb damage assessment. the use of this technology in conjunction with conventional sensors provides a means of determining chemical traces in the area of interest, which for many target types can provide the necessary information to confirm target type or damage level. this can then be used to resolve uncertainties in the output from conventional sensors and available intelligence, thereby increasing the level of confidence in targeting and damage assessment .
in nagasaki, very heavy plaster damage was observed in many buildings up to 9, 000 feet; moderate damage was sustained as far as 12, 000 feet, and light damage up to 15, 000 feet .
this 461 - page study showcases pioneering french efforts in the technology and tactics of bombing enemy forces from the air including the development of aerial bombs, bomb - dropping mechanisms, bombsights, intelligence - based targeting packages, formation flying, night flying and navigation, long - range fighter escorts, and aerial photography for bomb damage assessment .
just as fires and explosions are closely related phenomena in physical and chemical terms, bomb - damage assessment is an aspect of forensic science closely related to arson investigation. in both cases, authorities analyze a crime scene for telltale signs of the nature of the materials that facilitated the conflagration. in the united states, the two agencies most concerned with bomb - damage assessment at the federal level are the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, and firearms (atf), and the explosives unit of the federal bureau of investigation (fbi) .
in nagasaki, very heavy damage to window frames and doors was observed up to 8, 000 feet, and light damage up to 12, 000 feet .
the us took all steps to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage .
the first limitation is in the need to carry specialised equipment in addition to existing reconnaissance sensors or bomb damage assessment cameras. this will add weight to the aircraft' s sensor suite, as well as increasing the cost and maintenance requirements of the aircraft' s systems .
severe damage to gas holders occured out to 6, 500 feet in both cities .
in the light of our experience during the air campaign, the uk national battle damage assessment / targeting process has been fully reviewed and a series of recommendations for follow - up action highlighted. these include :
video provided by the pentagon showed a huge cloud of smoke after the bomb exploded .
in hiroshima, steel frame buildings suffered severe structural damage up to 5, 700 feet from x, and in nagasaki the same damage was sustained as far as 6, 000 feet .
explosions can be accidental, such as the rupture and ignition of a propane tank, yet they can also be the deliberate result of the detonation of a bomb. in assessing a crime scene, forensic scientists look for the telltale signs of the cause of the bomb damage .
roof damage extended as far as 16, 000 feet from x in hiroshima and in nagasaki .
in addition to the atf, the fbi operates a laboratory to which other law - enforcement agencies submit materials for investigation. at the international level, bomb damage assessment may be performed by security services of various nations, or even by international teams, which may include civilians. such was the case in the investigation of the scene in bali, indonesia, where islamist terrorists detonated a bomb that killed several hundred people in october 2002 .
the bomb also destroyed the base used by the militants and blew up a large stash of weapons .
on 9 september, north korea confirmed it had carried out its fifth test of a nuclear bomb .
air forces have traditionally relied upon photographic evidence to assess the damage inflicted upon the target. the photography may be carried out by the delivery aircraft with an onboard bomb damage assessment camera, or by a post strike reconnaissance sortie flown by another aircraft. the latter has the advantage of potentially cleaner photography due to the absence of smoke and dust clouds produced by the delivered munitions, as well as better quality imagery due the use of specialised reconnaissance camera equipment .
aleppo bomb blast kills six - syrian state tv a bomb blast killed six people and injured 32 in the salah al - din district of aleppo, syrian state television reported on wednesday without giving further details .
the roads, and railroad and street railway trackage sustained practically no primary damage as a result of the explosion. most of the damage to railroads occurred from secondary causes, such as fires and damage to bridges or other structures. rolling stock, as well as automobiles, trolleys, and buses were destroyed and burned up to a considerable distance from x. streets were impassable for awhile because of the debris, but they were not damaged. the height of the bomb explosion probably explains the absence of direct damage to railroads and roads .
he massive ordnance air blast (moab) bomb used is widely known in the us military as the
mother of all bombs
. it is the first time the bomb has been used against an enemy .
