Daily Papers

As the length of input text increases, the key-value (KV) cache in LLMs imposes prohibitive GPU memory costs and limits long-context inference on resource constrained devices. Existing approaches, such as KV quantization and pruning, reduce memory usage but suffer from numerical precision loss or suboptimal retention of key-value pairs. In this work, Low Rank Query and Key attention (LRQK) is introduced, a two-stage framework that jointly decomposes full-precision query and key matrices into compact rank-\(r\) factors during the prefill stage, and then employs these low-dimensional projections to compute proxy attention scores in \(O(lr)\) time at each decode step. By selecting only the top-\(k\) tokens and a small fixed set of recent tokens, LRQK employs a mixed GPU-CPU cache with a hit-and-miss mechanism where only missing full-precision KV pairs are transferred, thereby preserving exact attention outputs while reducing CPU-GPU data movement. Extensive experiments on the RULER and LongBench benchmarks with LLaMA-3-8B and Qwen2.5-7B demonstrate that LRQK matches or surpasses leading sparse-attention methods in long context settings, while delivering significant memory savings with minimal accuracy loss. Our code is available at https://github.com/tenghuilee/LRQK.

Diffusion models have achieved remarkable success as generative models. However, even a well-trained model can accumulate errors throughout the generation process. These errors become particularly problematic when arbitrary guidance is applied to steer samples toward desired properties, which often breaks sample fidelity. In this paper, we propose a general solution to address the off-manifold phenomenon observed in diffusion models. Our approach leverages a time predictor to estimate deviations from the desired data manifold at each timestep, identifying that a larger time gap is associated with reduced generation quality. We then design a novel guidance mechanism, `Temporal Alignment Guidance' (TAG), attracting the samples back to the desired manifold at every timestep during generation. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that TAG consistently produces samples closely aligned with the desired manifold at each timestep, leading to significant improvements in generation quality across various downstream tasks.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Reinforcement learning (RL) plays a crucial role in shaping the behavior of large language and reasoning models (LLMs/LRMs). However, it often produces brittle and unstable policies, leading to critical failures such as spurious reasoning, deceptive alignment, and instruction disobedience that undermine the trustworthiness and safety of LLMs/LRMs. Currently, these issues lack a unified theoretical explanation and are typically addressed using ad-hoc heuristics. This paper presents a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing the stability of the mapping from a reward function to the optimal policy. We show that policy brittleness often stems from non-unique optimal actions, a common occurrence when multiple valid traces exist in a reasoning task. This theoretical lens provides a unified explanation for a range of seemingly disparate failures, reframing them as rational outcomes of optimizing rewards that may be incomplete or noisy, especially in the presence of action degeneracy. We extend this analysis from the fundamental single-reward setting to the more realistic multi-reward RL across diverse domains, showing how stability is governed by an "effective reward" aggregation mechanism. We also prove that entropy regularization restores policy stability at the cost of increased stochasticity. Our framework provides a unified explanation for recent empirical findings on deceptive reasoning, instruction-following trade-offs, and RLHF-induced sophistry, and is further validated through perturbation experiments in multi-reward RL. This work advances policy-stability analysis from empirical heuristics towards a principled theory, offering essential insights for designing safer and more trustworthy AI systems.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Training tool-use agents typically relies on outcome-based filtering: Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on successful trajectories and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on pass-rate-selected tasks. However, this paradigm ignores interaction dynamics: successful trajectories may lack error recovery or exhibit redundancy, while pass rates fail to distinguish structurally informative tasks from trivial ones. We propose TopoCurate, an interaction-aware framework that projects multi-trial rollouts from the same task into a unified semantic quotient topology. By merging equivalent action-observation states, this projection transforms scattered linear trajectories into a structured manifold that explicitly captures how tool invocations and environmental responses drive the divergence between effective strategies and failure modes. Leveraging this representation, we introduce a dual-selection mechanism: for SFT, we prioritize trajectories demonstrating reflective recovery, semantic efficiency, and strategic diversity to mitigate covariate shift and mode collapse; for RL, we select tasks with high error branch ratios and strategic heterogeneity, maximizing gradient Signal-to-Noise Ratio to address vanishing signals in sparse-reward settings. Evaluations on BFCLv3 and Tau2 Bench show that TopoCurate achieves consistent gains of 4.2\% (SFT) and 6.9\% (RL) over state-of-the-art baselines. We will release the code and data soon for further investigations.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

