Add dataset card (v0.1)
Browse files
README.md
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
---
|
| 2 |
+
license: cc-by-4.0
|
| 3 |
+
language:
|
| 4 |
+
- en
|
| 5 |
+
pretty_name: Africa TLS Deployment Scan
|
| 6 |
+
tags:
|
| 7 |
+
- africa
|
| 8 |
+
- cryptography
|
| 9 |
+
- post-quantum
|
| 10 |
+
- pqc
|
| 11 |
+
- security
|
| 12 |
+
- harvest-now-decrypt-later
|
| 13 |
+
- tls
|
| 14 |
+
- cybersecurity
|
| 15 |
+
- tls
|
| 16 |
+
- forward-secrecy
|
| 17 |
+
- government
|
| 18 |
+
- web-security
|
| 19 |
+
size_categories:
|
| 20 |
+
- n<1K
|
| 21 |
+
---
|
| 22 |
+
# Africa TLS Deployment Scan
|
| 23 |
+
|
| 24 |
+
*Electric Sheep Africa · Post-Quantum Cryptographic Exposure cluster · dataset DS-1 · v0.1*
|
| 25 |
+
|
| 26 |
+
African digital infrastructure is being recorded by state actors today under the assumption it will be decryptable once quantum computers arrive (2030–2035 per NIST/NCSC/ENISA). This dataset is one dimension of the Africa-specific evidence for that claim.
|
| 27 |
+
|
| 28 |
+
## What this dataset answers
|
| 29 |
+
|
| 30 |
+
What share of African government web infrastructure runs TLS configurations that leave recorded traffic exposed to retroactive (quantum) decryption?
|
| 31 |
+
|
| 32 |
+
## Key findings (v0.1)
|
| 33 |
+
|
| 34 |
+
- 2,708 .gov.ng/.gov.gh hostnames found in CT logs; 1,032 were live.
|
| 35 |
+
- 0% of live government hosts lacked forward secrecy — but classical forward secrecy does NOT protect a recorded session from quantum decryption, because the key exchange in the recording is itself quantum-breakable.
|
| 36 |
+
- 8% of live hosts do not support TLS 1.3 (NG 6%, GH 14%).
|
| 37 |
+
|
| 38 |
+
## Files
|
| 39 |
+
|
| 40 |
+
### `ds1_gov_national.csv` (2708 rows)
|
| 41 |
+
|
| 42 |
+
| Column | Example |
|
| 43 |
+
|---|---|
|
| 44 |
+
| `domain` | 37milhosp.gov.gh |
|
| 45 |
+
| `country_code` | GH |
|
| 46 |
+
| `sector` | government |
|
| 47 |
+
| `status` | ok |
|
| 48 |
+
| `max_tls_version` | 1.3 |
|
| 49 |
+
| `supports_tls13` | True |
|
| 50 |
+
| `accepts_deprecated_tls` | False |
|
| 51 |
+
| `negotiated_cipher` | TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 |
|
| 52 |
+
| `forward_secrecy` | True |
|
| 53 |
+
| `rsa_key_exchange` | False |
|
| 54 |
+
| `quantum_vulnerable_today` | False |
|
| 55 |
+
|
| 56 |
+
### `ds1_tls_posture.csv` (30 rows)
|
| 57 |
+
|
| 58 |
+
| Column | Example |
|
| 59 |
+
|---|---|
|
| 60 |
+
| `domain` | gcbbank.com.gh |
|
| 61 |
+
| `country_code` | GH |
|
| 62 |
+
| `sector` | banking |
|
| 63 |
+
| `status` | ok |
|
| 64 |
+
| `max_tls_version` | 1.3 |
|
| 65 |
+
| `supports_tls13` | True |
|
| 66 |
+
| `accepts_deprecated_tls` | False |
|
| 67 |
+
| `negotiated_cipher` | TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 |
|
| 68 |
+
| `forward_secrecy` | True |
|
| 69 |
+
| `rsa_key_exchange` | False |
|
| 70 |
+
| `quantum_vulnerable_today` | False |
|
| 71 |
+
|
| 72 |
+
## Method
|
| 73 |
+
|
| 74 |
+
Government hostnames were enumerated from Certificate Transparency logs (every certificate ever logged for .gov.ng and .gov.gh), then each live host probed with native TLS handshakes to record supported versions, negotiated cipher, and forward secrecy. ds1_gov_national.csv is the near-census national scan; ds1_tls_posture.csv is a curated 30-institution cross-country set.
|
| 75 |
+
|
| 76 |
+
## Sources
|
| 77 |
+
|
| 78 |
+
crt.sh Certificate Transparency logs; active TLS handshakes (passive observation of publicly reachable endpoints).
|
| 79 |
+
|
| 80 |
+
## Limitations
|
| 81 |
+
|
| 82 |
+
National scan covers Nigeria and Ghana government domains; other countries and the private sector are future work. Hosts behind foreign CDNs report the CDN's TLS, not the origin's (see africa-crypto-algorithm-inventory).
|
| 83 |
+
|
| 84 |
+
## How to cite
|
| 85 |
+
|
| 86 |
+
```
|
| 87 |
+
Electric Sheep Africa (2026). Africa TLS Deployment Scan (africa-tls-deployment-scan). African Cryptographic Exposure & Post-Quantum Risk dataset cluster. Hugging Face. https://huggingface.co/datasets/electricsheepafrica/africa-tls-deployment-scan
|
| 88 |
+
```
|
| 89 |
+
|
| 90 |
+
```bibtex
|
| 91 |
+
@dataset{esa_africa_tls_deployment_scan_2026,
|
| 92 |
+
title = {Africa TLS Deployment Scan},
|
| 93 |
+
author = {Electric Sheep Africa},
|
| 94 |
+
year = {2026},
|
| 95 |
+
publisher = {Hugging Face},
|
| 96 |
+
url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/electricsheepafrica/africa-tls-deployment-scan}
|
| 97 |
+
}
|
| 98 |
+
```
|
| 99 |
+
|
| 100 |
+
## Part of the cluster
|
| 101 |
+
|
| 102 |
+
This is one of eight datasets in the **African Cryptographic Exposure & Post-Quantum Risk** cluster by Electric Sheep Africa. The others cover TLS deployment, certificate-authority dependency, algorithm inventory, submarine cable topology, IXP/routing exposure, the regulatory gap, incident history, and PQC migration cost. See the collection on the [electricsheepafrica](https://huggingface.co/electricsheepafrica) org page.
|
| 103 |
+
|
| 104 |
+
## Methodology & ethics
|
| 105 |
+
|
| 106 |
+
All collection is passive and uses public data, or standard TLS handshakes against publicly reachable endpoints (the same a browser performs). No interception, no exploitation, no private access. Figures are v0.1 and reproducible from the open collector code.
|
| 107 |
+
|