“a great majority of scientists were opposed to the sudden employment of the atom bomb. ” in einstein’s judgment, the dropping of the bomb was a political – diplomatic decision rather than a military or scientific decision .
in 1967 a study of the effectiveness of bombing bridges in north vietnam was made by oer analysts. a sample of 46 joint chiefs of staffs (jcs) target bridges which had severe damage was used. the study covered the period from the start of bombing through january 1967. photography provided most of the information for the assessment of the extent of damage to the bridges, and bomb damage assessment reports provided data on the volume and types of ordnance used. the study revealed that there were 249 hits out of 11, 744 bombs dropped, for an average of one hit for every 47 bombs dropped in other words, slightly over 2 percent of all bombs dropped succeeded in damaging a bridge to such an extent that it needed extensive repairs .
although complete window damage was observed only up to 12, 000 feet from x, some window damage occurred in nagasaki up to 40, 000 feet, and actual breakage of glass occured up to 60, 000 feet .
the only wholly reliable method of bomb damage assessment to date has been to overrun the target with friendly land forces, and examine the damage inflicted by the air attack. this is not a practical proposition in most wartime situations, as the target may not be readily accessible, or it may be heavily defended by hostile land forces. an alternative is to deploy special operations forces to observe the target from shorter distances, however this method is problematic as it uses a scarce wartime resource .
a large part of the electric supply was interrupted by the bomb blast chiefly through damage to electric substations and overhead transmission systems. both gas works in nagasaki were severely damaged by the bomb. these works would have required 6 - 7 months to get into operation. in addition to the damage sustained by the electrical and gas systems, severe damage to the water supply system was reported by the japanese government; the chief damage was a number of breaks in the large water mains and in almost all of the distributing pipes in the areas which were affected by the blast. nagasaki was still suffering from a water shortage inside the city six weeks after the atomic attack .
the first peacetime detonation of a nuclear bomb happened on bikini atoll in the pacific ocean in 1946. in total, more than 20 tests were carried out on the atoll. a huge hydrogen bomb, code - named castle bravo, was detonated in 1954. it was 1, 000 times more powerful than the hiroshima bomb .
the bomb explodes in the air and creates a massive shockwave. the resulting
overpressure
collapsed the tunnels .
sean spicer, spokesman for the white house, said the bomb was dropped at 7pm local time in afghanistan .
washington decided that japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the a - bomb .
however, most of the manhattan project scientists who developed the atom bomb were opposed to using it on japan .
in the post cold war context, where economy of force is a critical factor, laser remote sensing offers the potential for significantly more accurate strategic and tactical reconnaissance as well as bomb damage assessment. this in turn will provide for substantially better utilisation of air assets, thereby creating a force multiplication effect within any air force deploying this capability. the potential payoff should not be underestimated. ž
post - strike imagery shows extensive damage to the left side of the building. due to precision weaponeering on the part of us targeteers, no apparent damage to neighboring buildings is visible. (digitalglobe imagery as of 1 april 2003 )
the tsar bomb caused a 100 megaton explosion in 1961. the last test at novaya zemlya took place in 1991 .
britain shares u. s. assessment that it is' highly likely the regime was responsible for a sarin attack' on april 4 - british u. n. envoy
the panels are a rare collection of well - preserved aerial shots showing damage in both cities, spokesman jim baird said .
he size of the bomb, measuring 30ft long, meant that a us air force mc - 130 cargo plane with a rear door had to be used and it was pushed out of the aircraft rather than dropped from a bomb bay .
128 the mod' s short answer to the question' how much damage was done?' was' enough'. [
such forensic investigations can take place at the municipal and state level, if the involved agencies have the capability to conduct the investigations. certainly, such capability exists at the national level. in the united states, the two agencies most concerned with bomb - damage assessment at the federal level are the bureau of alcohol, tobacco, and firearms (atf), and the explosives unit of the federal bureau of investigation (fbi) .
126 in assessing the overall effectiveness of the air campaign, we are therefore hampered by two particular uncertainties. the first, on a practical level, is the revealed shortcomings of nato' s battle damage assessment, and the inability to assess fully the damage done to strategic targets while milosevic remained in control of serbia. the second, on a more political level, is the difficulty of disentangling the coercive impact of the attacks on serbia .
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within seconds, the largest non - nuclear bomb america has ever used in combat hurtles towards an isil complex of caves and tunnels .