In this paper, we introduce a novel predict-and-optimize method for profit-driven churn prevention. We frame the task of targeting customers for a retention campaign as a regret minimization problem. The main objective is to leverage individual customer lifetime values (CLVs) to ensure that only the most valuable customers are targeted. In contrast, many profit-driven strategies focus on churn probabilities while considering average CLVs. This often results in significant information loss due to data aggregation. Our proposed model aligns with the guidelines of Predict-and-Optimize (PnO) frameworks and can be efficiently solved using stochastic gradient descent methods. Results from 12 churn prediction datasets underscore the effectiveness of our approach, which achieves the best average performance compared to other well-established strategies in terms of average profit.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

Large language models (LLMs) can call tools effectively, yet they remain brittle in multi-turn execution: following a tool call error, smaller models often degenerate into repetitive invalid re-invocations, failing to interpret error feedback and self-correct. This brittleness hinders reliable real-world deployment, where the execution errors are inherently inevitable during tool interaction procedures. We identify a key limitation of current approaches: standard reinforcement learning (RL) treats errors as sparse negative rewards, providing no guidance on how to recover, while pre-collected synthetic error-correction datasets suffer from distribution mismatch with the model's on-policy error modes. To bridge this gap, we propose Fission-GRPO, a framework that converts execution errors into corrective supervision within the RL training loop. Our core mechanism fissions each failed trajectory into a new training instance by augmenting it with diagnostic feedback from a finetuned Error Simulator, then resampling recovery rollouts on-policy. This enables the model to learn from the precise errors it makes during exploration, rather than from static, pre-collected error cases. On the BFCL v4 Multi-Turn, Fission-GRPO improves the error recovery rate of Qwen3-8B by 5.7% absolute, crucially, yielding a 4% overall accuracy gain (42.75% to 46.75%) over GRPO and outperforming specialized tool-use agents.