] however, there was some collateral damage. on 7 may, the chinese embassy in belgrade was hit by us jdam missiles. [
some bombs are relatively unsophisticated. one example is a pipe bomb, which is typically little more than a metal pipe containing shotgun powder .
thermal imaging or infra - red photography, using either flir (forward looking infra - red) equipment, or purpose designed reconnaissance linescan cameras, has provided some notable gains over conventional photographic methods of bomb damage assessment. a thermal imager will register temperature differences in a target with contrast, or subject to postprocessing, false colour. infrared radiation will also penetrate many obscurant aerosols far better than visible wavelengths, as the wavelengths are larger in relation to the aerosol particles in the atmosphere .
as intended, the bomb was exploded at an almost ideal location over nagasaki to do the maximum damage to industry, including the mitsubishi steel and arms works, the mitsubishi - urakami ordnance works (torpedo works), and numerous factories, factory training schools, and other industrial establishments, with a minimum destruction of dwellings and consequently, a minimum amount of casualties. had the bomb been dropped farther south, the mitsubishi - urakami ordnance works would not have been so severely damaged, but the main business and residential districts of nagasaki would have sustained much greater damage casualties .
heavy fire damage was sustained in a circular area in hiroshima with a mean radius of about 6, 000 feet and a maximum radius of about 11, 000 feet; similar heavy damage occured in nagasaki south of x up to 10, 000 feet, where it was stopped on a river course .
the u. s. air force has awarded a $ 480, 000 contract to northrop grumman corp. to demonstrate its munition - deployed bomb damage assessment system. the system includes an airborne video sensor and an rf datalink designed to provide battlefield commanders with critical, real - time information about the effectiveness of air strikes. the sensor separates from the munition after release and trails 1, 000 ft. behind it on a tether, generating high - speed, high - resolution images until after munition ...
the bomb, also known as the gbu - 43b, was dropped in the achin district of nangarhar province, close to the border with pakistan .
in my opinion, the japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. thus, it wouldn’t have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb .
the limitation of both photographic and thermal imaging methods is that they can only provide contrast information in the visible and infrared bands. while this is suitable for bomb damage assessment and identification of many target types, it may not be adequate for assessing hardened targets or targets housed in hardened facilities. a very good example are bunkers used as command posts, and hardened aircraft shelters concealing aircraft. the desert storm air campaign is a good instance of this problem, in that many such targets were needlessly reattacked due to inadequate bda .
the war would have been over in two weeks... . the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all .
in hiroshima, multi - story brick buildings suffered structural damage up to 6, 600 feet, and in nagasaki up to 6, 500 feet from x .
an area of partial damage by blast and fire lies just outside the one just described and comprises approximately 35. 8 square miles. of this area, roughly 1 / 6th was built up and 1 / 4th was water. the extent of damage varied from serious (severe damage to roofs and windows in the main business section of nagasaki, 2. 5 miles from x), to minor (broken or occasionally broken windows at a distance of 7 miles southeast of x) .
israel' s military said on wednesday it believes syrian president bashar al - assad' s forces still possess several tonnes of chemical weapons, issuing the assessment two weeks after a chemical attack that killed nearly 90 people in syria .
some of the targets appear difficult to justify. no clear explanation of the decision to bomb the danube bridges at novi sad yet appears to have been given .
underground air raid shelters with earth cover roofs immediately below the explosion had their roofs caved in; but beyond 1 / 2 mile from x they suffered no damage .
n a 2003 review of the legality of using the bomb, the pentagon concluded that it could not be called an indiscriminate killer under the law of armed conflict .
asked if he had authorised the use of the bomb, mr trump said :
everybody knows exactly what happened and what i do is i authorise my military .
with the explosive power of up to 30 thousand tonnes of tnt, the latest north korean warhead was more powerful than the bomb dropped by the united states on hiroshima .
war was really won before we used a - bomb, u. s. news and world report, 8 / 15 / 60, pg. 73 - 75 .
liu also miscalculates that “a 20 - kiloton bomb detonated at optimum height would have a maximum emp damage distance of 20 kilometers” in part, because he assumes “15, 000 volts / meter or higher” in the e1 emp component is necessary for damage. this figure is an extreme overestimation of system damage field thresholds. damage and upset to electronic systems will happen from e1 emp field strengths far below liu’s “15, 000 volts / meter or higher. ” a one meter wire connected to a semiconductor device, such as a mouse cord or interconnection cable, would place hundreds to thousands of volts on microelectronic devices out to ranges of hundreds of miles for low - yield devices. based on our experience with many emp tests, semiconductor junctions operate at a few volts, and will experience breakdown at a few volts over their operating point, allowing their power supply to destroy exposed junctions .
william jones was an aerial photographer in the army air corps during world war ii. during the occupation of japan, jones photographed the atomic bomb damage of both hiroshima and nagasaki at low altitude. after his discharge he continued in his photography career, owning and operating a studio, jones photos, in columbia city, indiana, for over 43 years .
such severe nuclear contamination is created in fractions of a second. when a nuclear bomb explodes underground, the rock surrounding the device is vaporized. rock lying further from the bomb is melted as temperatures rise by several million degrees. in many cases, the ground above collapses into the molten cavity, allowing radiation to spread into the atmosphere and surrounding environment .
121 the choice of targets during this phase was controversial, and the risks of collateral damage were high. civilian casualties were another of the weak spots of the alliance targetted by milosevic' s counter - coercive tactics, and the serbian propaganda machine exploited them to maximum effect. the considerable efforts made by the raf, together with other nato air forces, to keep collateral damage to a minimum were largely successful. the chief of joint operations told us that uk attacks, so far as we know, did not result in any collateral damage. [
in hiroshima over 60, 000 of 90, 000 buildings were destroyed or severely damaged by the atomic bomb; this figure represents over 67% of the city' s structures .
[ i ] concluded that even without the atomic bomb, japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. my own view was that japan would capitulate by november 1945 .
in contrast to blackouts caused by single - point or small - scale failures, a nuclear emp attack would inflict massive widespread damage to the electric grid, causing millions of failure points. with few exceptions, the us national electric grid is unhardened and untested against nuclear emp attack. in the event of a nuclear emp attack on the united states, a widespread protracted blackout is inevitable. this common sense assessment is also supported by the nation’s best computer modeling. [ 14 ]
the advent of thermal imaging (flir) targeting systems such as pave tack and lantirn has added a new aspect to conventional bomb damage assessment. these systems use a thermal imaging camera boresighted with a near infrared pulsed laser (typically 1. 066 um nd: yag). the laser is used both for rangefinding and designation of targets with a coded pulse stream, for use by laser guided munitions. if the thermal imagery is fed into a video tape recording device, a real time record of the attack will exist for post flight analysis. this feature of the f - 111f pave tack and f - 117a dlir was used extensively for bda during the gulf campaign .
macarthur’s views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on hiroshima and nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed …. when i asked general macarthur about the decision to drop the bomb, i was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. what, i asked, would his advice have been? he replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. the war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the united states had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor .
u. s. nuclear regulatory commission historian j. samuel walker has studied the history of research on the decision to use nuclear weapons on japan. in his conclusion he writes, “ the consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. it is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that truman and his advisors knew it. ” (j. samuel walker, the decision to use the bomb: a historiographical update, diplomatic history, winter 1990, pg. 110) .
on september 9, 1945, admiral william f. halsey, commander of the third fleet, was publicly quoted extensively as stating that the atomic bomb was used because the scientists had a “toy and they wanted to try it out... . ” he further stated, “the first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment... . it was a mistake to ever drop it. ”
according to an account by walter brown, assistant to then - us secretary of state james byrnes, truman agreed at a meeting three days before the bomb was dropped on hiroshima that japan was “looking for peace”. truman was told by his army generals, douglas macarthur and dwight eisenhower, and his naval chief of staff, william leahy, that there was no military need to use the bomb .
nato attacked a total of 440 static targets during the air campaign, with more than three - quarters assessed to have suffered moderate to severe damage. nato figures suggest that the targets destroyed or significantly damaged included :
gives rather more detail on the different processes involved in assessing damage to fixed as opposed to mobile targets. damage to fixed targets is inherently more easily verifiable but additionally, after kfor' s deployment into kosovo, an assessment team was able to visit a representative sample of fixed targets such as tunnels, bunkers, petroleum facilities and other facilities. generally the post - strike inspections confirmed the in - campaign assessments. although the destruction of around 100 aircraft on the ground is classified under attacks on fixed targets, it is presumably possible to conceal the evidence of such attacks in the same ways as for damaged mobile targets. this number is interesting, as it compares with only 6 serbian fighters destroyed by the allies in air combat. [
the fire damage in both cities was tremendous, but was more complete in hiroshima than in nagasaki. the effect of the fires was to change profoundly the appearance of the city and to leave the central part bare, except for some reinforced concrete and steel frames and objects such as safes, chimney stacks, and pieces of twisted sheet metal. the fire damage resulted more from the properties of the cities themselves than from those of the bombs .