Although diffusion models (DMs) have shown promising performances in a number of tasks (e.g., speech synthesis and image generation), they might suffer from error propagation because of their sequential structure. However, this is not certain because some sequential models, such as Conditional Random Field (CRF), are free from this problem. To address this issue, we develop a theoretical framework to mathematically formulate error propagation in the architecture of DMs, The framework contains three elements, including modular error, cumulative error, and propagation equation. The modular and cumulative errors are related by the equation, which interprets that DMs are indeed affected by error propagation. Our theoretical study also suggests that the cumulative error is closely related to the generation quality of DMs. Based on this finding, we apply the cumulative error as a regularization term to reduce error propagation. Because the term is computationally intractable, we derive its upper bound and design a bootstrap algorithm to efficiently estimate the bound for optimization. We have conducted extensive experiments on multiple image datasets, showing that our proposed regularization reduces error propagation, significantly improves vanilla DMs, and outperforms previous baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate code with subtle but critical bugs, especially for complex tasks. Existing automated repair methods typically rely on superficial pass/fail signals, offering limited visibility into program behavior and hindering precise error localization. In addition, without a way to learn from prior failures, repair processes often fall into repetitive and inefficient cycles. To overcome these challenges, we present TraceCoder, a collaborative multi-agent framework that emulates the observe-analyze-repair process of human experts. The framework first instruments the code with diagnostic probes to capture fine-grained runtime traces, enabling deep insight into its internal execution. It then conducts causal analysis on these traces to accurately identify the root cause of the failure. This process is further enhanced by a novel Historical Lesson Learning Mechanism (HLLM), which distills insights from prior failed repair attempts to inform subsequent correction strategies and prevent recurrence of similar mistakes. To ensure stable convergence, a Rollback Mechanism enforces that each repair iteration constitutes a strict improvement toward the correct solution. Comprehensive experiments across multiple benchmarks show that TraceCoder achieves up to a 34.43\% relative improvement in Pass@1 accuracy over existing advanced baselines. Ablation studies verify the significance of each system component, with the iterative repair process alone contributing a 65.61\% relative gain in accuracy. Furthermore, TraceCoder significantly outperforms leading iterative methods in terms of both accuracy and cost-efficiency.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is effective for training large language models on deterministic outcome reasoning tasks. Prior work shows RLVR works with few prompts, but prompt selection is often based only on training-accuracy variance, leading to unstable optimization directions and weaker transfer. We revisit prompt selection from a mechanism-level view and argue that an effective minibatch should provide both (i) a reliable positive anchor and (ii) explicit negative learning signals from rare failures. Based on this principle, we propose positive--negative pairing: at each update, we sample a hard-but-solvable q^{+} and an easy-but-brittle prompt q^{-}(high success rate but not perfect), characterized by low and high empirical success rates under multiple rollouts. We further introduce Weighted GRPO, which reweights binary outcomes at the pair level and uses group-normalized advantages to amplify rare successes on q^{+} into sharp positive guidance while turning rare failures on q^{-} into strong negative penalties. This bidirectional signal provides informative learning feedback for both successes and failures, improving sample efficiency without suppressing exploration. On Qwen2.5-Math-7B, a single paired minibatch per update consistently outperforms a GRPO baseline that selects two prompts via commonly used variance-based selection heuristics: AIME~2025 Pass@8 improves from 16.8 to 22.2, and AMC23 Pass@64 from 94.0 to 97.0, while remaining competitive with large-scale RLVR trained from a pool of 1209 training prompts. Similar gains are observed on Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly capable of tackling complex real-world tasks, yet their reliance on inter-agent coordination, tool use, and long-horizon reasoning makes error recognition particularly challenging. Minor errors can propagate across agents, escalating into task failures while producing long, intertwined execution trajectories that impose significant costs for both human developers and automated systems to debug and analyze. Our key insight is that, despite surface differences in failure trajectories (e.g., logs), MAS errors often recur with similar structural patterns. This paper presents CORRECT, the first lightweight, training-free framework that leverages an online cache of distilled error schemata to recognize and transfer knowledge of failure structures across new requests. This cache-based reuse allows LLMs to perform targeted error localization at inference time, avoiding the need for expensive retraining while adapting to dynamic MAS deployments in subseconds. To support rigorous study in this domain, we also introduce CORRECT-Error, a large-scale dataset of over 2,000 annotated trajectories collected through a novel error-injection pipeline guided by real-world distributions, and further validated through human evaluation to ensure alignment with natural failure patterns. Experiments across seven diverse MAS applications show that CORRECT improves step-level error localization up to 19.8% over existing advances while at near-zero overhead, substantially narrowing the gap between automated and human-level error recognition.

Reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT) often suffers from reward over-optimization, where a policy model hacks the reward signals to achieve high scores while producing low-quality outputs. Our theoretical analysis shows that the key lies in reward misspecification at the high-reward tail: the inability to reliably distinguish Excellent responses from merely Great ones. This motivate us to focus on the high-reward region. However, such tail examples are scarce under the base LLM. While off-policy exemplars (e.g. from stronger models or rewrites) are easier to obtain, naively training on them yields a misspecified reward for the policy we aim to align. To address this, we study rubric-based rewards. By design, rubrics can leverage off-policy examples while remaining insensitive to their artifacts. To elicit rubrics that capture the high-reward tail, we highlight the importance of distinguishing among great and diverse responses, and introduce a workflow to implement this idea. We empirically demonstrate that rubric-based rewards substantially mitigate reward over-optimization and deliver effective LLM post-training improvements. Our code can be accessed at https://github.com/Jun-Kai-Zhang/rubrics.git .