photography as a method for assessing bomb damage has its limitations. static single frame images, using single aperture or stereoscopic photography, will suffer limitations in resolution due the film medium and camera' s performance, as well as being unable to provide clear definition through haze, cloud, smoke or other obscurants. a clever opponent may successfully defeat conventional photographic reconnaissance by using smoke generators, camouflage or decoys with suitable accuracy in shape, size and contrast .
the story of estimating bomb damage and analyzing north vietnamese countermeasures abruptly ended on 31 october 1968 when the bombing program was stopped. however, the expertise and voluminous files that were built up over three years of work are still useful these assets now provide the basis for estimating the extent and speed of reconstruction rather than the cost and effect of destruction. also, they will provide a valuable data base for the historian or anyone doing a post - mortem on the rolling thunder program .
in [ july ] 1945… secretary of war stimson, visiting my headquarters in germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on japan. i was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. …the secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in new mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent .
if surrender could have been brought about in may, 1945, or even in june or july, before the entrance of soviet russia into the [ pacific ] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer .
although the blast damaged many bridges to some extent, bridge damage was on the whole slight in comparison to that suffered by buildings. the damage varied from only damaged railings to complete destruction of the superstructure. some of the bridges were wrecked and the spans were shoved off their piers and into the river bed below by the force of the blast. others, particularly steel plate girder bridges, were badly buckled by the blast pressure. none of the failures observed could be attributed to inadequate design or structural weaknesses .
] in the us, further study is underway within the department of defense to integrate the findings of all available data and to develop insights' on a variety of important topics'. these topics include understanding attack effectiveness, what systems proved most accurate and timely in helping the assessment of attack effectiveness, and how should the inevitable uncertainty over this information be handled. [
the us secretary of war, henry stimson, told president truman he was “fearful” that the us air force would have japan so “bombed out” that the new weapon would not be able “to show its strength”. he later admitted that “no effort was made, and none was seriously considered, to achieve surrender merely in order not to have to use the bomb”. his foreign policy colleagues were eager “to browbeat the russians with the bomb held rather ostentatiously on our hip”. general leslie groves, director of the manhattan project that made the bomb, testified: “there was never any illusion on my part that russia was our enemy, and that the project was conducted on that basis. ” the day after hiroshima was obliterated, president truman voiced his satisfaction with the “overwhelming success” of “the experiment” .
the scientists questioned the ability of destroying japanese cities with atomic bombs to bring surrender when destroying japanese cities with conventional bombs had not done so, and – like some of the military officers quoted above – recommended a demonstration of the atomic bomb for japan in an unpopulated area .
practically every wooden building or building with timber frame within 2. 0 miles of x was either completely destroyed or very seriously damaged, and significant damage in nagasaki resulted as far as 3 miles from x. nearly all such buildings collapsed and a very large number were consumed by fire .
nato needs to have an improved and standardised target approval methodology in future. the level of national scrutiny should be limited to only the most sensitive targets. nato must ensure that combat assessment teams are staffed by those who would not have restrictions on their access to information because of its classification. sufficient analysis needs to have been carried out before hostilities begin to enable targets to be matched with specific mission objectives .
when assessing the potential vulnerability of us military forces and civilian critical infrastructures to emp, it is necessary to be mindful of the complex interdependencies of these highly - networked systems, because emp upset and damage of a very small fraction of the total system can cause total system failure. [ 12 ]
in his article, lewis also suggested that vehicle transportation would continue after an emp event based on the fact that only 6 of 55 vehicles were shut down by a single simulated emp test on vehicles. [ 10 ] however, the emp test protocol limited testing vehicles only to upset, not to damage, because the emp commission could not afford to repair damaged cars. even with this limitation, one vehicle was still damaged, indicating that at least 2 percent of vehicles were severely affected by emp damage. over 50 years of emp testing indicates that full field damage to vehicles would probably be much higher than 2 percent. modern vehicles are even more susceptible to emp attack because of their much larger complement of electronics than present in the vehicles tested by the commission more than a decade ago. furthermore, vehicles cannot run without fuel and gas stations cannot operate without electricity. gas pumps could also be damaged in an emp attack .
between march 27 and april 1, the facility was repeatedly hit with several highly visible above - ground strikes. the post - strike examination of the inside of the bunker by independent news media revealed no appreciable damage to the underground bunker, despite the repeated strikes. (digitalglobe imagery as of 1 april 2003 )
i think that the japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the russians and, i think, the swiss. and that suggestion of [ giving ] a warning [ of the atomic bomb ] was a face - saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted .
the commander in chief of the u. s. fleet and chief of naval operations, ernest j. king, stated that the naval blockade and prior bombing of japan in march of 1945, had rendered the japanese helpless and that the use of the atomic bomb was both unnecessary and immoral. also, the opinion of fleet admiral chester w. nimitz was reported to have said in a press conference on september 22, 1945, that “the admiral took the opportunity of adding his voice to those insisting that japan had been defeated before the atomic bombing and russia’s entry into the war. ” in a subsequent speech at the washington monument on october 5, 1945, admiral nimitz stated “the japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of hiroshima and before the russian entry into the war. ” it was learned also that on or about july 20, 1945, general eisenhower had urged truman, in a personal visit, not to use the atomic bomb. eisenhower’s assessment was “it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing... to use the atomic bomb, to kill and terrorize civilians, without even attempting [ negotiations ], was a double crime. ” eisenhower also stated that it wasn’t necessary for truman to “succumb” to [ the tiny handful of people putting pressure on the president to drop atom bombs on japan. ]
[ 7 ] high - altitude emp (hemp), the phenomenon under discussion, results from the detonation of a nuclear weapon at high - altitude, 30 kilometers or higher. all nuclear weapons, even a primitive hiroshima - type a - bomb, can produce levels of hemp damaging to modern electronics over large geographic regions .
in general, the atomic bomb explosion damaged all windows and ripped out, bent, or twisted most of the steel window or door sashes, ripped doors from hinges, damaged all suspended wood, metal, and plaster ceilings. the blast concussion also caused great damage to equipment by tumbling and battering. fires generally of secondary origin consumed practically all combustible material, caused plaster to crack off, burned all wooden trim, stair covering, wooden frames of wooden suspended ceilings, beds, mattresses, and mats, and fused glass, ruined all equipment not already destroyed by the blast, ruined all electrical wiring, plumbing, and caused spalling of concrete columns and beams in many of the rooms .
in nagasaki 14, 000 or 27% of 52, 000 residences were completely destroyed and 5, 40o, or 10% were half destroyed. only 12% remained undamaged. this destruction was limited by the layout of the city. the following is a summary of the damage to buildings in nagasaki as determined from a ground survey made by the japanese :
the human and environmental devastation caused by decades of nuclear testing is still being felt today. the people of bikini atoll were told they would have to leave the island for just three months before it would be safe for them to return home. more than 60 years after the detonation of the castle bravo bomb, the island is still too dangerous to live on .
for the mod to say that
enough
damage was done is not good enough. the mod, and the alliance more generally, cannot simply rely on the response that because milosevic conceded, the campaign was a success. they need to demonstrate that they have seriously addressed these questions before they are faced with another situation in which recourse to military force for coercive diplomacy is chosen .
in hiroshima, all utilities and transportation services were disrupted for varying lengths of time. in general however services were restored about as rapidly as they could be used by the depleted population. through railroad service was in order in hiroshima on 8 august, and electric power was available in most of the surviving parts on 7 august, the day after the bombing. the reservoir of the city was not damaged, being nearly 2 miles from x. however, 70, 000 breaks in water pipes in buildings and dwellings were caused by the blast and fire effects. rolling transportation suffered extensive damage. the damage to railroad tracks, and roads was comparatively small, however. the electric power transmission and distribution systems were badly wrecked. the telephone system was approximately 80% damaged, and no service was restored until 15 august .
the next most seriously damaged area in nagasaki lies outside the 2. 9 square miles just described, and embraces approximately 4. 2 square miles of which 29% was built up. the damage from blast and fire was moderate here, but in some sections (portions of main business districts) many secondary fires started and spread rapidly, resulting in about as much over - all destruction as in areas much closer to x .