A grand challenge in reinforcement learning is intelligent exploration, especially when rewards are sparse or deceptive. Two Atari games serve as benchmarks for such hard-exploration domains: Montezuma's Revenge and Pitfall. On both games, current RL algorithms perform poorly, even those with intrinsic motivation, which is the dominant method to improve performance on hard-exploration domains. To address this shortfall, we introduce a new algorithm called Go-Explore. It exploits the following principles: (1) remember previously visited states, (2) first return to a promising state (without exploration), then explore from it, and (3) solve simulated environments through any available means (including by introducing determinism), then robustify via imitation learning. The combined effect of these principles is a dramatic performance improvement on hard-exploration problems. On Montezuma's Revenge, Go-Explore scores a mean of over 43k points, almost 4 times the previous state of the art. Go-Explore can also harness human-provided domain knowledge and, when augmented with it, scores a mean of over 650k points on Montezuma's Revenge. Its max performance of nearly 18 million surpasses the human world record, meeting even the strictest definition of "superhuman" performance. On Pitfall, Go-Explore with domain knowledge is the first algorithm to score above zero. Its mean score of almost 60k points exceeds expert human performance. Because Go-Explore produces high-performing demonstrations automatically and cheaply, it also outperforms imitation learning work where humans provide solution demonstrations. Go-Explore opens up many new research directions into improving it and weaving its insights into current RL algorithms. It may also enable progress on previously unsolvable hard-exploration problems in many domains, especially those that harness a simulator during training (e.g. robotics).

Recent advancements adopt online reinforcement learning (RL) from LLMs to text-to-image rectified flow diffusion models for reward alignment. The use of group-level rewards successfully aligns the model with the targeted reward. However, it faces challenges including low efficiency, dependency on stochastic samplers, and reward hacking. The problem is that rectified flow models are fundamentally different from LLMs: 1) For efficiency, online image sampling takes much more time and dominates the time of training. 2) For stochasticity, rectified flow is deterministic once the initial noise is fixed. Aiming at these problems and inspired by the effects of group-level rewards from LLMs, we design Group-level Direct Reward Optimization (GDRO). GDRO is a new post-training paradigm for group-level reward alignment that combines the characteristics of rectified flow models. Through rigorous theoretical analysis, we point out that GDRO supports full offline training that saves the large time cost for image rollout sampling. Also, it is diffusion-sampler-independent, which eliminates the need for the ODE-to-SDE approximation to obtain stochasticity. We also empirically study the reward hacking trap that may mislead the evaluation, and involve this factor in the evaluation using a corrected score that not only considers the original evaluation reward but also the trend of reward hacking. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GDRO effectively and efficiently improves the reward score of the diffusion model through group-wise offline optimization across the OCR and GenEval tasks, while demonstrating strong stability and robustness in mitigating reward hacking.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Error Feedback (EF) is a highly popular and immensely effective mechanism for fixing convergence issues which arise in distributed training methods (such as distributed GD or SGD) when these are enhanced with greedy communication compression techniques such as TopK. While EF was proposed almost a decade ago (Seide et al., 2014), and despite concentrated effort by the community to advance the theoretical understanding of this mechanism, there is still a lot to explore. In this work we study a modern form of error feedback called EF21 (Richtarik et al., 2021) which offers the currently best-known theoretical guarantees, under the weakest assumptions, and also works well in practice. In particular, while the theoretical communication complexity of EF21 depends on the quadratic mean of certain smoothness parameters, we improve this dependence to their arithmetic mean, which is always smaller, and can be substantially smaller, especially in heterogeneous data regimes. We take the reader on a journey of our discovery process. Starting with the idea of applying EF21 to an equivalent reformulation of the underlying problem which (unfortunately) requires (often impractical) machine cloning, we continue to the discovery of a new weighted version of EF21 which can (fortunately) be executed without any cloning, and finally circle back to an improved analysis of the original EF21 method. While this development applies to the simplest form of EF21, our approach naturally extends to more elaborate variants involving stochastic gradients and partial participation. Further, our technique improves the best-known theory of EF21 in the rare features regime (Richtarik et al., 2023). Finally, we validate our theoretical findings with suitable experiments.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.