[ 8 ] according to electric infrastructure security council, report: ussr nuclear emp upper atmosphere kazakhstan test 184, (urltoken), citing research by oak ridge national laboratory, a comparable emp event over the u. s. today “would likely damage about 365 large transformers in the u. s. power grid, leaving about 40 percent of the u. s. population without electrical power for 4 to 10 years. ”
[ 14 ] modeling by the us ferc reportedly assesses that a terrorist attack that destroys just 9 of 2, 000 ehv transformers–merely 0. 0045 (0. 45 %) of all ehv transformers in the us national electric grid–would be catastrophic damage, causing a protracted nationwide blackout. modeling by the congressional emp commission assesses that a terrorist nuclear emp attack, using a primitive 10 - kiloton nuclear weapon, could destroy dozens of ehv transformers, thousands of scadas and electronic systems, causing catastrophic collapse and protracted blackout of the us eastern grid, putting at risk the lives of millions. for the best unclassified modeling assessment of likely damage to the us national electric grid from nuclear emp attack see: us federal energy regulatory commission (ferc) interagency report, coordinated with the department of defense and oak ridge national laboratory: electromagnetic pulse: effects on the u. s. power grid, executive summary (2010); ferc interagency report by edward savage, james gilbert and william radasky, the early - time (e1) high - altitude electromagnetic pulse (hemp) and its impact on the u. s. power grid (meta - r - 320) metatech corporation (january 2010); ferc interagency report by james gilbert, john kappenman, william radasky, and edward savage, the late - time (e3) high - altitude electromagnetic pulse (hemp) and its impact on the u. s. power grid (meta - r - 321) metatech corporation (january 2010) .
one difference between lower - level explosives and their more sophisticated cousins is the fact that the latter requires a detonator or blasting cap, a device to make it active. investigators will, therefore, seek not only the telltale physical and chemical residue that will lead to a determination of the type of bomb used, but also for evidence of detonators and other components such as tapes, wires, timers, switches, and batteries .
fire fighting and rescue units were stripped of men and equipment. almost 30 hours elapsed before any rescue parties were observable. in hiroshima only a handful of fire engines were available for fighting the ensuing fires, and none of these were of first class type. in any case, however, it is not likely that any fire fighting equipment or personnel or organization could have effected any significant reduction in the amount of damage caused by the tremendous conflagration .
thus, even if north korea only has primitive, low - yield nuclear weapons, and if other states or terrorists acquire one or a few such weapons as well as the capability to detonate them at an altitude of 30 kilometers or higher over the united states. as, the emp commission warned over a decade ago in its 2004 report, “the damage level could be sufficient to be catastrophic to the nation, and our current vulnerability invites attack. ”
real world failures of electric grids from various causes indicate that the congressional emp commission, us department of defense, us federal energy regulatory commission (ferc), us department of homeland security, and us defense threat reduction agency are right that a nuclear emp attack would have catastrophic consequences. significant and highly - disruptive blackouts have been caused by single - point failures cascading into system - wide failures, originating from damage comprising far less than 1 percent of the total system. [ 13 ]
it definitely seemed to me that the japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. they were surrounded by the navy. they couldn’t get any imports and they couldn’t export anything. naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the japanese would then be in a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring russia in .
in nagasaki, buildings with structural steel frames, principally the mitsubishi plant as far as 6, 000 feet from x were severely damaged; these buildings were typical of wartime mill construction in america and great britain, except that some of the frames were somewhat less substantial. the damage consisted of windows broken out (100 %), steel sashes ripped out or bent, corrugated metal or corrugated asbestos roofs and sidings ripped off, roofs bent or destroyed, roof trusses collapsed, columns bent and cracked and concrete foundations for columns rotated. damage to buildings with structural steel frames was more severe where the buildings received the effect of the blast on their sides than where the blast hit the ends of buildings, because the buildings had more stiffness (resistance to negative moment at the top of columns) in a longitudinal direction. many of the lightly constructed steel frame buildings collapsed completely while some of the heavily constructed (to carry the weight of heavy cranes and loads) were stripped of roof and siding, but the frames were only partially injured .
in estimating the cost of repairing damage to a bridge, the structure was broken down into its component parts; abutments, piers, and superstructure. relative costs for each of these components were then derived for each damaged bridge, and only the destroyed components were considered in estimating the cost of both temporary and permanent repair or replacement. the estimated total cost figure for rebuilding all bridges to their original state rose from about $ 10 million after the first year of bombing to over $ 30 million by the end of the rolling thunder campaign .
the most illuminating perspective, however, comes from top world war ii american military leaders. the conventional wisdom that the atomic bomb saved a million lives is so widespread that … most americans haven’t paused to ponder something rather striking to anyone seriously concerned with the issue: not only did most top u. s. military leaders think the bombings were unnecessary and unjustified, many were morally offended by what they regarded as the unnecessary destruction of japanese cities and what were essentially noncombat populations. moreover, they spoke about it quite openly and publicly .
[ 2 ] peter v. pry, statement before the united states senate subcommittee on terrorism, technology, and homeland security hearing on terrorism and the emp threat to homeland security: “foreign views of electromagnetic pulse (emp) attack, ” march 8, 2005, urltoken. ; min - sek kim and jee - ho yoo, “military source warns of north’s emp bomb” joonang daily, september 2, 2009; daguang li, “north korean electromagnetic attack threatens south korea’s information warfare capabilities” tzu chin, june 1, 2012, 44 - 45 .
as the bombing campaign progressed, policy - makers and high - level presidential advisors started asking the intelligence community to assess the effectiveness of the effort. among the questions posed were those on the status of damaged bridges and north vietnamese countermeasures to bypass the bridges. the secretary of defense specifically wanted to know the number of bridges damaged, the estimated cost of repairing the damage, whether or not the flow of traffic south was being effectively impeded, how quickly the bridges could be restored, and the net impact on logistics capabilities. answering these questions proved to be a knotty problem .
though most americans are unaware of the fact, increasing numbers of historians now recognize the united states did not need to use the atomic bomb to end the war against japan in 1945. moreover, this essential judgment was expressed by the vast majority of top american military leaders in all three services in the years after the war ended: army, navy and army air force. nor was this the judgment of “liberals, ” as is sometimes thought today. in fact, leading conservatives were far more outspoken in challenging the decision as unjustified and immoral than american liberals in the years following world war ii .
as the document concerning marshall’s views suggests, the question of whether the use of the atomic bomb was justified turns … on whether the bombs had to be used against a largely civilian target rather than a strictly military target—which, in fact, was the explicit choice since although there were japanese troops in the cities, neither hiroshima nor nagasaki was deemed militarily vital by u. s. planners. (this is one of the reasons neither had been heavily bombed up to this point in the war .) moreover, targeting [ at hiroshima and nagasaki ] was aimed explicitly on non - military facilities surrounded by workers’ homes .
during his recitation of the relevant facts, i had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so i voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because i thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, i thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save american lives. it was my belief that japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’. the secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude….
bomb damage assessment ( bda ) , also known as battle damage assessment , is the practice of assessing damage inflicted on a target from a stand-off weapon , most typically a bomb or air launched missile . it is part of the larger discipline of combat assessment . assessment is performed using many techniques including footage from in-weapon cameras , gun cameras , forces on the ground near the target , satellite imagery and follow-up visits to the target . preventing information on battle damage reaching the enemy is a key objective of military censorship . for nuclear weapons special techniques may be required due to the extensive damage caused and difficulty in approaching the site . 
bomb damage assessment (bda), also known as battle damage assessment, is the practice of assessing damage inflicted on a target from a stand-off weapon, most typically a bomb or air launched missile. it is part of the larger discipline of combat assessment. assessment is performed using many techniques including footage from in-weapon cameras, gun cameras, forces on the ground near the target, satellite imagery and follow-up visits to the target. preventing information on battle damage reaching the enemy is a key objective of military censorship. for nuclear weapons special techniques may be required due to the extensive damage caused and difficulty in approaching the site.
bomb damage assessment (bda), also known as battle damage assessment, is the practice of assessing damage inflicted on a target from a stand-off weapon, most typically a bomb or air launched missile. it is part of the larger discipline of combat assessment. assessment is performed using many techniques including footage from in-weapon cameras, gun cameras, forces on the ground near the target, satellite imagery and follow-up visits to the target. preventing information on battle damage reaching the enemy is a key objective of military censorship. for nuclear weapons special techniques may be required due to the extensive damage caused and difficulty in approaching the site.